



Strasbourg, 9 October 2015

CDL(2015)048*

Opinion No. 807 / 2015

Or. Engl.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)

DRAFT REPORT
ON EXCLUSION OF OFFENDERS
FROM PARLIAMENT

on the basis of comments by

Mr Sergio BARTOLE (Substitute Member, Italy)
Mr Oliver KASK (Member, Estonia)
Mr Jorgen Steen SØRENSEN (Member, Denmark)
**Ms Anna GAMPER (Expert of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe, Austria)**

**This document has been classified restricted on the date of issue. Unless the Venice Commission decides otherwise, it will be declassified a year after its issue according to the rules set up in Resolution CM/Res(2001)6 on access to Council of Europe documents.*

CONTENTS

I.	Introduction	3
II.	International standards.....	4
A.	Ineligibility to be elected	4
B.	Loss of mandate.....	6
III.	Overview of national legislation	6
A.	Exclusion from standing for Parliament	6
1.	Regulatory level	6
2.	According to the nature of the offence.....	7
3.	According to the nature of the sentence.....	11
4.	Other restrictions	13
5.	No restriction.....	13
6.	General restrictions or case-by-case decisions?	13
B.	Loss of the parliamentary mandate.....	15
1.	According to the nature of the offence.....	15
2.	According to the nature of the sentence.....	17
3.	When a case of ineligibility arises	21
4.	Other cases	22
5.	Procedural issues	24
IV.	Case study: Italy.....	25
A.	The legal and factual context.....	25
B.	Elements of appreciation	27
V.	Analysis	27
A.	Ineligibility to be elected	28
1.	In general.....	28
2.	Specific cases.....	30
B.	Loss of mandate.....	31
C.	In which kind of legislation and how should the issue be addressed?	31
VI.	Conclusions.....	32

I. Introduction

1. On 23 December 2014, an agreement between the majority and the opposition in Albania took place, putting an end to the boycott of Parliament by the opposition. Among the areas requiring reform, the issue of the exclusion of offenders from Parliament was addressed. This could lead to a legislative reform introducing a new cause of ineligibility to be elected, to be preceded by a public round table involving both the majority and the opposition as well as international experts.

2. On 22 April 2015, the Chairman of the Special Committee to address the issue in the resolution for agreement between the ruling majority and the opposition in the Assembly of the Republic of Albania asked the Venice Commission for co-operation, in addressing the issue of people with criminal records who hold or seek to be elected or appointed to a public office.

3. Before organising specific activities in co-operation with the Albanian authorities, the Council for Democratic Elections and the Venice Commission decided to prepare a report including comparative data on the issue and focusing on access to Parliament. This report was prepared on the basis of comments by Messrs Bartole, Kask and Sørensen, as well as, for information concerning regional parliaments, by Ms Anna Gamper.

4. The question whether persons convicted should be allowed to be Members of Parliament is an issue in many countries, although not very highly discussed at the international level as the number of cases is usually low. Still, as the practices vary, it is of general interest to state the situation in the Venice Commission Member States in order to provide help for countries where the issue gets more attention.

5. In a *first part*, the report will address the issue of the standards applicable in Europe, especially from the point of view of the limitation of the right to be elected, as well as the kind of legislation which is most appropriate.

6. In a *second part*, the present document will make an overview of the legal situation, in the Council of Europe Member States as well as in a few other selected states, concerning the possibility to prevent sentenced people from standing for Parliament, on the one side, and to exclude elected members of Parliament from this body if sentenced, on the other side.

7. Not only constitutional provisions, but also ordinary legislation will be quoted when available, in particular from countries with no or very limited constitutional provisions in the field, such as Finland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom – as well as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, the Republic of Korea and the United States.

8. The report will address rules applied not only to national parliaments, but also to regional parliaments. in the following selected countries: Austria, Belgium,¹ Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The selection has been made in accordance with the fact that these countries do not only have regions with (primary) legislative powers and elected parliaments², but that the constitutional arrangements provide for a predominantly (even though, perhaps, asymmetrically) regionalised design. The survey will not consider Bosnia and Herzegovina due to its rather unique confederal-like structures.

¹ For the purposes of this study, both the parliaments of the Belgian regions and the Belgian linguistic communities will be considered.

² "Regional parliament" is used as a generic term here, notwithstanding the constitutional obstacles in some of the selected countries to apply the term "parliament" to an elected assembly at regional level.

9. A number of national contributions, including practical examples of the application of rules in the field, were received from members of the Venice Commission and will be taken account of in this report.³

10. The report will deal successively with exclusion (of offenders) from standing for Parliament and loss of the parliamentary mandate.

11. In a *third part*, it will address the specific situation in Italy, where legislation was recently changed and practice – in particular concerning the case of a former President of the Council - led to much attention.

12. In a *fourth part*, the report will deal with possible conclusions to be inferred from the standards of the Council of Europe in the field of restrictions to the right to be elected, as well as from the comparative material available.

13. Parliamentary immunity issues are not at stake here. They were addressed in the Report on the Scope and Lifting of Parliamentary Immunities adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th plenary session.⁴

14. *The present report was adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its xxx^t meeting (Venice, xxx2015) and by the Venice Commission at its xxx Plenary Session (Venice, xxx 2015).*

II. International standards

A. Ineligibility to be elected

15. Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Court of Human Rights implies the (active) right to vote as well as the (passive) right to be elected. This was made clear by the European Court of Human Rights.⁵

16. At least the principles and values discussed in ECtHR case-law on the right to vote have to be observed.⁶ “Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates. The exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.

17. Ineligibility must first be based on clear norms of law.⁷ It must pursue a legitimate aim. However, a “wide range of purposes may ... be compatible with Article 3”.⁸

³ Contributions were received from Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Peru, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Ukraine and the USA.

⁴ CDL-AD(2014)011.

⁵ See, for example, ECtHR *Tănase v. Moldova* [GC], 7/08, 27 April 2010, § 154ff; *Ždanoka v. Latvia* [GC], 58278/00, 16 March 2006, § 102; *Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2)* [GC], 74025/01, 6 October 2005, § 57.

⁶ See, for example, the above-mentioned *Hirst (no. 2)* case; *Scoppola (No. 3) v. Italy* [GC], 126/05, 22 May 2012; *Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia*, 11157/04 and 15162/05, 4 July 2013.

⁷ On the conditions for restrictions to the right to stand for elections, see for example *Tănase*, § 154ff.

⁸ *Hirst (no. 2)*, § 74.

18. The principle of proportionality must also be observed. In this respect, the “margin of appreciation is wide” for members states, but it “is not all-embracing”.⁹ It is, of course, this issue which has been most contentious in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court. The proportionality test is the main common European standard to be applied for restrictions on the right to stand in elections or for the loss of mandate.

19. “[T]he Court accepts that stricter requirements may be imposed on the eligibility to stand for election to parliament, as distinguished from voting eligibility”.¹⁰ This assertion was made with a specific reference to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters drafted by the Venice Commission. The case-law concerning the right to vote may therefore not always apply automatically to the problem of ineligibility, especially when applying the proportionality test to the restrictions. So the margin is even wider when it comes to ineligibility than to deprivation of the right to vote. However, a rule under which any person with a criminal conviction would be ineligible would not be in compliance with Article 3.

20. According to the Court, the disenfranchisement of a person barred from public office as an ancillary penalty pursues the legitimate aim of the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic regime.¹¹ Leaving the right to vote to individuals who infringed the standards of conduct in a democratic society is less dangerous for democracy than letting them exercise political power, and this justifies the wider margin of appreciation given to the states.

21. Moreover, “the Contracting States may decide either to leave it to the courts to determine the proportionality of a measure restricting convicted prisoners’ voting rights, or to incorporate provisions into their laws defining the circumstances in which such a measure should be applied. In this latter case, it will be for the legislature itself to balance the competing interests in order to avoid any general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction”.¹²

22. The independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of the Rule of Law. Criminal procedures may be abused by the authorities in order to set opponents aside. This would go against Article 18 ECHR, according to which “[T]he restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed”.¹³

23. The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters drafted by the Venice Commission provides for somewhat more detailed standards.¹⁴

- i. provision may be made for depriving individuals of their right to vote and to be elected, but only subject to the following cumulative conditions:
- ii. it must be provided for by law;
- iii. the proportionality principle must be observed; conditions for depriving individuals of the right to stand for election may be less strict than for disenfranchising them;
- iv. the deprivation must be based on mental incapacity or a criminal conviction for a serious offence;

⁹ *Hirst (no. 2)*, § 82.

¹⁰ *Melnichenko v. Ukraine*, 17707/02, 19 October 2004, § 57; cf. *Paksas v. Lithuania* [GC], 34932/04, 6 January 2011, § 96.

¹¹ *M.D.U. v. Italy (dec.)*, 58540/00, 28 January 2003.

¹² *Scoppola (No. 3) v. Italy*, 126/05, 22 May 2012, § 96.

¹³ On politically motivated prosecution, see e.g. ECtHR *Lutsenko v. Ukraine*, 6492/11, 3 July 2012, § 104-110; *Tymoshenko v. Ukraine*, 49872/11, 30 April 2013, § 294-301; *Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan*, 15172/13, 22 May 2014, § 137-144.

¹⁴ CDL-AD(2002)023rev, I.1.1.d.

v. furthermore, the withdrawal of political rights or finding of mental incapacity may only be imposed by express decision of a court of law.”

24. Following the recent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the just mentioned paragraph I.1.1.d.v of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters should not be taken literally, as imposing a specific judgment in each case.

25. The Venice Commission also stated that “[i]t is not uncommon that due to a criminal conviction for a serious offence, individuals are deprived of the right to stand for election. However, it can be regarded as problematic if the passive right of suffrage is denied on the basis of any conviction, regardless of the nature of the underlying offence. Such a blanket prohibition might not be in line with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[...] On the other hand, it might be not appropriate not to include (or not to implement) any restriction to eligibility to be elected for criminals at all[...]”.¹⁵

26. A more thorough study on restrictions to stand in local elections has been carried out by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe¹⁶ but differences with law applicable to parliamentary elections are not unacceptable, as Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR is not applicable to these elections.

27. The Congress recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite the governments of member States to review their domestic legislation with regard to local and regional elections, in order to ensure that those countries that currently apply an automatic ban on standing for election following certain criminal convictions, review their legislation in order that any decision of ineligibility require a specific judicial decision of limited duration, and proportionate to the seriousness of the offence committed, in conformity with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.¹⁷

B. Loss of mandate

28. The passive aspect of Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights is not limited to the right to be elected *stricto sensu*. Incompatibilities between a seat in Parliament and, in the case under consideration, dual citizenship, were also considered as a violation of this provision.¹⁸ It can be inferred from this case-law that the loss of a mandate after taking office could infringe the right to free elections.

29. This implies that such termination should be based on clear norms of law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate.

III. Overview of national legislation

A. Exclusion from standing for Parliament

1. Regulatory level

30. The majority of constitutions of Council of Europe Member States do not provide for explicit constitutional provisions concerning parliamentary candidates. Several countries

¹⁵ CDL-AD(2006)018, paragraphs 78-79, with a reference to the Opinion on the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Ukraine, CDL-AD(2006)002, paras 16 and 100.

¹⁶ Criteria for standing in local and regional elections (CG/2015(28)7PROV), paras 72-97.

¹⁷ Recommendation 375 (2015) of the Congress, paragraph 19(vi).

¹⁸ *Tănase v. Moldova* [GC], 7/08, 27 April 2010.

such as Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Moldova, Monaco, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,¹⁹ Spain,²⁰ and Switzerland, state that cases of non-eligibility and incompatibility with an office of members of Parliament (MPs) should be determined by law. Nonetheless, about one third of the Council of Europe countries have more detailed constitutional provisions concerning parliamentary candidates. These provisions set forth various restrictions that prevent convicted persons from running for elections. It may already be underlined at this stage that none of the countries under consideration addresses as such the issue of convictions taking place abroad.

31. In the federal and regionalised (European) states examined, the issue of the restriction of the right to be elected in the Parliaments of the federate or regional entities lies in general in the competence of the Central State. Some of the federal and regional states under consideration regulate the issue at central level (**Belgium, Russia, United Kingdom**), albeit Belgium and the United Kingdom have adopted different pieces of legislation for the various parliaments. In **Spain**, even if regional electoral law provides for ineligibilities, they do not do more than referring to the sanctions provided by state law. In **Italy**, the regions are recognised competences in the field of ineligibility in accordance with the fundamental principles provided for by a law of the state (and some specific provisions apply to the regions with special status), but regional laws do not go beyond national legislation. Even if the **Swiss** Constitution states that the cantons are competent to regulate the exercise of political rights at cantonal level,²¹ it is doubtful that this would enable cantons to provide for a sanction that has expressly been removed from the Penal Code; at any rate, no canton has introduced it. In **Germany** too, the federate states (Länder) are competent to enact legislation on their parliamentary elections; however, their legislation (and in some cases their constitution), while mentioning restrictions “by reason of a court’s judgment”, refers, in practice, to federal legislation. In **Austria**, the Länder have the competence to introduce restrictions, but they “may not impose more stringent conditions for suffrage and electoral eligibility than does the Federal Constitution for elections to the National Council”.²² In practice, those restrictions are almost identical and closely resemble the respective provisions of the ordinary federal law on the National Council’s election. In general, the relevant rules are entrenched in ordinary legislation or in special (non-constitutional) legislation (Belgium, except for the parliament of the German-speaking community for which ordinary legislation applies; Spain – organic law -). The general absence of substantive infra-state legislation may be linked to the fact that criminal law is a competence of the central state in all the countries concerned.

2. According to the nature of the offence

32. For clarity’s sake, legal orders may be divided into a few categories when addressing the issue of ineligibility to be elected due to criminal sentences for candidates for Parliament. It is possible to distinguish countries in which ineligibility is based on the nature of the offence from those where the nature of the sanction is decisive.

a. Concerning the nature of the offence, a number of countries provide for ineligibility to be elected for:

- Electoral offences

¹⁹ However, in case of Slovenia, even if Paragraph 2 of Article 82 of the Constitution provides that the eligibility of persons to be elected as PMs “shall be regulated by statute”, such a legal provision was never adopted after the adoption of the Constitution in 1991.

²⁰ However, Article 70 of the Constitution provides for causes of ineligibility which do not concern offenders.

²¹ Constitution of Switzerland, Article 39.

²² Constitution of Austria, Article 95.2.

33. In **Cyprus**²³, **France**, **Malta**,²⁴ the **Netherlands** and the **United Kingdom** (corrupt or illegal practices) legislation provides for prohibition to run for elections when the candidate has committed an electoral offence. Namely, in Cyprus, the Constitution provides that a citizen can be disqualified from candidacy to parliamentary elections “by a competent court for any electoral offence”.²⁵ In the same way, in Malta the persons convicted of any “offences connected with the election of members of the House of Representatives” shall be disqualified from being elected.²⁶ In **France**, such limitation is provided by Article L45-1 of the Electoral Code, which states that a person declared ineligible by an administrative court judgment or another judgment²⁷ cannot become a parliamentary candidate. The French Electoral Code provides for similar sanctions in case of false electoral campaign accounts.²⁸

34. In the **Republic of Korea**, under the Constitution and the current law, a person who committed an offence linked to elections or the exercise of a public mandate can be excluded from standing for Parliament. This includes persons who committed an election crime; a crime provided for in the provisions of Articles 45 and 49 of the Political Fund Act; as well as crimes in connection with the duties while in office as President, member of the National Assembly, member of a local council, and head of local government.²⁹ The ineligibility to be elected applies: during ten years after the end of execution of an imprisonment sentence (or an exemption from its execution); during ten years too after a suspended sentence became final; during five years after the sentence to a fine exceeding one million won became final.

- *Selected offences*

35. In **Cyprus**,³⁰ **Denmark**,³¹ **Iceland**³² and **Turkey**,³³ citizens who have been convicted for an offence involving moral values such as honesty, worthiness, honour and reputation cannot be candidates to Parliament. The Constitution of Turkey excludes eligibility to be elected of persons guilty of financial crimes (“embezzlement, corruption, bribery, theft, fraud, forgery, breach of trust, bankruptcy”), of crimes against the state (“smuggling, conspiracy in official bidding or purchasing, offences related to the disclosure of state secrets, involvement in acts of terrorism), or incitement and encouragement of such activities, even if they have been pardoned.³⁴ The Constitution of Malta adds bankruptcy to the offences which would prevent a person from becoming a parliamentary candidate. Denmark prevents a person from being candidate to Parliament if he/she committed any “act which in the eyes of the public makes him/her unworthy to be a MP”³⁵.

36. In **Iceland**, Act No. 24 from 16 May 2000 Concerning Parliamentary Elections to the Althing provides that a person who does not possess his or her full civil rights cannot stand for Parliament.³⁶ Additionally, Iceland goes further by providing that an “unblemished

²³ Constitution of Cyprus, Article 64c.

²⁴ Constitution of Malta, Article 54.

²⁵ Constitution of Cyprus, Article 64c.

²⁶ Constitution of Malta, Article 54.

²⁷ Under Articles L118-3 and L118-4. The same provisions apply for judgments under Articles LO 136-1 and LO 136-6.

²⁸ Articles L118-3, LO136-1 and LO136-3.

²⁹ Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act and Article 3 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment.

³⁰ Constitution of Cyprus, Article 64c.

³¹ Constitution of Denmark, Article 30.

³² Constitution of Iceland, Article 34.

³³ Constitution of Turkey, Article 76.

³⁴ Constitution of Turkey, Article 76.

³⁵ Constitution of Denmark, Article 30. For more details, see Article 4 of the Parliamentary Election Act.

³⁶ Act No. 24 from 16 May 2000 Concerning Parliamentary Elections to the Althing states on the right to vote and eligibility in Article 5.

reputation” is needed to run for elections.³⁷ Article 5 of Act No. 24/2000 on Parliamentary Elections clarifies when a conviction for a punishable offence results in a blemished reputation involving the loss of full civil rights. An individual who has been convicted by a court of law for committing an act that is considered heinous by public opinion is no longer considered a having “unblemished reputation”.³⁸ Article 5(2) subsequently explains when an act is considered heinous by public opinion, i.e. the defendant in a criminal case must have reached the age of 18 when the offence was committed and the resulting sentence must have been at least four years of prison without probation. The same goes for someone who is placed under security measures after not being sentenced due to insanity.³⁹ On the contrary, an individual who is convicted to a sentence of 3 months with a period of conditional suspension of two years is not considered to have “blemished” reputation and is eligible to be elected to the Althingi.

37. According to the **Russian** Federal Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in a Referendum,⁴⁰ which is also applicable at the level of the subjects of the Russian Federation, citizens sentenced to imprisonment for severe crimes, citizens convicted for extremist crimes as envisaged in the Russian Criminal Code or citizens subjected to certain administrative penalties will be ineligible, unless the conviction has been withdrawn or spent; as already said, persons convicted by courts for certain offences under the said Federal Law itself are also ineligible. Moreover, if a convicted candidate has not yet completed his/her sentence, the information about the conviction must be indicated in his/her application and the notice-boards at the polling stations shall display information about the candidate’s convictions.⁴¹

38. In **Canada**, the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act provide for ineligibility criteria. Under section 65 of the Canada Elections Act, a person convicted of a corrupt or illegal practice within the previous five years or a person currently serving a prison term cannot be a candidate to parliamentary elections. Section 502 of the Canada Elections Act provides a list of offences and clarifies for how long the person is disqualified.

39. A provision of analogous nature may be found in **Turkey**. Persons convicted of “smuggling, conspiracy, [...] disclosure of state secrets, of involvement in acts of terrorism, or incitement and encouragement of such activities [...], even if they have been pardoned”⁴² may not run for the elections.

40. In the **Netherlands**, the Criminal Code also provides rules for the additional penalty of deprivation of rights, including the right to be elected.⁴³ This additional penalty can only be attached to conviction and punishment of specific crimes, named in the law. They are mainly situated in Title I (Crimes against the security of the state) and Part XXVIII (Offences committed while in office) of the Criminal Code.⁴⁴ In addition, in the case of the offences described in the articles Z1, Z2 and Z3 of the Elections Act, if an individual is sentenced and imprisoned for at least one year, he or she can be deprived of the right to vote. The

³⁷ Constitution of Iceland, Article 34; Article 4 of the Act No. 24/2000 on Parliamentary Elections.

³⁸ Act No. 24 from 16 May 2000 Concerning Parliamentary Elections to the Althing deals with the right to vote and eligibility in Article 5. Additionally, the rules on restoration of civil rights are in provisions 84 and 85 of the Icelandic Penal Code No. 29/1940.

³⁹ See Article 15 and 62 of the Icelandic Penal Code No. 19/1940. This applies to persons who were, at the time an act was committed, totally unable to control their actions on account of mental disease, retardation or deterioration, or on account of impaired consciousness or other similar condition

⁴⁰ Article 4 paragraph 3.2.

⁴¹ Article 33 paragraph 2.1 and 61 paragraph 4 of the Law.

⁴² Constitution of Turkey, Article 76.

⁴³ Article 28 paragraph 1.

⁴⁴ more specifically the articles 92-103, 105, 108- 112, 115, 116, 121-124, 129, 355-357 (Sr).

deprivation of the right to vote and to be elected has been applied on a large scale after World War II to members of the *Nationalist Social Movement* (NSB). The latest information from the Electoral Council shows that some of these people are still alive. Since the deprivation of the right to vote was for life, they are still not able to stand as a candidate or vote.

41. Furthermore, as political parties are considered to be private organisations and should take the form of an association, they can be prohibited under Article 2:20 of the Dutch Civil Code. Article 140 of the Criminal Code stipulates that it is a crime to continue the work of an organisation that is prohibited and dissolved by a court. If it is proven that a candidate is attempting to continue the activities or the political programme of a previously banned political party, it is possible to use this provision to prosecute the candidates or leaders of this party individually. Two parties were banned and declared dissolved under the Decree on dissolution of treacherous organisations. This decision was taken by the Dutch government in exile in London. In 1944, the NSB and its related and other Nazi and fascist organisations were banned. The decision also stated that all organisations that aimed to continue the efforts of one or more of these organisations to seek conflict within the Dutch society should be regarded as associations against public order. Under this provision the National European Social Movement was also banned in 1953. In 1978, the Nederlandse Volksunie was prohibited, because of its racist nature and its resort to violent means to reach its goal. Its founder tried to participate in the next election under a different party name (lijst Glimmerveen), but was prohibited to do so in certain regions of the country. This is the only instance where a candidate was refused the right to run for elections based on the prohibition of a party of which he was the leader. On 18 November 1998, the Amsterdam District court banned and dissolved the CP'86, another right wing party that often used racial languages and motivated its followers to use violence against foreigners.

- *Offences in general*

42. In **Latvia**, the Saeima Election Law of 25 May 1995 provides that persons are not to be included in the lists of candidates and are not eligible to be elected to the Saeima (Parliament) if they have been convicted of an intentionally committed criminal offence - except in cases when they have been rehabilitated or their conviction has been expunged or vacated.⁴⁵

43. Some countries provide for more general provisions. In **Albania**, "convicts who are serving a prison sentence have only the right to vote" so no right to be elected.⁴⁶

44. In **Israel**, a person who was convicted of committing an offence is ineligible to be a candidate for 7 years under Article 6(1) of the Basic-Law.

45. In **Peru**, a person who has criminal records cannot be elected MP.

46. In **Chile**, according to the Constitution, the status of Chilean citizen⁴⁷ grants voting rights and the right to be elected. It is lost "due to a felony crime sentence"⁴⁸ or "due to a sentence for crimes that the law defines as terrorist behaviour and those related to drug trafficking, and that have, also, earned felony sentence".⁴⁹ Therefore, if the status of citizen is lost or the

⁴⁵ The Saeima Election Law of 25 May 1995, Article 5.

⁴⁶ Constitution of Albania, Article 45(3).

⁴⁷ Constitution of Chile, Article 13.

⁴⁸ They shall recover it in accordance with the law once their criminal liability has expired.

⁴⁹ Constitution of Chile, Article 17. Those concerned may request their reinstatement to the Senate after serving their sentence.

right to vote of a citizen is suspended a person cannot be eligible for Parliament nor keep his or her seat in the legislative body.

47. In **Mexico**, according to Article 38 of the Constitution, citizens' rights and prerogatives can be suspended in the following cases:

I. [...].

II. If the person is on trial for a crime which deserves physical punishment. In such a case the trial counts from the date the detention order was issued.

III. If the person is serving time in prison.

IV. [...]

V. If the person is a fugitive, from the moment in which the detention order has been issued to the moment when prosecution has expired.

VI. As a result of a sentence.

The law shall define the ways in which citizens' rights will be revoked or suspended, as well as the recovery procedures."

48. Moreover, Article 46 of the Federal Criminal Code establishes that when a jail sentence is issued, a suspension of political rights follows, starting when the sentence is executed and during the whole period of the imprisonment.

49. Mexican law therefore admits deprivation from the right to be elected not only after a criminal sentence has been handed down but also in case pre-trial detention was ordered. The interpretation of Article 38.II of the Constitution on the issue led to controversies inside the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which were concluded by decision 33/2011, which stated that the right to vote is suspended after the formal order of imprisonment or of indictment, only when the person on trial is effectively deprived of liberty. A decision on this line had already been taken in the case of Martín Orozco Sandoval, where the Electoral Tribunal considered that, since this person had been released on bail and had not been sentenced to prison, his political rights were untouched and he had the right to run for office.⁵⁰ In the case of Pedraza Longi, the Electoral Tribunal had stated that since he was entitled to bail, his political rights had not to be suspended.⁵¹

3. According to the nature of the sentence

50. Most often, ineligibility to be elected also depends on the nature of the sentence pronounced (imprisonment), possibly combined with the nature of the offence.

51. In **Armenia**,⁵² **Austria** (at national and Länder level),⁵³ **Azerbaijan**,⁵⁴ **Bulgaria**,⁵⁵ **Latvia**,⁵⁶ **Lithuania**,⁵⁷ **Luxembourg**,⁵⁸ **Montenegro**,⁵⁹ **the Netherlands**,⁶⁰ **Poland**,⁶¹ **Turkey**,⁶² **Slovakia**⁶³ and **Ukraine**,⁶⁴ a citizen convicted to a prison sentence cannot be a

⁵⁰ <http://portal.te.gob.mx/coleccion/sentencias/html/SUP/2010/JDC/SUP-JDC-00098-2010.htm>.

⁵¹ <http://portal.te.gob.mx/coleccion/sentencias/html/SUP/2007/JDC/SUP-JDC-00085-2007.htm>.

⁵² Constitution of Armenia, Article 30.

⁵³ Constitution of Austria, Article 26 paragraph 5, which does not state that this applies to every sentence, so ordinary legislation has limited this sanction to convictions to more than one year imprisonment

⁵⁴ Constitution of Azerbaijan, Article 85.

⁵⁵ Constitution of Bulgaria, Article 65.

⁵⁶ The Saeima Election Law of 25 May 1995, Article 5.

⁵⁷ Constitution of Lithuania, Article 56.

⁵⁸ Constitution of Luxembourg, Article 53 paragraph 1.

⁵⁹ Constitution of Montenegro, Article 87.

⁶⁰ The Criminal Code (Sr), Article 28(1) provides rules for the additional penalty of deprivation of rights.

⁶¹ Constitution of Poland, Article 99 paragraph 3.

⁶² Constitution of Turkey, Article 76.

⁶³ Act on election to the National Council of the Slovak Republic (no. 333/2004 Collection of Laws).

parliamentary candidate (only when serving his or her sentence in the case of Armenia). In **Luxembourg** and **Ukraine**, the Constitutions specify that the above mentioned prohibition concerns convictions for crimes only. In **Azerbaijan**, persons convicted of *serious* crimes may not be elected as deputies of the Milli Majlis.⁶⁵ In **Malta**,⁶⁶ a person cannot become a parliamentary candidate if he/she is serving a sentence of imprisonment exceeding twelve months. It should be noted that sentences that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as separate sentences if none of them exceeds twelve months, but if any one of them exceeds that term they shall be regarded as one sentence.

52. In **Spain**, persons sentenced to imprisonment by a final court's decision are ineligible for the term of their conviction. However, persons convicted for rebellion, terrorism or other offences against public administration are ineligible even if the judgment is not final. In such cases, the judgment must specifically establish the penalty of deprivation of the right to be elected or the penalty of disqualification from public office.⁶⁷

53. In **Germany**, the Criminal Code automatically imposes the prohibition to stand in public elections in case of a conviction for a felony to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year; this accessory penalty lasts five years and it begins to run when the term of imprisonment was served. When the judge pronounces a sentence of less than one year, he or she may pronounce the deprivation of the right to be elected as an accessory penalty only for specific offences; the judge decides about the length of this accessory penalty, which must be between two and five years.⁶⁸

54. In addition, the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG) empower the Federal Constitutional Court to deny a person its right to be elected in case of forfeiture of basic rights.⁶⁹ Persons may forfeit their basic rights if they abuse the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press, the freedom of teaching, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of association, the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications, the rights of property, or the right of asylum in order to combat the free democratic basic order.⁷⁰ There is no decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht known in which the Court has ever used this competence.

55. In **Poland**, not only the prison sentence but any "deprivation of liberty" as well will prevent a person from becoming a parliamentary candidate.

56. In this country, like in **Turkey and Ukraine**, only deprivation of liberty concerning intentional offences will be taken into account.

57. In the **United Kingdom**, persons serving a prison sentence for more than one year cannot be elected for the time of pursuance of the sentence, under the Representation of the People Act (including to devolved assemblies).

58. In **Romania**, the Criminal Code provides for deprivation of electoral rights as an ancillary punishment, pursuant to Articles 54 and 55 in conjunction with Articles 65 and 66 and with the Criminal Code. According to Article 54 of the Criminal Code, „An ancillary

⁶⁴ Constitution of Ukraine, Article 76.

⁶⁵ Constitution of Azerbaijan, Article 85(2).

⁶⁶ Constitution of Malta, Article 54.

⁶⁷ Art. 6.2.b) Organic Law 5/1985 on the General Electoral System.

⁶⁸ German Criminal Code, § 45 and 45a.

⁶⁹ Article 39 para. 2 BVerfGG.

⁷⁰ Article 18 Grundgesetz.

punishment consists in the deprivation of certain rights, from the date when the sentence is final until the punishment by deprivation of liberty is executed or considered as executed.”⁷¹

59. In **Australia**, a person convicted and under sentence or subject to be sentenced⁷² for an offence punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer is disqualified from standing for elections.⁷³

60. The situation in **Italy** will be studied more in detail below.⁷⁴

4. Other restrictions

61. No constitutional provision concerning persons being prosecuted but not convicted exists in the constitutions of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe. On the contrary, in **Australia**, a person subject to be sentenced for an offence punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer is disqualified to stand for elections.

62. There is yet another possibility to regulate the right to stand for election for convicted persons. It is possible to allow them to take part in elections with an obligation to declare publicly the information on conviction, e.g. by adding to posters a sentence on the conviction. This is the case in **Lithuania** for previous convictions already served.⁷⁵

5. No or very limited restriction

63. On the contrary, in the **United States**, “indictment for or conviction of a felony offense is not a constitutional bar to be elected or re-elected a Member of Congress, other than a conviction for treasonous conduct after having taken an oath of office [...] The [disqualifications] to serve in Congress were intentionally kept at a minimum by the framers of the Constitution to allow the people broad discretion to send whom they wish to represent them...”⁷⁶

64. In **Finland**, offences do not lead to ineligibility any more, since the amendment of the Criminal Code of 1995. Nor do they in the **Czech Republic**, **Slovenia**, **Sweden** and **Switzerland** (since 2007).

6. General restrictions or case-by-case decisions?

65. In case the right to stand for elections is restricted, two main types of systems are used: 1) the restriction is provided for in a general manner by law, stipulating the conviction, type of sentence or offence which leads to the deprivation of the right to be elected; 2) the restriction is decided by a court as a punishment on a case-by-case basis.

66. 1) The first category (automatic deprivation of the right to be elected) includes an important number of countries. Such automatic deprivation is in general provided for in the Constitution or in electoral legislation.

⁷¹ Article 54 of the Criminal Code (Sr), to be read in conjunction with Articles 55, 65 and 66.

⁷² See below ch. III.A.4.

⁷³ Transparency International's study

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/ineligibilities_arising_from_criminal_law_decisions

⁷⁴ Ch. IV.

⁷⁵ Election Code of Lithuania, Article 98(3).

⁷⁶ Congressional Research Service – Status of a Senator Who has been Indicted for or Convicted of a Felony, <https://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL34716.pdf>, p. 7-8; see also Status of a Member of the House Who has been Indicted for or Convicted of a Felony, <https://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL33229.pdf>, p. 5-6 (both texts were drafted by Jack Maskell).

67. In some countries (A), the restriction applies when the sentence is served or beforehand, but in most of them (B) it goes beyond, often for a long time.

68. (A) In **Lithuania**, persons who have not fulfilled punishment imposed by a court judgment may not stand as candidates in elections.⁷⁷ The same applies to persons who have been impeached.⁷⁸

69. In “**the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**”, a person does not have the right to be elected if he or she has been sentenced by a final court decision to unconditional imprisonment for more than six months and the sentence has not been enforced, or if he or she is serving an imprisonment sentence for a criminal offence.⁷⁹ Since the first democratic parliamentary elections (1990), there has been one case of exclusion from standing for Parliament on account of a criminal accusation. Namely, in 2004, a MP from VMRO/DPMNE was accused of war crime during the 2001 conflict, when he was Minister of Interior. He was released after his trial before the Court in The Hague.

70. The **Albanian** Constitution also provides that “[c]onvicts who are serving a prison sentence have only the right to vote”,⁸⁰ and are therefore ineligible.

71. (B) The other countries under consideration provide for ineligibility to go beyond the execution of the sentence. For example, in **Estonia**, Article 58 of the Constitution⁸¹ leaves it open to the legislation to decide on the ban to take part in elections (including the right to stand in elections) for persons convicted for a crime and sentenced to imprisonment. The law does not leave any margin of appreciation: the *Riigikogu* Election Act⁸² provides for a general ban, irrespective of the crime committed or the length of imprisonment.⁸³

72. In **Kyrgyzstan**, persons who are being held in places of confinement, as well as persons whose previous convictions have not been cancelled, have no right to be elected.⁸⁴

73. In **Moldova**, individuals who are sentenced to prison (deprivation of liberty) by a final court decision and who serve their sentence in a penitentiary institution, as well as individuals who have active criminal records for deliberately committing crimes, are denied the right to stand as a candidate in elections.⁸⁵

74. In **Greece**, the Constitution⁸⁶ provides that persons deprived of their civic rights following an irrevocable criminal conviction are denied the right to vote and to be elected. Although in custody in view of their then forthcoming trial, the leaders of “Golden Dawn”, an extremist pro-Nazi party, were able to be re-elected in the last election of 25 January 2015, because they had not yet been convicted. Former dictator George Papadopoulos and numerous members of his government were unable to run for Parliament after Greece’s return to democracy, because, in 1975, they had been deprived of their civic rights for life.

⁷⁷ Art 56(2) of the Constitution; Article 2(3) of the Election Code.

⁷⁸ Election Code, Art 2(4).

⁷⁹ Election code, Article 7(3).

⁸⁰ Article 45(3) of the Constitution.

⁸¹ <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/rhvv/act/530102013003/consolide>.

⁸² <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/520012015018/consolide>, Article 4(6).

⁸³ No court practice on the matter is available.

⁸⁴ Election Code, Art 3(3) and 3(4).

⁸⁵ Electoral Code, Article 13(2)c.

⁸⁶ Article 51 paragraph 3.

75. In **Iceland**, Article 5 of Election Law provides that persons who have been convicted by a court of law for committing an act that is considered heinous by public opinion, are automatically deprived (*inter alia*) of the right to be elected.⁸⁷

76. In **Turkey**, persons sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year (with the exception of conviction for negligence) are ineligible to stand for election, as well as persons convicted of specific serious criminal offences listed in the law.

77. A similar restriction also exists in **Armenia**⁸⁸. In **Germany**, as already said, the criminal code provides that they automatic deprivation of the right to be elected is applied in the case of a conviction for a felony to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year.⁸⁹

78. 2) On the contrary, several countries provide for a *specific judicial decision to be made* concerning the deprivation of the right to be elected. This decision is based on criminal legislation. That is the case in **Germany** for sentences to less than one year imprisonment.⁹⁰ In the **Netherlands**, to be eligible for Parliament, a candidate must not have been disqualified from voting,⁹¹ which can be the result of a judicial sentence.⁹² The same rule exists in **Luxembourg** for persons sentenced for minor offences. In **France**, the Constitutional Council repealed the law that automatically added to a number of convictions a ban to be registered on electoral lists, leading to ineligibility. This prohibition is still possible but must always be decided by a court, on the basis of the constitutional principle of necessity and individualisation of sentences.⁹³ The legislation of the **Republic of Korea** provides that the eligibility of a person is suspended or forfeited according to a decision by court or pursuant to other Acts.⁹⁴ In **Moldova**, while electoral law deprives those who were sentenced for deliberately committing crimes from the right to stand as candidate as long as they have active criminal records, the judge can also impose as an ancillary punishment, on the basis of the Penal Code,⁹⁵ the interdiction to hold some positions for a term from 1 to 5 years and, in cases expressly provided in the special part of the Penal Code, for a term from 1 to 15 years. Legislation can therefore combine automatic deprivation and case-by-case decisions.

B. Loss of the parliamentary mandate

79. More than 40 % of Council of Europe Member States⁹⁶ have constitutional provisions regarding the loss of MP mandates; others deal with the issue at legislative level. The study of other legislative acts of selected countries has revealed additional useful information on the issue. Moreover, grounds concerning the loss of parliamentary mandates may vary, but can again depend on the nature of the offence or the nature of the sentence. In other countries, they will apply in the same situations as ineligibility to be elected. This will be addressed below, including cases which do not (fully) fall into the mentioned categories.

1. According to the nature of the offence

a. Electoral offences

⁸⁷ See above ch. III.A.2.

⁸⁸ Article 2(3) of the Electoral Code

⁸⁹ Other examples are given under III.A.2-3.

⁹⁰ Article 18(1) of the Federal Election Law.

⁹¹ Constitution of the Netherlands, Article 56.

⁹² Constitution of the Netherlands, Article 54.2.

⁹³ QPC 6/7 2010 - 11 June 2010.

⁹⁴ The Public Official Election Act, Articles 18, 19 and 264.

⁹⁵ Article 65.

⁹⁶ Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Turkey, Ukraine.

80. In **Cyprus**⁹⁷, **Finland**⁹⁸ and **Malta**⁹⁹, a MP loses his/her mandate if he/she is convicted for an electoral offence. In **Italy**, Act no. 175/2010 has introduced a new ground for ineligibility: electoral offences. In **France**, the Electoral Code¹⁰⁰ provides for offences relating to campaigns and voting operations that result in the forfeiture of (active and passive) civic rights. Ineligibility leads to a declaration of automatic resignation. This is also the case when the Constitutional Council sanctions non-compliance with provisions relating to the financing of election campaigns. Ineligibility is then limited to three years.

81. In the **Republic of Korea**, under the Constitution and the current law, a MP can be dismissed following the invalidation of the election due to election crimes if the sentence exceeded one million won.¹⁰¹ For example, since the 2012 parliamentary elections, eight members of the National Assembly were excluded following a final sentence imposing a higher fine, for violation of the Public Official Election Act. Typical cases are (a) illegal spending of election expenses, (b) unlawful election campaign, and (c) publication of false facts. The most recent example is Mr Ahn's, a former member of the National Assembly, who was excluded due to the final sentence on the allegation of his election manager's illegal spending of election expenses on March 12, 2015. The sentence was six months imprisonment suspended for two years. He was found guilty and at the same time excluded from the National Assembly.

b. Offences considered as (particularly) immoral

82. As previously highlighted concerning parliamentary candidates, "an offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude" in **Cyprus** can cause the loss of a MP's mandate;¹⁰² similar provisions exist in **Finland** where the Constitution provides that "if the offence is such that the accused does not command the trust and respect necessary for the office of a Representative", the Parliament may terminate the mandate.¹⁰³

c. Other offences and cases

83. In **Brazil**, a Deputy of Senator shall lose his or her office if he or she is criminally convicted by a final and unappealable sentence.¹⁰⁴ Since 2010, the law "disqualifies those convicted of racism, homicide, rape, drug trafficking and misuse of public funds by a second-level court (even if an appeal is still pending), as well as those whose resignation were motivated to avoid impeachment, from holding political office for a period of eight years. Politicians engaged in vote-buying, abuses of power and electoral manipulations are also considered ineligible for a period of eight years".¹⁰⁵

84. In **Canada**, there are several relevant legislative provisions regarding removal from office. Under section 31 of the Constitution Act, a senator loses his/her seat because of bankruptcy or if convicted of treason, felony, "or any other infamous crime".

⁹⁷ Constitution of Cyprus, Article 64c.

⁹⁸ Constitution of Finland, section 28.

⁹⁹ Constitution of Malta, Article 55.

¹⁰⁰ Article L 117.

¹⁰¹ Public Official Election Act, Article 264.

¹⁰² Constitution of Cyprus, Article 64c.

¹⁰³ Constitution of Finland, section 28.

¹⁰⁴ Article 55 (VI) of the Constitution.

¹⁰⁵ Transparency International's study

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/ineligibilities_arising_from_criminal_law_decisions

85. In **Portugal**, deputies cease to hold office if they are convicted by a court for a crime committed in the exercise of their duties and are thus sentenced, or for membership of an organisation that is racist or has a fascist ideology.¹⁰⁶

86. In **Moldova**, the Constitution provides for the possibility to withdraw the mandate of a MP, without specifying the grounds for this withdrawal,¹⁰⁷ but there are no implementing provisions in the present legislation. Nonetheless, all these provisions were never applied and no MP was dismissed, since there were no cases of conviction of MPs in the Republic of Moldova. There was a case of conviction of a MP by a foreign court but the process of recognition and enforcement of this decision in Moldova started only after this MP resigned. It has to be noted that, in its decision no. 2 of 20 January 2015 on the interpretation of Article 1 paragraph 3 in conjunction with Article 69 and 70 of the Constitution (immunity and termination of mandate of MPs), the Constitutional Court stated that "In case of conviction of a member of the Parliament for crimes committed with intention and/or conviction to prison (imprisonment) by a final and binding court decision, including of the foreign states, his or her mandate cannot be withdrawn but ceases *ex officio* (by the effect of law)".

2. According to the nature of the sentence

87. In **Albania**,¹⁰⁸ **Azerbaijan**,¹⁰⁹ **Bulgaria**,¹¹⁰ **Estonia**,¹¹¹ **Finland**,¹¹² **Georgia**,¹¹³ "**the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**",¹¹⁴ **Slovakia**,¹¹⁵ **Turkey**¹¹⁶ and **Ukraine**,¹¹⁷ a MP loses his/her mandate when he/she faces any kind of judicial sentence. The Constitution of **Armenia** provides for the same rule if term of imprisonment is imposed.¹¹⁸ In the **Republic of Korea**, a member of the National Assembly who violated the general criminal law and was sentenced to a non-suspended sentence shall also be excluded.¹¹⁹ There have been two cases of exclusion from the Parliament elected in 2012 following a conviction for crimes against other pieces of legislation than the Public Official Election Act or the Political Funds Act. One of them is the following: In the Tear Gas Powder Case (Supreme Court Decision 2014do1894 decided June 12, 2014), the Defendant, Sun-dong Kim, was a National Assembly member affiliated with the Unified Progress Party. For the purpose of obstructing a National Assembly plenary session concerning the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement ratification, the defendant detonated a CS tear gas powder grenade

¹⁰⁶ Art 160(1) of the Constitution.

¹⁰⁷ Constitution of Moldova, Article 69 paragraph 2.

¹⁰⁸ Constitution of Albania, Article 71 paragraph 2.

¹⁰⁹ Constitution of Azerbaijan, Article 89.

¹¹⁰ Constitution of Bulgaria, Article 72 paragraph 1.

¹¹¹ Constitution of Estonia, Article 64 paragraph 2.

¹¹² Constitution of Finland, section 28.

¹¹³ Constitution of Georgia, Article 54 paragraph 2.

¹¹⁴ Constitution of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Article 65 (1), provides that " The mandate of a Representative terminates if he/she is sentenced for a criminal offence for which a prison sentence of at least five years is prescribed" and Paragraph 4 says: "The Representative can have his/her mandate revoked if he/she is sentenced for committing a criminal or other punishable offence making him/her unfit to perform the office of a Representative".

¹¹⁵ Constitution of Slovakia, Article 81a. Additionally, according to § 57 of the Law on Rules of Procedure of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (no. 350/1996 Coll.) disqualification of MPs in general must be deliberated by the Mandate and Immunity Committee and subsequently submitted to the National Council for a decision. Since MPs are disqualified by the very fact that a judgment on criminal conviction becomes final, the decision of the National Council in this case can only be of declarative nature.

¹¹⁶ Constitution of Turkey, Article 84.

¹¹⁷ Constitution of Ukraine, Article 81.

¹¹⁸ Constitution of Armenia, Articles 65 and 67. It should be mentioned that there have also been a few cases when the National Assembly gave consent for involvement of MPs as defendants and on their arrest. In neither of the cases, the MP's assembly were terminated.

¹¹⁹ National Assembly Act, Article 136, and Public Official Election Act, Article 19.

behind the speaker's podium in front of the chairperson's seat, then threw the tear gas powder remaining inside the canister to the National Assembly Vice-speaker, who was presiding over the session. As a result, the defendant was indicted for carrying a dangerous item and committing acts of violence against National Assembly members. Furthermore, the defendant was the person in charge of his party's accounting, and was also indicted for violating the Political Funds Act.

88. The above mentioned countries' law provides for different formulations. For example, in Estonia, the judicial conviction is referred to as "a guilty verdict", in **Georgia** – as "a final judgment of conviction", in Turkey - as "a final judicial sentence" and in **Ukraine** – as "a guilty verdict".

89. The following example can be quoted concerning the latter country. On 28 June 2000, Ukrainian MP Pavlo Lazarenko was convicted by the Geneva *Tribunal de Police*, under Article 305bis of the Swiss Criminal Code, for two cases of money laundering, and sentenced to one-and-a-half years imprisonment, as well as a fine of 10.696.732,8 CHF. His MP mandate was prematurely terminated on the ground of the entry into force of his criminal conviction, following a Resolution by the Verkhovna Rada Ukraine (Parliament of Ukraine).

90. A bigger margin of appreciation is given to the judge by the Constitution of **Sweden**: the MPs may be deprived of their mandate in case they have proven themselves manifestly unfit to hold a mandate by reason of a criminal act. A decision in such a case shall be taken by a court of law.¹²⁰ Further, criminal acts that, according to general provisions in ordinary criminal law, could cause imprisonment for two years or more may also result in the deprivation of a MP from his or her mandate. The ordinary courts deal with these cases in the first instance. Ordinary prosecutors initiate the case, but the court dealing with a criminal case against a MP has the right to initiate the deprivation procedure by its own initiative. The courts have to deal with these cases with expediency. Under the present 1974 constitution, there are at least two cases where MPs have been deprived of their seats in Parliament by court decisions. In the first case, a MP was found guilty of two acts of severe fraud and the second case concerned criminal acts by a MP who committed assault, unlawful threat and molesting, also of a sexual nature. The decisions in these two cases were taken by appeal courts.

91. In **Greece**, Article 51 paragraph 3 of the Constitution provides that "the law cannot abridge the right to vote except in cases where a minimum age has not been reached or in cases of legal incapacity or as a result of irrevocable criminal conviction for certain crimes". Following such convictions, if a MP is deprived of his/her right to vote, he/she will lose his/her seat in Parliament. For example, Dimitrios Tsovolas, a former Minister of the Economy of the A. Papandreou Government from 1987 to 1989, received in 1992 a sentence within what at the time was known as the "Koskotas scandal". Since he was deprived of his right to vote (for a very short period), he lost his seat in Parliament. He was reelected in 1994 as the leader of his own party (Dikki). The trial of the leaders of "Golden Dawn" (a neo-nazi party, which obtained between 6% and 7% in the 2012 and the 2015 Greek elections) has started. If convicted, they will probably lose their parliamentary seats. For this to happen, according the wording of the Constitution, an "irrevocable" conviction is necessary, *i.e.* after an appeal against their conviction by the competent Court of Appeals is rejected by the country's Supreme Court.

92. In **Canada**, under section 750 of the criminal code, a MP (Senate or House) loses his/her seat only if convicted to an indictable offence and sentenced to a two years or more prison term. As persons imprisoned in correctional institutions are disqualified from being

¹²⁰ Constitution of Sweden, chap. 4, section 11.

candidates in elections, a MP sentenced to a prison term for less than two years could remain in Parliament but could not run for re-election.¹²¹

93. In **Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Finland, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”** and **Slovakia**, along with judicial sentences (or some of them) as a general ground for the loss of MPs’ mandates, the Constitutions specifically mention that commission of a crime would also cause the loss of a MP’s mandate.

94. As an example, in **Armenia**, MPs Hakob Hakobyan, Myasnik Malkhasyan, Sasun Mikayelyan and Khachatur Sukiasyan (who had resigned from office during the procedure) were sentenced to different terms in prison. On 17 September 2009, based on the law of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, a protocol on the termination of the powers of these MPs was signed by the Chairperson of the National Assembly. The protocol was sent to the Central Electoral Commission which confirmed it. A similar case involved MP Vardan Oskanyan. After pre-trial investigation, the criminal case was dismissed. As the mere fact of being a defendant in a criminal case is not a ground for the dismissal of a MP, Mr Vardan Oskanyan was not dismissed from the National Assembly.

95. In **“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”**, from the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1990 to the last in 2014, there has been one case of exclusion from standing for Parliament on account of a criminal accusation. Namely, one of the MPs from VMRO/DPMNE in 2004 was accused for war crime, done during the conflict from 2001 when he was Minister of Interior. After trial before the Court in the Hague, he was released. Second, in 2001, a deputy from DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) publicly announced that he was leaving the Parliament and joining NLA (National Liberation Army) as a commander in Vitina (Kosovo). The Parliament, by a two-thirds majority vote of all Representatives, revoked him. He was put on the “American Black List”, created by the Bush administration. After several months of war activities, before the end of the inter-ethnic conflict, he was amnestied under the Law on Amnesty and again became a deputy, now from DUI (Democratic Union for Integration).

96. In **Bulgaria**, the loss of mandate will take place only when the person had the intention of committing the crime, or for an unsuspended prison sentence.

97. In **Italy**, according to Act no. 175/2010, a person declared guilty and convicted to 1 to 5 years of imprisonment may no longer hold a parliamentary mandate. A little different formulation is provided in **Malta**: MPs will lose their seat in case there are any circumstances which, if they were not a member of the House of Representatives, would cause them to be disqualified from elections.¹²² In other words, among others, the judicial sentence providing for imprisonment will cause the loss of the mandate. The Constitution allows the convicted MP not to vacate the seat until thirty days have elapsed. This period can be further extended by the Speaker of the House of Representatives (but shall not exceed 150 days) in order to enable the convicted MP to appeal.¹²³

98. In **Croatia**, the Act on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament has always entailed a provision stipulating that the MP’s mandate ceases prior to the expiration of the period he or she has been elected for if he or she is sentenced by a legally valid court decision to an unconditional sentence of imprisonment longer than 6 months.¹²⁴ The Croatian Parliament, at its session of 13 February 2015, passed the Act on Revisions and

¹²¹ <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2012-38-e.htm#txt2>.

¹²² Constitution of Malta, Article 55.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Act of the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament, Article 10.

Amendments to the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament Act (Official Gazette No. 19 of 20 February 2015). Article 8 amended Article 9 of the Elections Act so to prescribe also the requirements for excluding offenders from being nominated as candidates for parliamentary elections. Namely, voters and political parties cannot nominate candidates who are sentenced to imprisonment for longer than six months or who are sentenced for criminal offences against official duty (abuse of office and official capacity), against humanity and human dignity, or against life and limb (aggravated murder).¹²⁵

99. In its Decision/Declaration No. U-VII-5293/2011 of 12 November 2011, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia took a position on the issue whether a person convicted for a war crime can be the "holder of the list".¹²⁶ The Court stated that "the fact that the 'Elections Act does not contain any prerequisites or restrictions or prohibitions with respect to determining the list holder but that this is the free right of political parties' does not automatically mean that 'prerequisites', 'restrictions' or 'prohibitions' may not be inherent in the objective order of values laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia".¹²⁷

100. In **Ireland**, the Electoral Act 1992 provides that a person serving a sentence of imprisonment of more than six months imposed by an Irish court is disqualified from sitting in Dáil Éireann (lower house of Parliament).¹²⁸ When members of the Dáil are convicted whilst in office they vacate their seat once the time limit for appeal is up or the appeal is lost.¹²⁹ There is no recorded case of members of the Dáil losing their seat because they have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment. There have been, however, a relatively large number of Dáil members who have been sentenced to periods of imprisonment whilst in office, but who received sentences below the required six months imprisonment threshold. One member of Dáil Éireann was imprisoned three times in 2002 for contempt of court and addressed the Dáil whilst serving a sentence of imprisonment; he had been transported to the Dáil by the Prison Service. There is no prohibition on persons with previous convictions, regardless of the nature of their conviction or where they were convicted, serving in Dáil Éireann. For example, two current Dáil members have served substantial prison sentences imposed by an Irish court and there is a long history of prisoners imprisoned in the United Kingdom being elected to Dáil Éireann.

101. In **Latvia**, the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima¹³⁰ provide that a member who has been convicted of a criminal offence shall be deemed expelled from the Saeima as of the date when the sentence comes into force. A member may be expelled from the Saeima by a decision of the Saeima if, upon approval of his/her mandate, it is established that he/she: 1) has been elected in violation of the provisions of the Saeima Election Law (in connection with criminal convictions – Article 5, point 2, 3, 4 and 7; 2) has committed a crime in a state

¹²⁵ These amendments to the Elections Act were introduced in the Croatian legal order after some sensitive cases of standing for elections or participation in elections of persons who were sentenced by a legally final court decision for serious criminal offences appeared in the practice. The Constitutional Court has addressed the issue in Decision/Declaration No. U-VII-5293/2011 of 12 November 2011.

¹²⁶ Croatia used to have a proportional electoral system based on closed lists. A ballot paper did not state the names of all candidates, but it included the name of the political party and the name of one person only, the so-called "holder of the list". However, in February 2015, the Act on Elections of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament was revised to introduce the open party lists. Thereby Croatia abandoned the closed lists system (and thus also "the holder of the list") and introduced the open list system with one preferential vote.

¹²⁷ The Constitutional Court's decision concerns such "holder of the list", who was in Croatia sentenced for committing a war crime. However, as it has mentioned in the previous note, in February 2015 the Act on Elections of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament was revised to introduce the open party lists. Thereby Croatia abandoned the closed lists system (and thus also "the holder of the list") and introduced the open list system with one preference vote.

¹²⁸ Electoral Act 1992, section 41(j).

¹²⁹ Electoral Act 1992, section 42.

¹³⁰ Law of 28 July 1994, Article 18.

of diminished responsibility or, after committing the crime, has become mentally ill, which made him/her incapable of taking a conscious action or controlling it.

102. For example, after the 9th Saeima election, a case of counterfeiting of votes came to light in the Balvu region. The mandate of J. Boldāns was approved by the Saeima, which agreed to the continuation of prosecution. J. Boldāns never started to work in the Saeima, and was later expelled after his conviction on 20 October 2008.

103. It has to be noted that, in general, provisions on the termination of mandates of MPs are contained in Constitutions, and sometimes repeated in the election laws.¹³¹

3. When a case of ineligibility arises

104. National law may provide that MPs lose their mandate, automatically or following a specific decision, if they are in a situation which would lead to ineligibility to be elected. This is the case (at constitutional level) in **Albania**,¹³² **Bulgaria**,¹³³ **Iceland**¹³⁴ **Slovakia**¹³⁵ and **Spain**,¹³⁶ as well as in **Chile**.¹³⁷ In the latter country, a MP who loses a general requirement of eligibility shall lose his/her office. Therefore, if a MP is sentenced for a felony crime, he/she will lose his/her position. For instance, in 2005, a senator (Mr Jorge Lavandero) was found guilty of sexual abuse (a felony crime) and, as a consequence, his dismissal operated *ipso iure*.

105. The **Estonian** Constitution¹³⁸ provides for the termination of a MP's mandate in case of entering into force of a conviction – which would have led to ineligibility to be elected in case it had been passed before the elections. Similar provisions are to be found in the Status of Members of Riigikogu Act.¹³⁹ In practice, there have been until now two cases of termination of mandate based on criminal conviction, both of them for corruption or bribery. There are still two more pending cases with judgments not entered into force yet. The sanctions have been imprisonment on probe. In none of the cases a question on the proportionality of the termination of the MP's mandate of has been raised.

106. In **Germany**, the Federal Electoral Law (*Bundeswahlgesetz*) excludes MPs from the Bundestag if they lose one of the prerequisites for permanent eligibility.¹⁴⁰ This is the case (for five years) if a criminal court has imposed a term of imprisonment of not less than one year for a felony.¹⁴¹ Moreover, the Electoral Law requires that MPs must not have been deprived by judicial decision of eligibility to stand for parliament or of qualification to hold public office.¹⁴² Additionally, a person cannot be elected if she/he is disqualified from voting,¹⁴³ and a person shall be disqualified from voting if she/he is not entitled to vote owing to a judicial decision.¹⁴⁴

¹³¹ E.g. Election Code of Bulgaria, Article 271.

¹³² Constitution of Albania, Article 71(2)(c).

¹³³ Constitution of Bulgaria, Article 72(1).

¹³⁴ Constitution of Iceland, Article 50.

¹³⁵ Constitution of Slovakia, Article 81a paragraph c. See also: the Act on election to the National Council (no. 333/2004 Coll.), the Constitutional Act on the Protection of Public Interest in the Performance of Offices by Public Officials (no. 357/2004 Z.z.) and the Act on Rules of Procedure of the National Council (no. 350/1996 Coll.).

¹³⁶ Constitution of Spain, Article 70

¹³⁷ Constitution of Chile, Article 60, paragraph 7.

¹³⁸ Article 64(2).

¹³⁹ <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/516042015001/consolide>, Article 8.

¹⁴⁰ German Federal Electoral Law (*Bundeswahlgesetz*, briefly BWahlG), § 46 para. 1 No. 3.

¹⁴¹ German Criminal Code, § 45 and 45a.

¹⁴² German Federal Electoral Law (*Bundeswahlgesetz*, briefly BWahlG), § 15.

¹⁴³ German Federal Electoral Law (*Bundeswahlgesetz*, briefly BWahlG), § 13.

¹⁴⁴ German Federal Electoral Law (*Bundeswahlgesetz*, briefly BWahlG), § 13 No. 1.

107. The loss of membership of the Bundestag does not occur automatically, but there has to be a resolution of the Council of Senior Members (*Ältestenrat*) of the Bundestag, if eligibility has been lost as a result of a judicial decision. However, the Council of Senior Members does not control the judicial decision, but takes note of it and decides about the date when the convicted MP has to leave the Bundestag. The regulations concerning MPs of the Länder correspond to those on the federal level.¹⁴⁵

108. The case of Friedrich Cremer, member of the Social Democratic Party and of the Parliament in Bavaria, is one of the few cases in which a MP had to leave the Parliament because of a criminal conviction. He was found guilty by a Bavarian criminal court for acting as an agent for a foreign intelligence service and was condemned to an imprisonment of two years and six months. In addition, the same court deprived him of the ability to be elected in public elections for three years. The Court was convinced that he had met agents of the intelligence service of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) several times between 1974 and 1979 and thereby supported the activities of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR. After the decision of the criminal court, the Bavarian parliament voted for the exclusion of Mr Cremer from the Parliament and the loss of his rights as a MP. Friedrich Cremer appealed to the Federal High Court of Justice (*Bundesgerichtshof*) and the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*), however without success.

109. In **Lithuania**, the MP's mandate will be terminated in case the candidate did not follow the rules provided for disclosure of prior conviction.¹⁴⁶

110. In **Romania** too, cessation of the term of office occurs in case of loss of electoral rights as regulated in the Law on the statute of deputies and senators.¹⁴⁷ The regulations of the two Chambers of Parliament contain similar provisions.¹⁴⁸

111. In the **Netherlands**,¹⁴⁹ if a court decides to impose the exclusion of active and passive suffrage as an additional penalty, it will notify the Chairman of the House of Parliament, the Commissioner of the King (provincial level) or the mayor (municipal level). Due to the loss of the right to vote, the representative in question will no longer meet the criteria for holding the office and a procedure to expulse him or her from the office will be started.

4. Other cases

112. A number of legal orders provide for a combination of (some of) the criteria already quoted, but may also include specific rules.

¹⁴⁵ Bade-Württemberg (Section 47 Electoral Law of Bade-Württemberg); Bavaria (Article 56 Electoral Law of Bavaria); Berlin (Section 6 Electoral Law of Berlin); Brandenburg (Section 41 Electoral Law of Brandenburg); Bremen (Section 34 Electoral Law of Bremen); Hamburg (Section 11 Electoral Law of Hamburg); Hesse (Section 39 Electoral Law of Hesse); Lower Saxony (Section 7 Electoral Law of Lower Saxony); Mecklenbourg-Western Pomerania (Section 59 Electoral Law of Mecklenbourg-Western Pomerania); North Rhine-Westphalia (Section 5 Electoral Law of North Rhine-Westphalia); Rhineland-Palatinate (Section 58 Electoral Law of Rhineland-Palatinate); Saarland (Section 41 Electoral Law of Saarland); Saxony (Section 45 Electoral Law of Saxony); Saxony-Anhalt (Section 7 Electoral Law of Saxony-Anhalt); Schleswig-Holstein (Section 49 Electoral Law of Schleswig-Holstein); Thuringia (Section 46 Electoral Law of Thuringia).

¹⁴⁶ Election Code, Article 98(3).

¹⁴⁷ Law no. 96/2006 on the Statute of deputies and senators, Article 7.

¹⁴⁸ Regulation of the Senate, Article 188, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 948 of 25 October 2005. The list of Deputies/Senators who ceased their term of office before the end of the parliamentary term, as well as the way this mandate ended, can be found on the websites of the two Chambers of the Romanian Parliament. See: <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.de?leg=2012&cam=1> and <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.de?leg=2012>.

¹⁴⁹ See ch.III.A.2.

113. In **Israel**, under current law, MPs may not be removed from their position by a decision of parliament. Internal disciplinary proceedings may result in suspending a member from participating in discussions, but that member is permitted to vote even during the suspension. However, recently the Knesset (Parliament) has discussed a proposal to amend the “Basic-Law: The Knesset”, to empower the Knesset to dismiss a member who acted or expressed views in contradiction with the State’s fundamental values, even if that member was not convicted in criminal proceedings and committed no offence. This proposal has not (yet) been adopted.

114. There is a difference between MPs and ministers regarding the consequences of filing an indictment. The relevant provisions regarding ministers - set in the “Basic Law - The Government” -, are similar to those quoted above regarding members of parliament. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that ministers are dismissed from their position once being accused of committing serious offences, and may be back in office only if and when acquitted in court. However, this ruling was not applied to members of parliament. Thus, ministers who are indicted are dismissed from office but continue to serve as members of parliament. The underlying rationale is that parliament members are elected officials, and thus should be removed from office only after conviction, whereas ministers, who hold executive powers, should be subject to a higher standard to enhance public confidence in government.

115. In the **United States**, on the one hand, “the status and service of that Member [a Senator¹⁵⁰ who has been indicted for a felony] is not directly affected by any federal statute, constitutional provision, or Rule of the Senate”.¹⁵¹ Indeed, “Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices even upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony”.¹⁵² There is no express constitutional disqualification for conviction of a crime other than certain treasonous conduct after taking an oath of office.¹⁵³ However, under party rules, members may lose chairmanships of committees or ranking status. Conviction of certain crimes may also subject Senators to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including expulsion.¹⁵⁴

116. On the other hand, “the status and service of that Member [a Member of the House¹⁵⁵ who has been indicted for a felony] is not directly affected by any federal statute or Rule of the House of Representatives. No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, or the Rules of the House merely upon an indictment for an offense, prior to an establishment of guilt under [the US] judicial system. Internal party rules in the House, however, now require an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a House committee, or a member of the House party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position, although the Member’s service in Congress would otherwise continue”¹⁵⁶. More precisely, once a Member of the House is convicted of a crime that is a felony, the following consequences may follow. First, while there is no express constitutional disqualification (other than for certain treasonous conduct), Members of the House are instructed by House Rule not to vote after conviction of a crime that carries a punishment of two or more years in prison. Second, under party rules, Members may lose chairmanships of committees and ranking status. Third, Members convicted of certain crimes may be subject to disciplinary proceedings, including expulsion.

¹⁵⁰ For more details, see <https://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL34716.pdf>. (by Jack Maskell).

¹⁵¹ <https://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL34716.pdf> page 1.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ For more details, see <https://fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL33229.pdf>.

¹⁵⁶ <https://fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL33229.pdf> page 1.

5. Procedural issues

117. The procedure concerning the loss of mandate is often rather complex and may involve the intervention of Parliament.

118. In **Belgium** and **Kazakhstan**, a MP is automatically disqualified and loses his/her seat if deprived by a court decision of his/her civil and political rights, whereas in **Germany**, **Hungary** and **Slovenia**, a MP convicted by a court does not automatically lose his/her seat: the court conviction must be followed by a decision of Parliament.¹⁵⁷ In **Denmark**, the Parliament (Folketing) can expel a MP who has been convicted of an offence that makes him/her unworthy to retain a seat.¹⁵⁸ In **Slovenia**, a MP is automatically disqualified unless the Parliament decides otherwise.¹⁵⁹ In “**the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**”, the procedure of exclusion of offenders from Parliament is determined by the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament.

119. In **France**, the procedure is regulated by the Electoral Code¹⁶⁰: the loss of civic rights leads to the loss of the mandate, but the disqualification must be declared by the Constitutional Council; it is generally taken on the request of the Minister of Justice, but the Bureau of the concerned Chamber or the prosecutor of the court which pronounced the sentence may also make such request.

120. In **Chile**, a final decision declaring that there are merits for a cause (not a conviction) leads to the suspension from office of a MP, who will be brought before the competent judge.

121. In **Romania**, the Chairman of the Chamber takes note of the cessation of the mandate and puts to the vote in the plenum of the said Chamber a resolution on the vacancy of the seat of deputy or senator.¹⁶¹

122. In the **Republic of Korea**, a member of the National Assembly who violated some provisions of the Constitution or committed other illegal acts can be dismissed by the disciplinary action of the Special Committee on Ethics, with the approval of the two-third majority of all the members.¹⁶² This last case is extremely rare. Indeed, only one member, Young-sam Kim, who later became President (1993-1998), was excluded by this procedure under the military dictatorship on October 4, 1979 on the allegation that he was a master-mind in collusion with the strike against the government.

123. Furthermore, in the **United Kingdom**, following the parliamentary expenses scandal, the Recall of MPs Act was adopted in 2015. Clause 1 of the Act sets out the processes by which a MP triggers the recall process: custodial prison sentence, suspension from the House ordered by the Committee on Standards, providing false or misleading expenses claims. Clauses 7 to 11 set out rules surrounding the petition. Clause 15 confirms that the MP seat becomes vacant in case of successful petition. This legislation is not applicable to devolved assemblies.

124. In **Mexico**, a MP who is on trial is suspended from office and can resume duties only in case of acquittal.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/mandate_e.pdf page 24.

¹⁵⁸ http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/mandate_e.pdf page 25.

¹⁵⁹ http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/mandate_e.pdf page 26.

¹⁶⁰ LO 136.

¹⁶¹ Law no. 96/2006 on the statute of deputies and senators regulates in Article 7 the way in which the term of office of a deputy or a senator ceases.

¹⁶² National Assembly Act, Articles 155 and 163.

¹⁶³ Constitution of Mexico, Article 115(7).

125. It appears from the examples given that there is more often discretion concerning the dismissal of MPs from office than ineligibility to be elected. This is partly linked to the fact that a number of countries provide for a parliamentary procedure for such dismissal.

126. Finally, some states know a recall process. Several **US** States provide for such a process in their state constitution or in their legislation.¹⁶⁴ In **Kenya**, under sections 45 to 48 of the Elections Act 2011, parliamentarians can be recalled by the Parliament: (1) if they are found to have violated the provisions of Chapter Six of the Constitution; (2) if they are found to have mismanaged public resources; or (3) if they are convicted of an offence under the Elections Act.

IV. Case study: Italy

A. The legal and factual context

127. According to Article 1 of the Legislative Decree (delegated law) of 31 December 2012, n. 235, persons who have been sentenced to more than two years in prison for specific crimes are not allowed a) to stand as candidates for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate of the Republic (“incandidabilità”), and b) to stay in office as members of these two legislative Assemblies of the Italian Republic. Article 3 of the same legislative text provides for an immediate deliberation on the removal from their office of the Senators and of the Deputies who are sentenced according to Article 1. There are also provisions forbidding the election of offenders to local governing bodies and allowing their dismissal if they are sentenced while in office.

128. The implementation of Article 1ff of the Legislative Decree has led to hot discussions, due to their possible effects on the development of the political life and of the relations between the political parties in Italy. One of the most discussed issues is its possible effects on persons already elected who have committed crimes before the entry into force of the Decree. However, at that time, most judges did not consider as unconstitutional these rules or their extension to the candidates to local government governing bodies and members of these bodies, which were immediately applied to local government institutions.

129. The Constitutional Court and the administrative judges which had dealt with similar questions in the past, shared the idea that it is not irrational to provide for the “incandidabilità” of offenders sentenced for particularly serious crimes, even if committed before the entry into force of the relevant legislation. The purpose of such a legislative choice was to avoid the presence in the elected assemblies of persons who had been judged morally unworthy: the sentence by which they had been sentenced to prison was considered to amount to an element of negative qualification. The conclusion was that what was at stake was not a sanction comparable with criminal and administrative sanctions, and, by way of consequence, was not covered by Article 7 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

130. On this basis, the Council of State, for instance, rejected the request to submit to the Constitutional Court the question of the constitutionality of the application of the “incandidabilità” rule in view of the removal of members of Parliament elected before the entry into force of the rule itself (sentence 6.2.2013 n. 695 concerning provisions of the mentioned Legislative Decree n. 235/2012). The judges considered that the retroactive effect

¹⁶⁴ For more details, see for Senators <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34716.pdf> page 7-8; for Members of the House <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33229.pdf>.

of the rule — did not conflict with the Constitution as far as it might be considered as not being a sanction.

131. The rule implying the “incandidabilità” of offenders sentenced for crimes committed before the entry into force of the rule itself (and the removal of those previously elected) was, therefore, applied in many cases. However, the constitutional question was reopened when the former President of the Council of Ministers, Senator Silvio Berlusconi, was sentenced by the Tribunal of Milan to years in prison for a fiscal crime. The Court of Appeal of Milan and the Court of Cassation confirmed the sentence which became final. Accordingly, the internal bodies of the Senate of the Republic considered that the sentence had created the condition for depriving Mr Berlusconi of his status of member of the Assembly and started the procedure aimed at his removal, according to the opinion. After a long debate, during which Mr Berlusconi informed the Senate of his decision to submit the case to the European Court of Human Rights, the plenary Assembly of the Senate dismissed Mr Berlusconi from his post of senator (October 2013 at the request of its Electoral Committee).

132. Pending the decision of the Strasbourg court, a number of judicial bodies have followed the reasoning of the Senate excluding that the dismissal (or the suspension, in case of a sentence which is not yet final) of an elected public official was a retroactive sanction; others have submitted constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court, whose cases are still pending . In particular, on 27 January 2014, the Court of Appeal of Bari, (N.R.G. 1748/2014) referred to the Constitutional Court – *inter alia* – the question of the conformity of several provisions of the mentioned decree with the act of delegation approved by Parliament, having regard a) to the difference of treatment between the members of Parliament and the regional councillors, and b) to the effect of criminal sentences on the status of member of an elected Assembly (in the case at stake, a suspension following a not-yet-final sentence affecting a regional councillor) even in the presence of crimes committed before the entry into force of legislative decree n° 235/2012. According to the opinion of the judge of Bari, the suspension or recall of an elected member of a Regional Assembly sentenced to two years’ or more imprisonment can be reasonably justified by wanting to avoid the presence of a morally unworthy person in a democratic deliberative body. However, the Court of Appeal said that the application of this administrative sanction is not allowed to infringe the constitutional guarantees of the electoral rights, and that its adoption has to comply with the principle that forbids the application of a criminal sanction for crimes committed before the entry into force of the law providing for this sanction. With regard to this last point, the judge questioned the constitutionality of the rule by referring to Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and asked for a decision of the constitutional judge on the merit.

133. On October 30th, 2014, the first section of the Regional administrative Tribunal of the Campania Region (n° 04798/2014) also submitted questions concerning the legislative decree n° 235/2012 to the Constitutional Court, in a case concerning the suspension of the mayor of the town of Naples. The judge started by qualifying the suspension as a sanction, even if he did not deny that the purpose of the law in question was to exclude from the democratic representative elected bodies of the State, regions and municipalities persons affected by dishonourable criminal sentences. These provisions aim to ensure the functioning of these bodies in line with the principles of democracy, fairness, integrity and transparency. If the measure affecting the sentenced person’s status was considered to be a sanction, it had to comply with the constitutional principles of the criminal law system and could not be applied retroactively way. Therefore, a provision authorising the dismissal or the suspension of a public official sentenced for a crime committed before the entry into force of the law that provides for these measures should be considered unconstitutional. The judge of Naples therefore asked the Constitutional Court to declare the impugned provisions unconstitutional. In the meantime, the administrative judges stated that, when a separate measure taken against a convicted person is challenged – more precisely, a non-judicial act

adopted following a judicial conviction -, its application may be suspended pending a judgement about its validity. This conclusion does not affect decisions taken against members of Parliament (“parliamentary acts”), which cannot be challenged before a judge.

B. Elements of appreciation

134. The Constitutional Court has not yet decided both cases mentioned above. However, the President of the Court talked in his last press conference of 2014 about sentence n. 104 adopted on April 14th, 2014, which declared as unconstitutional a legislative rule providing for the retroactive application of an administrative sanction because it violated the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. The Court explained that there is no specific constitutional provision on the matter, but it shared the idea of the European Court of Human Rights that there is a general implicit principle of law which extends the principles applicable to the criminal sanctions to all punitive measures. The question whether such measures are of a punitive nature is still to be decided by the Strasbourg Court.

135. With regard to Italian electoral legislation, reference could, instead, be made to the already quoted *Scoppola v. Italy (n. 3)* case, a judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights adopted on May 22th, 2012, according to which people serving in jail can have their electoral rights restricted in specific cases. The proportionality of this measure can be ensured by the legislation itself without the necessary adoption of a *case-by-case* decision of the competent judge. The conclusions of the Strasbourg judge underline the importance of the role of the legislator in shaping the rules in the electoral field. In the *Scoppola* case the coexistence of different interests – those concerning the exercise of the personal electoral rights of the prisoners and those related to the implementation of the criminal sentence – is the result of a balance directly operated by the legislator. As a matter of fact, both groups of interests regard the personal status of the concerned people, even if the interest in the implementation of the criminal sentences aims at defending the superior value of the observance of the criminal law. The fairness and integrity of the electoral process are affected in a very limited measure by the right to vote of sentenced prisoners as far as the vote of very few electors is concerned.

136. It could be argued that the presence and the participation of a convicted member in the work of one of the legislative Assemblies or of the local governing bodies has a major relevance because he is not only a voter but he is also allowed to take part in the formation of the will of the relevant body through his activity in the discussion and in the evaluation of the single items of the agenda. He may submit proposals and see them discussed and approved. It is easy to understand that the relevance of the personal interests and rights of the individual members of a democratically elected body, and their interests in keeping their seat or their right to run in an electoral competition, have to be balanced with the public interest in order to ensure a correct and fair functioning of the public institutions.

V. Analysis

137. The following elements can be inferred from the standards of the Council of Europe, as well as from the comparative material made available to the Venice Commission.

138. Legality is the first element of the *rule of law* and implies that the law must be followed, by individuals and by the authorities.¹⁶⁵ The exercise of political power by people who seriously infringed the law puts at risk the implementation of this principle, which is on its

¹⁶⁵ Report on the rule of law, CDL-AD(2011)003rev, par. 42.

turn a prerequisite of democracy,¹⁶⁶ and may therefore endanger the democratic nature of the state: a person who is not eager to recognise the standards of conduct in democratic society, may be unwilling to obey the constitutional or international standards on democracy and the rule of law. The basis for the restriction on such a person's right to be elected or to sit in Parliament is *inter alia* the occurred violation of democratically adopted criminal law, *i.e.* of generally recognised standards of conduct.

139. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, restrictions on the right to be elected should be limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic regime. This functioning would be more seriously endangered by an elected officer than by a simple voter exercising his active electoral rights. The restrictions under consideration should not be considered as limiting democracy, but as a means of preserving it.

140. The vast majority of if not all the states addressed in this report recognise the public interest in excluding offenders from Parliament and most of them have adopted legislative measures in order to achieve this result.

141. The question whether it is admissible to provide for ineligibility to be elected or loss of mandate for crimes committed before the entry into force of the relevant legislation is now pending before the Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Its solution depends in particular on whether such measures have to be considered as of a criminal nature in the sense of Article 7 ECHR.

142. Deprivation of the right to be elected and exclusion from elected bodies first aims at protecting the integrity of these bodies, but may also be an accessory punishment of individuals who committed offences. This is at least the case when a judge sentences an individual to ineligibility as an accessory penal sanction.

A. Ineligibility to be elected

1. In general

143. The exclusion of offenders from elected bodies does not necessarily require legislative measures. Ideally, democratic decision-making should guarantee that these persons are not elected to parliament or at least that their influence is negligible. For this exclusion to happen by the simple functioning of the electoral mechanisms, in the Venice Commission's opinion three conditions are necessary. (1) First, there is a widespread political culture that prompts the majority of voters to consider that these serious offenders have no place in elected bodies. (2) Second, voters should be effectively in a position to exclude them. This implies (2a) that there are mechanisms to ensure that the will of the voters to exclude such individuals may be expressed, either by internal party democracy or by open lists; and (2b) that there must be no obstacles to free suffrage under its two aspects: freedom of voters to form an opinion and freedom of voters to express their wishes.¹⁶⁷

144. (1) Whereas it is probable that most citizens would not like serious offenders to exercise power, the prevailing political culture in an immature democracy may lead to a spirit of resignation and general suspicion towards the political class. This may be the case in particular if important contesting parties do not accept the principles of the rule of law and of respect for human rights. Exclusion of offenders is then a way to put an end to these

¹⁶⁶ See the Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe.

¹⁶⁷ Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (CDL-AD(2002)023rev), I.3.

negative trends and spark a change in the mentality of the public. How far the restrictions of the general freedom of elections go therefore depends on the strength of democracy in a given concrete country.

145. (2) Even if the political culture is favourable to the exclusion of offenders, the influence of citizens on the choice between party candidates may be limited by the internal functioning of the parties or by the electoral system. In other words, in the absence of internal party democracy, a system of closed lists would prevent voters from excluding undesirable characters.

146. (3) The obstacles to free suffrage which are the most relevant in the present case are pressures on voters, at the various stages of the electoral process. The choice of the voter may however be biased in another way, that is through the absence of information on the fact that a candidate has been convicted. The role of the media as a public watchdog has to be stressed in this regard.

147. When the three conditions above are met, and there have been in practice no issues, or at least no issues of importance where criminal offenders have got an active part in politics, no statutory limitations appear as necessary, at least if the media performs its function well. If these conditions are not met, legislative intervention becomes necessary.

148. The Venice Commission further points to an important pre-condition in order for formal rules on the restriction on the right to be elected of criminal offenders to be effective and justifiable in a democratic society. These restrictions follow a criminal conviction, and the severity of the punishment is the ground for disenfranchisement. The judiciary therefore plays an essential role. The *independence and impartiality of the judiciary* are therefore a prerequisite to the proper implementation of restrictions to electoral rights. If there is a risk for opposition candidates to be sentenced based on political motivation, including through selective implementation of the law, or if criminal law is adopted by an authoritarian regime and a candidate may be sentenced for an offence which is not against general moral values, restrictions to the right to stand for elections would go against democratic standards.

149. If all these conditions are met, it appears justifiable and even appropriate to introduce statutory restrictions on the right to be elected of criminal offenders. The need to keep these persons away from elected bodies obviously decreases with time: it is more evident as concerns freshly committed offences, but the passing of time determines the possibility for positive change in an individual's attitude which should not be underestimated.

150. As concerns convicted persons still serving the sentence, there may be additional specific grounds for the disenfranchisement: it can also be argued that imprisoned persons cannot take part in parliamentary sessions, communicate freely with other MPs or with voters.¹⁶⁸ However, the principle of proportionality has always to be respected: the severity of the offence, its nature and/or the length of the sentence have to be taken into account.

¹⁶⁸ The Estonian Supreme Court noted in its judgment of 2 October .2013 in case 3-4-1-44-13, para. 13, dealing with a complaint by convicted a person sentenced to imprisonment which had been denied the right to stand for local elections: „Although not all the fundamental rights of convicted person sentenced to imprisonment are restricted, it entails a restriction of those fundamental rights whose prerequisite is liberty. Membership in a municipal council requires participation in the meetings of the council, at least; usually and as an assumption for efficient work it also implies participation in other meetings, meetings with voters, communication with local entrepreneurs and other duties and meetings which require liberty. In doing so, the council member can freely decide which activities and meetings with members of the council are needed to carry out his/her tasks. An essential part of the custodial sentence is that a person cannot move around freely. Hence, it is not unreasonable to exclude imprisoned persons the right to stand in municipal elections.”

151. For restrictions of passive electoral rights after the serving of the sentence, proportionality requires that the length of disenfranchisement depend on the nature of the offence.

152. Such duration should be carefully examined by parliament, when statutory disenfranchisement is decided. This in particular the case when no further specific decision on ineligibility will be taken, in particular when such restriction is provided for in electoral legislation. Parliament should also take into account the legal and political culture prevailing in the country.

153. Once the statutory disenfranchisement has expired, offenders may again run for elections: it is then up to the voters to decide whether or not they deserve to be elected on account of the past conviction.

154. In practice, as shown by the overview of the legislation of the Venice Commission member states, lifetime restrictions are provided only in very extreme cases.¹⁶⁹ The Venice Commission considers that long-time sanctions should be limited to very serious crimes – such as crimes against humanity, genocide, terrorism, murder – and crimes in relation with elections, public service or political activity – such as crimes of corruption and serious electoral offences (which go against the democratic nature of elections).

155. In case a person has not yet been convicted, the principle of presumption of innocence would go against the deprivation of political rights. In the Venice Commission's opinion, however, some exceptions could be legitimate and proportionate, e.g. for crimes stipulated in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court.

2. Specific cases

156. In the Commission's opinion, in case a criminal conviction takes place *during the elections*, the law should foresee the consequences for the candidacy. In case convicted persons are not allowed to stand as candidates, the consequence should be similar to any other kind of loss of the right to stand in elections (such as death): whether or not the candidate's name is deleted from the ballot, votes given to this person should be considered as invalid or counted only for the list.

157. The constitutions and legislations do not provide directly for the loss of candidacy rights due to convictions in *foreign countries*. Internal legislation or international treaties binding on the state concerned determine whether and when foreign judgments have to be enforced. Convictions by the International Criminal Court have to be enforced with the same consequences as convictions by domestic courts if the state has ratified the Rome statute.

158. The Venice Commission considers that sentences for crimes committed abroad should lead to the same consequences on the right to stand for elections as sentences pronounced in-country if they comply with the rules on fair trial, as defined in particular in Article 6 ECHR. On the contrary, they should not be taken into account if there are insufficient guarantees that they do¹⁷⁰.

159. This does not mean that criminal proceedings have to meet the exact same criteria used in the country where a candidate's right to be elected is at stake, but the sentence has to pass the test of fair proceedings by international standards.

¹⁶⁹ E.g. in Germany, Basic Law, Article 18.

¹⁷⁰ An extreme case would be an unfair trial aimed at excluding a foreign politician from elected bodies in his country.

160. In addition, the criterion of the severity of the sanction should not be applied automatically. If a person A is convicted in country B and issued a penalty the length of which prevents him from standing for elections in country C, he should usually not be barred from the right to stand for elections in cases where the penalty for the same offence in country C would not disqualify him. This is because the severity of the penalty is used as a “moral indicator”, and this should be based on standards applicable in the country of election (usually A’s home country). In other words, in case the penalty for a similar offence in the home country is lower, a proportionate restriction of the right to be elected implies to take into consideration the severity of the offence and not of the punishment

161. The Venice Commission considers that the decision of the deprivation of the right to stand for elections following a foreign judgment should be taken on an individual basis and that national (or international) legislation should clearly define the competent authority.

B. Loss of mandate

162. In case the conviction enters into force after the elections and the person has already assumed office, when those who voted were not necessarily aware of the pending of the proceedings and of the nature of the offences, in particular if those offences were committed or the criminal proceedings started after the elections. The democratic nature of the elections is therefore not hampered if the mandate is terminated. This could make the termination of a mandate following a criminal conviction more easily admissible than the ineligibility to be elected.

163. In case an MP is *accused* of having committed a severe crime, there may be a public interest to avoid participation of that person in parliamentary proceedings. An impeachment procedure could be provided. The Finnish Constitution¹⁷¹ provides for such a kind of dismissal procedure for MPs who have essentially and repeatedly neglected their duties as representatives. There is no restriction for those persons to stand at the next elections.

164. The Venice Commission considers that the termination of the mandate of an MP who has been sentenced and whose conviction entered into force before elections is justified if this was a cause of ineligibility to be elected. This should in particular happen when the sentence was passed abroad, and national authorities did not know about it.

C. In which kind of legislation and how should the issue be addressed?

165. In the Commission’s opinion, since this matter concerns the restriction of fundamental rights and the organisation of public power, which are constitutional issues *par excellence*, it is justified to address it in a constitutional provision, as this is the case in more than 40 % of the states under consideration. It is however also legitimate to deal with it in ordinary legislation. Most legislative provisions made available to the Venice Commission are electoral law ones. Rules of this nature would probably usually be better placed in electoral rather than in criminal legislation as they concern a specific issue rather than a general issue of criminal law.

166. It may be suitable for legislation to provide in a general way in which cases the right to be elected must be restricted, at least for the most serious offences and convictions. Most countries under consideration provide for such a rule, which the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights does not find in contravention with the Convention as long as it

¹⁷¹ Article 28.

respects the principle of proportionality. In less serious cases – as in some of the states under consideration –, a margin of discretion of the judge would be more appropriate.

167. Still more discretion is suitable in cases where *sitting MPs are convicted* for criminal offences (whether for offences committed before or during their membership). In such cases – where there is a specific need to decide on the right to remain as MP and the issue may be particularly contentious – it would seem more appropriate that the question of ineligibility be decided as part of the court decision in the actual case.

VI. Conclusions

168. On the basis of the applicable European standards, as developed in particular by the European Court of Human Rights when applying Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, and of information collected on the legal situation in more than thirty states, the Venice Commission has reached the following conclusions.

169. Ineligibility to be elected is a restriction of the right to free elections: it must therefore be based on clear norms of law, pursue a legitimate aim and observe the principle of proportionality. It is in the general public interest to avoid an active role of offenders in the political decision-making. Proportionality limits in particular the length of the restriction; it requires that such elements as the nature of the offence, its severity and/or the length of the sentence be taken into account.

170. The loss of parliamentary mandate must also be considered as a restriction to the right to free elections and must accordingly be submitted to the same conditions.

171. There is no common standard on the cases, if any, in which such restrictions should be imposed. However, the vast majority of the states examined limit the right of offenders to sit in Parliament, at least in the most serious cases.

172. The exclusion of serious offenders from elected bodies may happen by the simple functioning of the electoral mechanisms only if (1) the majority of voters are in favour of such exclusion; (2) voters are effectively in a position to exclude these people, which implies (2a) internal democracy of political parties or open lists and (2b) that there are no obstacles to free suffrage.

173. The Venice Commission considers that, if the exclusion of offenders from elected bodies does not happen by the simple functioning of the electoral mechanisms, legislative intervention becomes necessary.

174. The Commission also considers that the independence and impartiality of the judiciary are a prerequisite to the proper implementation of restrictions to electoral rights.

175. The duration of ineligibility is subject to the principle of proportionality. In the Commission's opinion, it is most justified during the execution of the sentence and its admissibility decreases with time.

176. The Venice Commission considers that the deprivation of political rights before final conviction is contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence, except for limited and justified exceptions. In practice, exceptions are applied in only a few states under consideration.

177. The Commission also considers that, whereas national legislation does not address the issue of convictions abroad as such, these should have the same effect as convictions in-country as soon as they comply with the rules on fair trial, as defined in particular in Article 6 ECHR. However, the principle of proportionality should lead to take into consideration the severity of the offence and not of the punishment.

178. Finally, the Commission finds it suitable for the Constitution to regulate at least the most important aspects of the restrictions to the right to be elected and of loss of parliamentary mandate, and indeed many states provide for such provisions. Other rules would probably be better placed in electoral rather than in criminal legislation. This is at any rate the case in most of the countries studied.

179. Whereas it may be suitable for legislation to provide for restrictions to operate automatically for the most serious offences or convictions – as is the case in most states under consideration -, discretion for the judges in deciding on the specific case may be suitable in less serious cases and, more generally, where the conviction relates to sitting MPs.