I. Introduction
On 18 November and on 19 November 2014 respectively, the Minister of
Justice of Moldova sent letters to the Venice Commission and to the OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
requesting assistance from both institutions in reviewing the Draft
Law on the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Moldova
(CDL-REF(2014)052), hereinafter the “Draft Law”).
Both OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission confirmed their
willingness to review the draft amendments. On 5-6 February 2015, a
joint delegation of the Venice Commission, DG I and the OSCE/ODIHR
visited Chisinau and held meetings with representatives of the
authorities (the Ministry of Justice, the Parliament, the General
Prosecutor’s Office, the Superior Council of Prosecutors) as well as
professional associations of prosecutors and lawyers and civil
society. The delegation is grateful to the Moldovan authorities and
to other stakeholders met for the excellent co-operation during the
visit.
II. Scope of the opinion
The scope of this Joint Opinion covers only the Draft Law, submitted
for review. Thus limited, the Joint Opinion does not constitute a
full and comprehensive review of the criminal procedure system of
Moldova.
The Joint Opinion raises key issues and provides indications of
areas of concern. In the interests of concision, the Joint Opinion
focuses more on problematic areas rather than on the positive
aspects of the draft amendments. The ensuing recommendations are
based on relevant international human rights and rule of law
standards and OSCE commitments, Council of Europe standards, as well
as good practices from other OSCE participating States and Council
of Europe member states. Where appropriate, they also refer to the
relevant recommendations made in previous OSCE/ODIHR-Venice
Commission opinions.
In view of the above, OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission and DG I
would like to make mention that this Joint Opinion is without
prejudice to any written or oral recommendations or comments on the
respective legal acts or related legislation that OSCE/ODIHR and the
Venice Commission may deliver in the future.
III. International standards
The OSCE/ODIHR, DG I and the Venice Commission have examined the
Draft Law in the light of the standards of the Council of Europe and
of the OSCE that are of relevance to legislation dealing with the
operation of public prosecution services, as well as of existing
good practices in the field, as available in particular in:
- the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) and the
related case law of the European Court of Human Rights;
- OSCE commitments, such as the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, which
provides that “the rules relating to criminal procedure will contain
a clear definition of powers in relation to prosecution and the
measures preceding and accompanying prosecution” and the 2006
Brussels Declaration on Criminal Justice Systems, which states that
“[p]rosecutors should be individuals of integrity and ability, with
appropriate training and qualifications; prosecutors should at all
times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession and
respect the rule of law;” and that “[t]he office of prosecutor
should be strictly separated from judicial functions, and
prosecutors should respect the independence and the impartiality of
judges”.
- Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee of Ministers to member
states on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice
system ;
- Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)11 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on the role of public prosecutors outside the criminal
justice system;
- Recommendation 1604 (2003) on the Role of the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in a Democratic Society Governed by the Rule of Law of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
- the Venice Commission's Report on European Standards as regards
the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II The Prosecution
Service (hereinafter “Report on the Prosecution Service”) and
related Venice Commission opinions;
- the European Guidelines on Ethics and Conduct for Public
Prosecutors (“the Budapest Guidelines”) adopted by the Conference of
Prosecutors General of Europe;
- the Opinion No. 3(2008) of the Consultative Council of European
Prosecutors on 'The Role of Prosecution Services Outside the
Criminal Law Field';
- the Opinion No.12 (2009) of the Consultative Council of European
Judges (CCJE) and Opinion No.4 (2009) of the Consultative Council of
European Prosecutors
IV. Executive summary
At the outset, OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission and DG I welcome
the Draft Law, which represents, overall, a substantial improvement
of the current Law regulating the operation of the Moldovan
Prosecution Service and reflects a genuine effort to modernize the
existing legal framework, in line with relevant European standards
and best practices. It appears to be of good technical and
structural quality, and it deals in detail - although in some cases
in a too detailed manner - with many important aspects of the
functioning of the
The proposed changes concern various steps to secure the autonomy of
individual prosecutors and the service’s own independence from
external influence, the structure of the service and its
demilitarisation, the appointment, tenure and removal of the
Prosecutor General, the appointment and promotion of other
prosecutors, as well as the performance evaluation and the
disciplinary procedures.
It is particularly positive
that the Draft Law proposes a significant reduction of the number of
tasks of the Prosecution Service by specifying that provisions not
related to the prosecution service’s core role, such as its
participation in civil cases and the supervision of the compliance
with the law, will expire within three years from the entry into
force of the Draft Law, thereby providing sufficient time to draft
legislation which will transfer these responsibilities to other
bodies. This will also allow the Prosecution Service to focus on its
core task of criminal prosecution. While it would seem desirable to
consider amending the Constitution to define the competences of the
Prosecution Service more closely and narrowly, a constitutional
amendment does not seem required for the changes envisaged in this
regard by the Draft Law.
The new procedure for the appointment of the Prosecutor General
envisaged by the Draft Law is, in the specific circumstances
prevailing in the Republic of Moldova, clearly preferable to the
current procedure but can, as acknowledged by the Transitional
Provisions, enter into force only once the Constitution has been
amended. This is a further aspect making it desirable to amend the
Constitution.
In addition, the emphasis on the independence and neutrality of the
prosecution service, improved rules on internal independence, the
competitive recruitment of prosecutors and the focus on objective
criteria in their performance evaluation, are significant steps to
ensure a professional and politically independent prosecution
service. Substantial amendments have also been introduced to the
provisions concerning the prosecutorial self-administration bodies.
In particular, the powers of the Superior Council of Prosecutors
have been enhanced.
Key recommendations
The above-mentioned improvements are welcome. The OSCE/ODIHR, the
Venice Commission and DG I, however, suggest the following
improvements to the Draft Law:
A. To provide a more precise and narrow delineation of the powers of
the Prosecution Service outside of criminal law and for judicial
supervision of prosecutors’ actions in this area, including during
the transitional period, and to consider amending the Constitution
with a view to defining the competences of the Prosecution Service
more closely and narrowly;
B. To include more precise provisions on the internal independence
of prosecutors and related safeguards (the requirement that
individual orders from hierarchically superior prosecutors be
reasoned and given in writing, the limitation of the number of
levels of hierarchical control over the prosecutor’s acts, increased
clarity as to the decisional discretion of the prosecutor and who
may change his/ her actions or inactions; more precisely defined
disciplinary offences and increased guarantees for the impartiality
of the disciplinary proceedings);
C. To include a specific mechanism for the dismissal of the
Prosecutor General, distinct from the provisions regulating
dismissal of other prosecutors and based on clear conditions and
criteria;
D. To reconsider the proposed provisions with respect to prosecutors
in the Autonomous Territorial Unit (ATU) of Gagauzia, which are not
compatible with the provisions of organic law on the ATU of Gagauzia.
This is problematic not only since such contradictions within the
applicable legislation have to be avoided in general but also since
any interference with the status of Gagauzia in the current context
raises sensitive issues and would require, if done at all,
appropriate consultation of the competent bodies of Gagauzia;
E. To ensure that the Transitional Provisions provide for the
appropriate harmonization of the provisions of the Draft Law with
those of the Code of Criminal Procedure and any other relevant
legislative provisions.
|
Quick Links |