At the request of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe the Venice Commission examined the above-mentioned law which has been in force since October 2008. This law is based on the premise that Abkhazia and South Ossetia belong to Georgia ; this position has been supported by the Parliamentary Assembly in its Resolution 1647(2009).

Among other things, the law criminalises irregular entry into Abkhazia (Georgia) and South Ossetia (Georgia) without explicit exceptions for emergency situations or for humanitarian aid; it also penalises irregular economic activities in these regions. These provisions, in the opinion of the Commission, should be modified as they risk to limit the access of humanitarian workers and the distribution of humanitarian aid in these occupied territories; as a result, this could adversely affect the well-being of the population.
 
In addition, the law retroactively applies as from 1990; this is in contradiction with the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law and could also infringe the European Convention for Human Rights, even if it is meant to be merely declaratory, as according to the Georgian authorities the legal situation prior to the entry into force of the law was the same.
Under the law the transactions and certificates issued by the authorities of these territories are null and void; the Commission recommends that the Georgian legislation guarantees clearly simplified procedures of recognition of those documents and certificates.
 
Equally, the Commission would recommend that this law contain a provision stating the transitory character of the whole regime set out in this law and that it shall be reviewed periodically taking into account the progress in the settlement of the conflict.
 

In its report on prohibition of political parties in Turkey, adopted during the 78th Plenary Session (13-14 March), the Venice Commission concludes that, when compared to common European practice, the situation in Turkey differs in three important respects:
 
1.       The long list of substantive criteria for the constitutionality of political parties, as laid down in Article 68 (4) of the Constitution and the Law on political parties, go beyond the criteria recognised as legitimate by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Venice Commission.
2.       The procedure for initiating decisions on party prohibition or dissolution makes this initiative more arbitrary and less subject to democratic control, than in other European countries.
3.       The tradition of regularly applying the rules on party closure to an extent that has no parallel in any other European country demonstrates that this is not in effect regarded as an extraordinary measure, but as a structural and operative part of the constitution.
 
The basic problem with the present Turkish legal provisions on party closure is that the general threshold is too low, both for initiating procedures for and for prohibiting or dissolving parties. This is in itself in abstracto deviating from common European democratic standards, and it can easily lead to action in breach of the ECHR, as demonstrated in many Turkish cases before the ECtHR.
 
In conclusion, the Venice Commission is of the opinion that the provisions of Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Law on political parties together form a system which as a whole is incompatible with Article 11 of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR and the criteria adopted in 1999 by the Venice Commission and since endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
 
Consequently, the Venice Commission considers that, although the 2001 constitutional revision was an important step in the right direction, it is still not sufficient to raise the general level of party protection in Turkey to that of the ECHR and the common European democratic standards. Further reform is necessary, both on the substantive and on the procedural side. Resuming the constitutional reform process would be the preferred option for the Venice Commission. Amending specific provisions would be another option.