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EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW

(VENICE COMMISSION)

in co-operation with
THE ESTONIAN NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

9TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES "INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR ELECTIONS"

Monday and Tuesday, 4-5 June 2012
Tallinn (Estonia)

SELECTED REPORTS

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OPENING REMARKS

by Mr Gianni BUQUICCHIO (Venice Commission)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I am delighted that we are all gathered here together one year after the conference held in Vienna in May 2011. As you can see, I have become something of an "*habitué"* of the European Conferences of Electoral Management Bodies.

My regular presence is of course due to the interesting subjects under discussion as well as to the quality of the participants and of the organisation, but it is primarily due to the importance of the event and to the fact that I was very happy to see these regular meetings become institutionalised.

This conference is the major annual event for the Venice Commission in the electoral field, enabling the main actors of the electoral process to meet and to share their experiences.

We have essentially created a network which not only involves all parts of Europe, but also goes far beyond, and this prior to the extension of the Venice Commission's activity on other continents.

Electoral administrations, after constitutional courts, were the pioneers in the Venice Commission's extra-European activities. Let me take this opportunity to welcome the delegation from Tunisia which joins us for the first time.

I would like to thank the Estonian National Electoral Committee for the excellent organisation of this event. The theme of new technologies is well chosen in a country which was among the first to introduce one the most innovative systems in the field of elections, remote e-voting.

The issue of new technologies in the voting process has already been addressed by the European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies. For example, we discussed e-voting at last year's conference in Vienna. However, this is the first time that a whole European conference of electoral management bodies has been dedicated to new technologies in the electoral field – proof that elections cannot be maintained outside the modern and living world. New technologies are part of everyday life and are less and less stopped at the entrance to the polling stations. Voting registers and counting centres can no longer be envisaged without computers.

Old concepts subsist, but their implementation gets adapted to our time. For example, the term "ψηφος" is still used in Greek for the vote – it meant stone, and in the Antiquity stones were used for voting. This does not of course mean that this system is still in use in Greece. Voting adapted to paper and pencil, and now it is adapting to computer technology. This move applies to all stages of the voting process, from the drawing up of voters' lists to counting – and including the vote itself. All these issues will be dealt with during this conference.

There are always people who are reluctant towards innovation as well as others who are unsatisfied with the *status quo*. I would however guess that the members of the first category are more numerous than those of the second one.

This has proved true -throughout history, including in the electoral field. I will not talk here about the move from traditional monarchy to elective democracy, but only about electoral law.

For example, when a member of the Parliament of Geneva made (in 1842) what is generally considered to be the first parliamentary proposal for the introduction of the proportional system, another parliamentarian asked whether he had any idea as to how his proposal, perhaps good in theory, could be implemented . Scepticism is not new. Experience shows that what appeared to be revolutionary some decades ago is now common practice.

Except perhaps for voting – to which I will come back later – we are no longer at the experimental stage in the field of the application of new technologies to the voting process (considered broadly). Electronic electoral registers as well as electronic vote counting have shown their advantages – but they are far from perfect and must still be improved. This will be discussed during the seminar.

The same is also true for on-line training which is not part of the electoral process itself, but which should not be neglected, as the training of election commissioners at all stages is often a difficult challenge which must be faced by all possible means.

There is still much reluctance towards e-voting, and in particular remote e-voting. However, this issue should no longer be considered theoretical, as it is now carried out in practice. We must also balance the advantages and the drawbacks of remote e-voting in comparison to other forms of remote voting. Problems common to all forms of remote voting, such as postal voting, should not be considered as specific to e-voting.

There is for example the risk of violation of the secrecy of the vote in the place of voting. More to the point, addressing innovation through the problems it causes (including its cost) is an extremely conservative approach which makes progress impossible. The solutions it brings must not be forgotten but underlined - in particular in terms of reliability and, also, of expenses which may be avoided.

It is now time to wish you much success - I hope that this conference will help reducing scepticism towards new ideas which should be soon considered as suitable options.

Thank you for your attention.

FIRST WORKING SESSION

ELECTRONIC VOTERS' LISTS AND REGISTERS OF VOTERS – NEW TECHNOLOGIES FACILITATING REGISTRATION: ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES

"Electronic residence registration and voter registration in Austria"

by Mr Gregor WENDA

Nation-wide elections

National Council Elections (max every 5 years)
Presidentiam Elections (max every 6 years)
European Elections (every 5 years)

Legal basis for nationa-wide elections:
Constitution and various federal acts

BM.I REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR INNERES

Austria's 9 provinces

Provinces

- specific executive powers
- provincial parliaments with select legislative powers
- own provincial electoral authorities and electoral legislation (for elections on provincial level)

BM.I REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR INNERES

Austria‘s municipalities

zmr zentrales melderegister

2357 Gemeinden Österreichs



2,357 municipalities

- maintain local election registers for federal elections
- maintain local election registers for provincial/municipal elections
- feed the Central Population Register “ZMR”

Federal Ministry of the Interior (BM.I)

Top administrative authority on the federal level and
“Election Management Body (EMB)“

Federal Minister of the Interior = Chair of the Federal Electoral Board (highest election commission in Austria)

Austrian Law of Federal Ministries:

Federal Ministry of the Interior in charge of “residence registration matters“ and “electoral matters in accordance with the Federal Constitution“

Creating the link between population and voter registration in Austria…

What we have today:

(electronic) Central Population Register
“slim“ Central Election Register
Central European Election Register

What we do not have (yet):

compulsory national ID card for every citizen
uniform personal identification number for all life situations
entirely centralized election register
electronic voters‘ lists
separate Citizens‘ Register

Central Population Register (“ZMR“)

“duty to register” in Austria

principle: after three days (hotel, private accomodation)

everybody residing in the country (not related to citizenship)

Austrians living abroad ("expatriates")

data kept seperately authorities:
mayors in municipalities → appeals: Security Directorates; overall responsibility: Federal Ministry of the Interior

Central Population Register ("ZMR")

"Zentrales Melderegister" (ZMR) as electronic data base

History:

Around the year 2000: scattered image (approx. 200 municipalities without IT infrastructure; approx. 70 different software partners of municipalities)

"ZMR" created in only 8 months (2000/2001)

interfaces for the integration of existing local registers of residence and interfaces for municipalities without local applications and software partners

Central Population Register ("ZMR") – cont'd

2002 Governmental Programme ("e-government offensive")

Adoption of an E-Government Act…

…establishing the central population register ("ZMR") as the "kernel of e-government"

Personal Identification number assigned to a person in "ZMR" → not the same in other registers (data protection!)

Central Population Register ("ZMR") – cont'd

Data bound system / register – accessible from all over Austria
for all municipalities (2,357)
for all public authorities
for the economic sector (enterprises)

70 "use cases"
registration, de-registration, re-registration
issue of registration certificate
data adjustment with the local registers of residence
special services for police authorities / alien police

Voter Registration in Austria

Who can vote?
Austrian citizens
16 years on election day
must be in electoral register on cut-off day
not excluded due to criminal conviction
expatriates: active registration required

EP Elections: Austrians & other EU citizens (formal declaration to elect Austrian MEPs)

Municipal elections: Austrians & other EU citizens (usually automatically)

Voter Registration in Austria – cont'd

Passive system: voters automatically registered (exception: Austrians permanently living abroad)

Municipalities keep election registers locally

Information extracted from "ZMR"

Voters' lists currently only on paper (!)
- "Wählerevidenz": permanently maintained, can be inspected any time
- "Wählerverzeichnis": established before an election

Voter Registration in Austria – cont'd

"Wählerverzeichnis" (voter list) → before an election

- Based on data in election register (extracted from "ZMR")
- Voter lists compiled by competent municipality
- Voters only on 1 voter list (main residence; exception for prisoners: last main residence before prison)
- Address change: need to de-register from old place of abode; re-register within three days with the new municipality
- Before cut-off date: changed automatically in voter list.

Voter Registration in Austria – cont'd

Central Election Register
- currently only "slim" IT application
- fed by municipalities (sometimes through providers)
- data transferred to Ministry twice a year (10 Feb., 10 Aug.)
- Link to Central Population Register ("ZMR")
- current "Central Election Register" = sum of all collected data

BUT:
- No clearing of data; no access by municipalities or Ministry
- Data given to parties represented in Parliament

Voter Registration in Austria – cont'd

Central European Election Register

Basis: European election registers (maintained in every municipality, like "regular" election registers)

Central database: contains data of (non-Austrian) EU citizens who declared to vote for Austrian MEPs

Necessary tool for exchange of data before a European election (according to Directive 93/109/EC)

2. Voter Registration in Austria – cont'd

Central Election Register – interface of Fed. Min. of the Interior

Data can be entered online (alternatives: CD Rom, DVD,…)

(example: selecting code for municipalities)

Central Election Register – detailed forms

7.1 Satzbeschreibung

Dateiname:	GEMZWE
Satzname:	GEM-WÄHLERSATZ
Satzform:	Fix
Bytes/Satz:	**247**
Sortierordnung	keine
Sonstige Satzspezifikationen:	Sämtliche Zeichen im „Character-Format", Groß- und Kleinbuchstaben in X-Feldern zugelassen

a FNr.	b obl.	c Feldbezeichnung		d 9/A/X	e Zeichen	f Bytes	g Anm.
1	?	Gemeindekennziffer		9		5	
2		Wahlsprengel		9		3	
3	?	Familienname		X	ÄÖÜß-	40	
4	?	Vorname		X	ÄÖÜß	20	
5		Titel		X		20	2
6	?	Geschlecht		9	Nur 12	1	3
7	?	Geburtsdatum		9		8	4
8	?	Straßenname		X	ÄÖÜß-/.,	40	5
9	?	Hausnummer		X	ÄÖÜß-/.,	10	6, 11
10		Stiege	Nummernfeld	X	ÄÖÜß-/.,	8	6
11		Türnummer		X	ÄÖÜß-/.,	10	6
12	?	Postleitzahl		X		4	12
13	?	Nummernfeldcode		9	1359	1	7,11
14		Wählerverzeichnis-Nr.		9		4	8
15		Namenskürzung		A	KM	1	9
16	?	Satzerstellungsdatum		9		8	10
17	**?**	**E-Mail-Adresse**		**X**	**@**	**64**	**13**

Central European Election Register - screenshot



Outlook

New (fully electronic) Central Election Register?

New Citizens Register

Outlook

New Central Election Register?

Part of 2008-2013 Governmental programme (but no priority)

Goal:
Real electronic central database, no more local registers

Municipalities enter data directly into centralized system

Easy online access for all municipalities (and Ministry)

Data by “ZMR” and other applications used (current Central Election Register and Central European Election Register)

More info needed than in “ZMR” (e.g. Austrians abroad, voting cards ordered, subscriptions, prisoners, etc.)

Outlook

New Central Election Register?

Many advantages
Definite clearing of data (also for European elections)

Centralized information on expatriates and other facts

No more data transfer from municipalities to Interior Ministry needed

Centralization of certain services

Corner stone for any kind of future electronic voting

BUT:

Online access needed everywhere (infrastructure)

Restrictions of access – data protection issues

Outlook

New Citizen Register

Project “Zentrales Personenstandsregister (ZPR)

2008-2013 Governmental programme
Goal: separate register (aside from Central Population Register)

What to expect:

“one stop shop” until 2013

automatic entries – access from all over Austria

specific ID number for this application

connection with “ZMR” and citizenship register

“The establishment of the electronic voters’ register in Albania”

by Mr Elmars SVEKIS

Outline

Present the situation before the introduction of electronic voter register in Albania

Describe the establishment of electronic voter register

Summarize the current situation

Look at benefits of electronic voter register extracted from population register

Identify lessons learned

Situation in 2005 (1/3)

Key problems in Albania:
- Quality of voter registers
- Identification documents

Voter register extracted from hand-written Civil Registry books

Books stored in 408 offices throughout Albania

Offices not connected. No central database

No unique ID number for persons

Mayor responsible for “his/her” voter registers and data quality

No central authority responsible for voter registers



Situation in 2005 (3/3)



- Civil Registry books – the source of voter register data

5

Objectives

Improve the voter register quality
Increase political acceptance of the voter register
The source of the problem: civil registry data
The solution: improve civil registration system and data

Activities: aims

Digital civil registry book data
Create central database of citizens
Assign unique ID to each person
Identify and remove multiple records
Enable data maintenance
Establish population registration system and transfer the data

Activities: data entry

Data entry in 408 civil status offices
476 workstations
More than 700 data entry operators
Double data entry
Two shifts
4,250,000 records digitized
Timeline: November 2007 – July 2008

Activities other

Develop temporary software for data maintenance during the transition period
Strengthen civil status service capacity for the new system
Establishing address system:
Create address register
Link persons with an address
Personal data protection authority established
Large scale public awareness on civil registry procedures and personal data protection

Current situation

National Register of Civil Status (NRCS) launched in December 2008
Unique ID for each citizen
Data up-to-date, accurate and complete
NRSC the personal data source for many purposes:
Voter register
Biometric ID cards and passports
Public administration: police and social welfare, etc.
Multiple records for the same person eliminated through biometric application process
Update of data technical and transparent process

Current situation: elections

Voter register generated from NRCS at any time
Transparent and technical process
Some 3,200,000 records on voter register
Mayors responsible for voter register. Data verifies based on the source documentation in the municipality
Voter register not contested during the last elections
Same data on voter register and on ID documents

Lessons learned: civil register vs voter register

Establishing functioning civil registration system – a sustainable solution
Breaking the cycle of dealing with improvements before each elections
Source principle: register once – multiple use

Lessons learned: technical issues

Data entry process: detailed planning and adequate resources
Sufficient time for technical work: no elections for two years (February 2007 and June 2009)
Change of mentality: incremental process
Utilise digitized data as soon as possible: data outdated day by day
Address register important component
Linking person with the location crucial for voter register

Lessons learned: conclusion

Political will
Allocate budget resources: ownership and sustainability
Local solution based on internationally recognised principles
Link process to bigger national prioroties: European integration and visa liberalisation
Technical process: limited political opposition
Public awareness: explain the process and gain public trust
Personal data protection considerations

“Access to information on voters’ lists”

by Mr Yuriy KLIUCHKOVSKYI

The problem we have to discuss on this workgroup is the access to information on voters’ lists and voters’ registers. As it often happens in public relations there exists a problem of collision between different basic legal principles.

Voters’ lists are the instrument of ensuring the universal suffrage. Everybody entitled to the right to vote has to have a possibility to vote. At the same time voters’ lists must guarantee one-fold voting by every voter. This means that every voter can be placed on voter’s lists only once.

The identification of a voter included to the voters’ list is made using his/her personal data – the name, date of birth, place of residence; sometimes some additional data are used. And this is the moment when a dilemma arises.

On the one hand, due to the principle of privacy personal data of every private person must be protected from illegal access and improper use.

On the other hand, correctness of voters’ lists is one of important aspects for realization of one of the basic principles of democratic elections, namely the principle of fair elections. Thus, there exists a necessity of public control of their correctness which needs a public access at least to some of personal data of voters’ lists. I’d like to remind that the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters declares: “The electoral registers must be published” (par. 1.2.iii).

Naturally every state solves this collision in its own manner proceeding on a base of social traditions and political situation.

I have to describe shortly the solution of mentioned dilemma which is adopted now in my country – in Ukraine. It’s obvious that such a solution cannot be considered as the best one or even the most appropriate. Nevertheless I’d like to notice that the experience of realization of the basic principles of electoral law in transitional and semi-democratic countries as Ukraine is now shows sometimes some aspects of these principles which are traditionally unnoticeable in traditionally democratic countries.

A great majority of the Council of Europe member states started (some of them for centuries ago) permanent registration of citizens, population, or voters. In Ukraine, the State voters’ register is functioning only for couple of years; the electronic database of the Register contains personal data of about 35 million of citizens of Ukraine who are eligible to vote. Thus our experience of solving the above mentioned dilemma is very young.

Obviously the set of personal data of every voter necessarily contains some information which should be considered as a confidential one. We, in Ukraine, have selected the way of minimization of such information to the really necessary level. That is why we have the voters’ register rather than the register of population.

Nevertheless a part of voters’ personal data must be public. It concerns the data identifying a voter personally, his/her status as well as ensuring one-fold including him/her to the Register and to voters’ lists. These data are: the name, a year (in the case of young people voting first time – a month and a day) of birth and a place of residence (or electoral address). Other data are considered to be closed. The access to the closed part of the Register database is permitted only partly and only for the specially authorized employees of the Register maintenance bodies. Such access is realized with the special electronic key separated in two parts; two employees possess

different parts of the key. Any other access to the whole electronic database of the Register is denied both in the recording and copying regime.

Speaking on the public access to the open part of the voters' personal data we should distinguish two different situations. One of them is the access to the open data of the voters' Register which could take place regardless to the election process. Another situation concerns access to voters' lists (or voters' rolls) the latter being documents used during voting on elections in polling stations.

Despite the absence of the access to the electronic database for persons not authorized for it the law foresees some mechanisms to obtain information given by the Register maintenance bodies.

First of all, every voter has a right to become acquainted in any time with his own personal data in full on his request to the corresponding Register maintenance body, but only on paper. It corresponds to the constitutional demand of free access of every citizen to the information concerning himself. A voter can also make objections against some data the content of which he/she considers as being wrong.

Secondly, everybody can obtain for request open data of all voters with the applicant's electoral address.

Thirdly, the parties represented in Parliament are eligible to get once a year an electronic copy of the database of the Register (without confidential data) safe from copying. A party can use these data for public control of the corresponding information during two months and then has to give the disc back to the Central Election Commission.

Fourthly, the statistical information on the number of voters in different territorial administrative units (oblast, rayon, city, town, village) is available in an open access on the official web-site of the Central Election Commission which is updated every month. It gives a possibility to observe changes of the voter number in dynamics.

Any other cases of access to information of the Register database could be permitted only by a court decision. Thus, as you see, the access to the electronic database of the Register is strongly limited. The open information is available in all cases only on paper.

Voters' lists as documents for polling stations are compiled on the base of Register data by corresponding Register maintenance bodies after the beginning of an election process. Voters' list contains open data only, including voter's place of residence.

Polling station electoral commission obtains voters' list in twenty days before the elections day. Beginning from the next day till the elections day voters' lists are open to everybody. I'd like to stress that every voter can re-examine voters' lists on every polling station irrespectively of being included to the corresponding voters' list. Nevertheless he/she is not allowed to make a copy of this document.

To sum up, we, in Ukraine, have chosen the way of maximal transparency of the open part of voters' personal data both in the Registers and in voters' lists but only in a paper form. We consider it to be the way to promote correctness of voters' lists, to avoid mistakes as far as possible and to prevent from abuse and fraud. In this case the principle of personal privacy must give place to guarantees of electoral rights of many people which needs openness of corresponding minimal set of voters' personal data. On the other hand the access to the State voters' register electronic database is strongly limited which is considered as means of its integrity and security.

This is the solution adopted in Ukraine. Other countries could select different priorities whish would lead to different solutions. I hope it'll be interesting to discuss these issues.

"Bodies responsible for electronic lists"

by Mr Gregor WENDA

2011 Electoral Reform

General Facts

On 29 April 2011, members of three Austrian parties – "SPÖ" (Austrian Social Democrats), "ÖVP" (Austrian People's Party) and "BZÖ" (Alliance for the Future of Austria) – introduced a bill in parliament which proposed a variety of changes to the Austrian electoral law. It is a common tradition in Austria to amend electoral laws by initiatives of members of the Austrian parliament rather than by bills proposed by the government. Only a very small number of electoral changes over the past twenty years were the result of governmental bills, for example the 2007 reform introducing full postal voting. The proposed law was adopted by the National Council – the lower chamber of the Austrian parliament – on 16 June 2011. Four out of five parties – the above-mentioned parties and "The Greens" – were in favour of the proposed changes.[1] The electoral reform took up a significant number of recommendations and suggestions raised in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report issued on the occasion of the 2010 Presidential Elections, particularly concerning the system of postal voting, the use of voting cards, and the abolishment of a provision that prevented members of formerly "ruling houses" such as the Habsburg Family to stand in presidential elections. The changes of the electoral law went into force on 1 October 2011.[2]

Postal Voting

Until the 2011 reform, the final counting of postal ballots began only after the deadline for their receipt eight days after poll day (in presidential elections: five days after poll day). The historic reason for this prolonged deadline was to allow postal ballots coming from abroad to be included in the tally. Although it was forbidden to cast a postal vote after election day (this had to be declared by an affidavit on the voting card) the fear of possible manipulation was increasingly voiced. Pursuant to the 2011 reform, all postal ballots now have to arrive at the electoral authority on election day (until closing of the last ballot stations at 5 p.m.) at the latest. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of deadlines in the electoral process were moved back to allow for a rather comparable time-frame.

In addition, the process of producing means of identification when applying for a voting card was tightened in order to ensure that nobody else can get a voting card. In many cases, voting cards now have to be sent by registered mail in order to track the delivery and to make the voter sign a confirmation of receipt. Persons in retirement homes or special care homes have to confirm the receipt in person and cannot rely on somebody else to pick up the voting card on their behalf. With these steps, highest security standards in the voting card and postal voting system are guaranteed. At the same time, the advantages and the flexibility of this voting channel were not given up.

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[1] For further details, see the website of the Austrian Parliament (http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/A/A_01527/index.shtml#tab-ParlamentarischesVerfahren).

[2] Published in the Austrian Federal Law Gazette on 7 July 2011 ("BGBl I Nr. 43/2011").

Exclusion from voting rights

Another issue tackled by the 2011 reform was the exclusion of certain candidates (descendants of [formerly] regnant families) in presidential elections. The Austrian Federal Constitution and the Presidential Elections Act were amended and the prohibition rule was dropped. In the future, there will be no restrictions whatsoever to stand in presidential elections.

In addition, voting restrictions for prisoners were modified after the ruling “Frodl vs. Austria” of the European Court of Human Rights. Since October 2011, disenfranchisement of prisoners only takes place if so decided in an individual sentence rendered by a criminal court. In their decision on disenfranchisement, judges have to consider the particular circumstances of the individual case. As additional safeguard, a new provision was incorporated into the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1975, which stipulates that “disenfranchisement […] [is to be] […] decided [upon] in the criminal judgment” and that this decision, being taken on an equal footing with the sentence, “can be appealed against”.

Judges can exclude individuals from the right to vote if they have been sentenced with final effect to a term of imprisonment of more than one year, given that there is a link between the offence committed and issues relating to elections and democratic institutions, or if they have been duly sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than five years for criminal offences committed with intent. An exhaustive list of offences linked to issues relating to elections and democratic institutions, which include high treason and other assaults against the state, assaults against the supreme organs of the state, assaults against the army, criminal offences related to elections and referenda, was explicitly incorporated into the National Council Elections Act. In line with the Austrian constitution, these amendments also apply to the elections of parliaments on the provincial level as well as to municipal and mayoral elections. Hence the respective provincial laws had to be amended as well.

SECOND WORKING SESSION

USING NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR TRAINING OFFICIALS OF ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES AND ELECTIONS

"Use of new technologies for election observers training and registration: Latvia's experience"

by Ms Kristine BERZINA

Dear colleagues,

I appreciate the opportunity to be with you here today and to share the experience of IT implementation for elections in Latvia. I would like to speak about a project called "Volunteer Election Observers", carried out by the Central Election Commission of Latvia in cooperation with the company "Intea" specialized in developing and consulting of interactive e-trainings.

In this project we used IT solutions for training and registration of election observers. The gained experience is an example of how modern technologies can be used not only for such important stages of the election process as developing of voter lists and vote counting, but for involving of different social groups into electoral process, too.

The project "Volunteer Election Observers"

For the first time the Central Election Commission of Latvia implemented the project "Volunteer Election Observers" in the Parliamentary elections of 2010. After that the project was implemented another three times – in the Referendum on dissolution of the 10th Saeima in 2011, in the early Parliamentary elections of 2011, and in this year Referendum on the second official language. Taking into account the gained experience and positive opinion of the project users', we intend to continue this project in the future too, as implementation of good governance principles.
The idea of the project arose at the time, when public confidence in government and local authorities was very low because of economic crisis and austerity measures that Latvia's people experienced for several years. For example, in 2009 only 7.3% of the Latvia's population were confident in government and just 4.5% were confident in parliament.

Having evaluated public sentiments, we concluded that one of the risks associated with this unpleasant situation is a possible decrease of public confidence also in election commissions and election results. So, it was necessary to undertake efforts to promote voters' confidence.

The project goals

The project "Volunteer Election observers" was conceived as one of the Central Election Commission's public relations projects, that has two main goals:

to promote public confidence in electoral process
to introduce young voters to the voting procedure and vote counting at a polling station.

The project target audience

The project target audience was the inhabitants of Latvia, reached 16 years of age.

Until the project was launched, mostly authorised observers from political parties and parties' associations, as well as mass media representatives observed the voting procedure and vote counting at polling stations.

But within this project our goal was to provide the opportunity to observe elections and referendums for those who were not members of any political party. Moreover we considered it important that not only Latvian citizens would have the possibility to observe elections, but also those inhabitants of Latvia who hadn't the citizenship of Latvia.

Of course before the project was introduced persons interested in election observation could become observers by addressing political parties. Unfortunately parties often didn't want to authorize as observers persons who were not members of particular party. Besides in the situation when most people are not confident in government and parliament they are not confident in political parties either and didn't wish to become party observers.

At the same time the project was an attempt to attract the attention of young people to election administration and to make them acquaint with election procedure at polling stations. That's why the minimum age for applicants was determined 16 years, not 18 years when citizens become eligible to vote. Thus young people under voting age were encouraged to familiarize themselves with elections as observers at a polling station.

Challenge

1) volunteer observers training;

2) volunteer observers' registration

During the project one of the main challenges was how to make volunteer observers to learn both the conditions of election procedure and vote counting, and their own duties. From experience we know one of the biggest problems connected with election observers - they are not often aware of the conditions of voting process and vote counting and have rather incomplete knowledge about their own rights and duties. As a consequence a misunderstanding can arise at a polling station or complaints about seeming violations are received where there is no justified violation.

Additional reason for training election observers in Latvia is our complicated vote counting system that differs from many countries, including our closest neighbours – Lithuania and Estonia. For example, in parliamentary elections in Latvia each vote counting minutes of our capital Riga's polling stations contain 1.400 entries.

What is the cause of having so many entries in the vote counting minutes? Firstly, in Latvia each candidate list is printed on a separate ballot paper and the preferred ballot paper shall be put into a ballot envelope. These ballot envelopes are the strict security documents. Secondly, each voter may put a sign "+" to those candidates to whom he/she gives special support in these elections or the voter may cross out unfavourable candidates.

This means that knowledge of election system and vote counting conditions helps observers to realize why the names of newly elected members of the Latvia's parliament cannot be announced at once in the election night, as it happens in these countries where other voting procedure is used.

At the beginning to solve the observers' training issue we thought to organize seminars in all

regions of the country but after having evaluated our facilities we realized that it required too many resources.

We also didn't want to make observers spend their own money and time to attend the seminars. The trainings should be convenient and easy accessible to all people. On the other hand we didn't want to issue observer's proxy for persons who hadn't learnt anything about voting procedure, vote counting and observers duties.

It is how we found the solution – to teach and register volunteer election observers at a distance, via an online training course on Internet.

The advantage of online training course is not only saved time and resources. This method enables to acquire knowledge in interesting and exciting way. Besides, the programme allows controlling whether a user has read the material and studied a topic. It is achieved by special tasks user has to complete during the training course. If a correct answer is not given the programme do not allow continuing the course. User should go back and read the material once again.

The registration of volunteer observer is placed at the end of the training course. Thus only those users who have gone through the entire course and answered all the tasks could register themselves as election observers.

Presentation of e-training programme

To start the training course the participants of the project needed to register on the training web-portal through the website of the Central Election Commission.

This registration made us possible to aggregate the users' statistics as well to check whether observers had completed the training course or not.



The most important issues from election law and regulations of the Central Election Commission were included in the course. The course consisted of five parts – introductory part, three parts about voting procedure and vote counting, and the last part that gave a possibility to register for election observation.

The introductory slides described:

the purpose of the course;



how to use the course;



frequently used abbreviations;



The main parts of the course were:

1) functions of the polling station before the election day;



2) election day;

3) vote counting.



I will continue with demonstration of some slides that gives an insight of the possibilities of the course.

For example, here is the slide that explains what the Minutes of Voting process is.



If a user clicks on the underlined words, he/she can see the explanation what information should be entered into the Minutes



Each important section of the training course is followed by tasks where a trainee should to choose one on several correct answers. After the task is completed the programme shows whether the answers are right or wrong.



Besides the programme allowed to include different visual elements into the training. This slide explains how a polling station should be equipped.



If you click on the picture in the bottom-left corner you move to another slide where you can learn more about each position of the equipment by pointing the cursor on it. Here the explanation shows the accessories to be available in a voting booth.



Similarly you can learn what equipment should be on an election clerk's desk and what duties each member of the polling station commission has.



Another possibility of the training course is to divide a longer text into several shorter parts and thereby make it easier to understand. For example, here the programme offers to read and understand the first four points of a text, and after that - the next five.





Here are some more slides from the Vote counting section.



This slide explains which operations should be done to prepare for vote counting. By pointing the cursor on the underlined words a trainee can open a picture with a respective section of the Vote counting minutes.



In addition the training material visually demonstrates the possible versions of invalid ballot envelopes and possible kinds of ballot papers.





By pointing the cursor on each small picture trainee can find out the right action in the respective case.

So the online training course helps to keep attention of the trainees and makes them follow the content – not only in traditional way by reading but also by acting trough different visual tasks.

Finally at the end of the training course each user can make a choice whether to fill in the application form to receive the volunteer observer's proxy or not.



If a user chooses to become an observer, he/she should fill in the application form and indicate one polling station at which he/she would like to be present on election day.

One of the Application Form entries demands a short explanation of the applicant's motivation for participation as election observer. The applicant should also indicate his/her phone number and e-mail address and has to confirm that he/she is completed the online training course.

The applicant also confirms that he/she is aware the observer's proxy can be cancelled in case the commission finds out that the observer had not completed the training course, observer is less than 16 years old, can not produce the identification document along with the observer's proxy at a polling station, exceeds the powers of the election observer or disturbs the polling station commission.

After completing the Application Form the observer receives an e-mail with request to accept the registration. After that observer receives a proxy which is prepared electronically and is valid

without any signature. The proxy along with the person's ID should be produced to the polling station commission on the election day.

After the deadline of volunteer election observers' registration the Central Election Commission distributes the list of observers to the polling station commissions.

Additional Benefit of the Project

In conclusion I would like to add that in the process of the project implementation we understood that the elaborated training course could be used for two more goals – for the training of parties' and parties associations' authorised observers and for the training of members of the polling station commissions. So we sent the information about electronic training course available on the Central Election Commission's website to the political parties and parties' associations, as well as to the local and polling station commissions.

Statistics

In 2010 when we launched this project for the first time there were 1.514 users registered in the training system of the Central Election Commission. 483 from these users were volunteer observers, 72 – observers authorised by political parties and parties' associations and 951 – representative of the polling station commissions. Almost a half or 218 from 483 registered volunteer observers chose to fill in the Application Form and received the Central Election Commission's volunteer observer proxy.

After the parliamentary elections of 2010 the Central Election Commission took an opinion poll where one of the questions was "Do you think that election results at the polling station where you voted, were counted correctly?" 75% answered the question in the affirmative. Making the comparison with the indicators of confidence in government and parliament in 2010 this indicator was really high.

Thank you very much for your attention!

“Using new solutions in informing the voter, observer and officer – solutions in 2011 elections”

by Mr Siiri SILLAJÕE

Forms of e-trainings:

NEC e-learning environment
“election school” videos in YouTube
information on the web site of the NEC (incl FAQ)
Facebook
Twitter, etc.

E-learning Environment : Principles

allow the members of electoral committees, but also observers and voters, better preparation for the elections;

offer newcomers as well as people with experience a simple and alternative way to dust off what they already knew and reinforce it;

participate on a voluntary basis;

create a complimentary instrument next to the traditional training (instructional materials on paper, seminars, etc) and not in its stead.

E-learning Environment : Pre-requierements

A wide range of functionality, for instance:

registration of users, presentation of study materials and photos, multiple choice tests,
display of results to users, web links, instructions for use, possibility to comment, questionnaires, etc.
In addition, users can be grouped and fitting tests determined for each level.

Web based learning environment should be structured in a logical way and be as simple and comfortable to use as possible.

Why Moodle?

an open source platform;

easy to use for participants as well as administrators, configurable according to needs;
Moodle offers a variety of possibilities and innovative solutions;

it allows an in-depth analysis of the results;

reliability. It has been well-tested and is developed by a strong international community. Moodle is used widely across the world.

E-Learning Environment : Courses

The most complex and in-depth course (14 chapters) was directed first and foremost at members of electoral committees.

In order for an observer to understand what is going on in the polling division, a more superior level course was also recommended.
A course for voters (11 chapters) was easier and graduates received all the main information in a concentrated form – when and how to vote.

To firmly learn the new information and test it, every user may answer test questions at the end of each chapter. Test results are not published.

"Bridge – Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections"

by Mr Adolfo CAYUSO

What is Bridge?

Bridge is standing for building resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections
Bridge is a modular professional development program with a particular focus on elections
The Bridge curriculum is delievered through face-to-face workshops using adult learning principles by accredited Bridge facilitators

The history of Bridge

Before Bridge, few formal opportunities available for comprehensive porfessional development in electoral administration
Electoral experts gathered to discuss creation of what is now BRIDGE in 1999
The first Bridge program was implemented in Timor-Leste in 2001

The objectives of Bridge

To promote internationally accepted electoral principles
To enhance the skills and confideance of stakeholders
To increase the awareness of tools and resources
To develop a support network for stakeholders in electoral processes

Who is Bridge for?

EMB staff
Electoral commissioners
Members of the Media
Political Parties
Parliamentarians
Security forces
Civil Society Groups
Academics and University students

Bridge today

Bridge has been run:
In 72 countries
For over 9700 participants
There are over 1650 fully accreditated Bridge facilitators from 129 nationalities
There is a Bridge workshop beeing run somewhere in the world every week

The Bridge methodology

Recognises if you want people to act professionally you must treat them as professionals
Acknowledges and values diversity
Encourages dialogue, sharing of knowledge and active participation
Is supportive rather than prescriptive
Makes participants responsible for their own learning
Encourages local ownership of the curriculum by CUSTOMIZING the contents
It's live training. No e-learning involved

Electoral technology!

Audio/visual applications
Bio-identification systems (Digital pictures, finger printing identification)
Call centers
DBMC (Data Base Management Systems)
EVM (Electroning Voting Machines)
GIS (Geographic Information Systems)
ICR (Intelligent Character Recognition)
OMR (Optical Mark Recognition)
PINs (Personal Identification Numbers)
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
SMS (Short Message Service)
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol)
User interfaces for data submissions (Barcodes, keyboards, optical scanning, touch screen)
Web publishing

The eternal question

A good trainer has to be just an outstanding, didactical communicator despite his/her knowledge of the matter

A good trainer has to know perfectly the matter regardless his/her capacity to communicate or beeing didactical


The BRIDGE Curriculum
FOUNDATION MODULES
Introduction to Electoral Administration
Strategic & Financial Planning
ELECTORAL ARCHITECTURE
Legal Framework
Boundary Delimitation
Electoral Systems
Electoral Management Design
Electoral Technology
Political Finance
WORKING WITH ELECTORAL STAKEHOLDERS
Access to the Electoral Process
Gender & Elections
Voter Information
Civic Education
Media & Elections
Electoral Contestants
Electoral Dispute Resolution
Electoral Observation
Electoral Assistance
ELECTORAL OPERATIONS
Voter Registration
Pre-election Activities
Training of Electoral Officials
Polling, Counting & Results
Post-election Activities
External Voting
Electoral Security


The resource networks
IFE
INSTITUTO FEDERAL ELECTORAL
a collaborative effort
ace
PROJECT | PROJET | PROYECTO
The Electoral Knowledge Network
IDEA
EISA
Elections Canada
European Commission
UNDP
IFES


The BRIDGE and ACE modus operandi
existing online databases, tools, publications and libraries
centralized repository for electoral knowledge/curriculum files
acquisition
part of the project
dissemination
Electoral Systems
Legislative Framework
Electoral Management
Boundary Delimitation
Voter Education
Voter Registration
Voting Operations
Parties and Candidates
Vote Counting
Media and Elections
Election Integrity
Elections and Technology
Practitioner sand/or Facilitators' Networks
produce and share knowledge

Functioning of the BRIDGE Website

Other sources of knowledge

… and obviously…

The European Commission for Democracy through Law

Post scriptum
Bridge Electoral Technology Module

A framework for policy makers, electoral officials and electoral stakeholders to decide on the appropriate level of technology
Overview of the state of the art of technological application in elections
Sound management approach in introducing new technologies

“Establishment of the electronic voters’ register in Albania”

by Mr Elmars SVEKIS

Outline

Present the situation before the introduction of electronic voter register in Albania

Describe the establishment of electronic voter register

Summarize the current situation

Look at benefits of electronic voter register extracted from population register

Identify lessons learned

Situation in 2005

Key problems in Albania:
- Quality of voter registers
- Identification documents

Voter register extracted from hand-written Civil Registry books

Books stored in 408 offices throughout Albania

Offices not connected. No central database

No unique ID number for persons

Mayor responsible for “his/her” voter registers and data quality

No central authority responsible for voter registers



Situation in 2005 (3/3)



- Civil Registry books – the source of voter register data

5

Objectives

Improve the voter register quality
Increase political acceptance of the voter register
The source of the problem: civil registry data
The solution: improve civil registration system and data

Activities: aims

Digital civil registry book data
Create central database of citizens
Assign unique ID to each person
Identify and remove multiple records
Enable data maintenance
Establish population registration system and transfer the data

Activities: data entry

Data entry in 408 civil status offices
476 workstations
More than 700 data entry operators
Double data entry
Two shifts
4,250,000 records digitized
Timeline: November 2007 – July 2008

Activities other

Develop temporary software for data maintenance during the transition period
Strengthen civil status service capacity for the new system
Establishing address system:
Create address register
Link persons with an address
Personal data protection authority established
Large scale public awareness on civil registry procedures and personal data protection

Current situation

National Register of Civil Status (NRCS) launched in December 2008
Unique ID for each citizen
Data up-to-date, accurate and complete
NRSC the personal data source for many purposes:
Voter register
Biometric ID cards and passports
Public administration: police and social welfare, etc.
Multiple records for the same person eliminated through biometric application process
Update of data technical and transparent process

Current situation: elections

Voter register generated from NRCS at any time
Transparent and technical process
Some 3,200,000 records on voter register
Mayors responsible for voter register. Data verifies based on the source documentation in the municipality
Voter register not contested during the last elections
Same data on voter register and on ID documents

Lessons learned: civil register vs voter register

Establishing functioning civil registration system – a sustainable solution
Breaking the cycle of dealing with improvements before each elections
Source principle: register once – multiple use

Lessons learned: technical issues

Data entry process: detailed planning and adequate resources
Sufficient time for technical work: no elections for two years (February 2007 and June 2009)
Change of mentality: incremental process
Utilise digitized data as soon as possible: data outdated day by day
Address register important component
Linking person with the location crucial for voter register

Lessons learned: conclusion

Political will
Allocate budget resources: ownership and sustainability
Local solution based on internationally recognised principles
Link process to bigger national prioroties: European integration and visa liberalisation
Technical process: limited political opposition
Public awareness: explain the process and gain public trust
Personal data protection considerations

THIRD WORKING SESSION

FIGHTING ELECTORAL FRAUD AND SECURING THE E-ENABLED VOTING – THE ROLE OF THE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION AND OBSERVATION OF VOTING

"Security first: verifiable electronic voting in Norway"

by Mr Christian BULL

Agenda

Facts on the Norwegian electoral system and the 2011 e-voting pilots
Norwegian preconditions for e-voting
An overview of the functional solution
Verifiability in Norwegian e-voting
Key numbers from the pilots
Lessons learned

Facts on voting in Norway

EMB is within the Ministry of local government
3.800.000 in electoral roll
64,5% turnout in the 2011 local elections
Parliamentary and local elections every four years
Complex ballot. Voters can make changes by reordering, adding and deleting candidates
Inetrnet voting period: 10 August -9 September
Election day: 12 September

E-vote 2011 project scope

Pilot Internet voting in 10 municipalities (4,5% of population) in the 2011 municipal and county council elections
Implement a new, central, fully integrated elections administrative system

Milestones 2008-2012





The election administrative system

As part of the E-vote 2011 project, a new election administration system was developed
Incorporates ballot scanning
Electronic voter registry derived from the population registry
Owned and operated by the government

Changes to the EMB's role in Norway
Historically…

All election ICTs used in Norway were provided by private vendors
The EMB was responsible for the electoral legal framework

From 2013…

The EMB owns and operates the central election ICT system
All municipalities and counties will use it

Our definition of "e-voting"

In Norwegian terms, "e-voting" means that an electronic ballot is sent via the Internet and counted centrally
Not scanning of paper ballots

Possibilities for fraud in e-voting

Whenever the subject of electronic voting is discussed, fraud is a hot topic:

- Vote selling/Coercion
- Vote-changing viruses
- Manipulation of votes or results:
  - by EMB staff
  - by software vendors
  - by "hackers"

The Norwegian Internet voting system



- You can e-vote as many times you want (re-voting)
- You may cancel your e-vote by voting on paper



Authentiwhat?

When you turn up at the polling station, you are required to *identify* yourself.
In Norway, voters have been required to produce an *ID-card* to vote (since 2007)
This is analogous to the process of *authentication* to a computer system, for instance using an eID.
A proper authentication system is one of the most important preconditions for e-voting


Logget inn som:Kirsti Brostrøm | Logg ut | Spørsmål og svar
VALG | Elektronisk stemmegivning QA-TEST
A A A
Velg parti eller gruppe ved kommunestyrevalget i Hammerfest
Det er 7 partier og grupper som stiller til valg i Hammerfest.
Velg det partiet eller gruppen du vil stemme på (partiene og gruppene vises i tilfeldig rekkefølge):
Kystpartiet
Senterpartiet
Sosialistisk Venstreparti
Høyre
Fremskrittspartiet
Kristelig Folkeparti
Det norske Arbeiderparti
Blank stemmeseddel
Gå tilbake
Avbryt
Vis stemmeseddelen


Logget inn som:Kirsti Brostrøm | Logg ut | Spørsmål og svar
VALG | Elektronisk stemmegivning QA-TEST
A A A
Stemmeseddel for Kystpartiet ved kommunestyrevalget i Hammerfest
Disse 23 kandidatene stiller til valg for Kystpartiet. Du kan velge om du vil endre på stemmeseddelen eller ikke. Du kan gi personstemme til en eller flere kandidater på listen. Det gjør du ved å sette et merke i ruten ved navnet til kandidaten. Du kan også gi personstemme til kandidater fra andre partier eller grupper.
01. Anne-Mette Bæivi f. 1971
02. Oddvar Linnes f. 1956
03. Andre Larsen f. 1966
04. Thomas Elverum f. 1986
05. Anne Grete Pedersen f. 1964
06. Fritjof Nilsen f. 1969
07. Hildur Hagen f. 1964
08. Tommy Andersen f. 1974
09. Sølvi Bæivi f. 1990
10. Mona Gaaseng f. 1954
11. Kurt-Arild Henriksen f. 1968
12. Alf Larsen f. 1948
13. Marilou Pontanares Larsen f. 1966
14. Edith Nilsen f. 1978
15. Freddy Salomonsen f. 1977
16. Asle Juliussen f. 1975
17. Jørn Rune Dagsvold f. 1973
18. Marianne Dagsvold f. 1973

04. Thomas Elverum	**f. 1986**
05. Anne Grete Pedersen	f. 1964
06. Fritjof Nilsen	f. 1969
07. Hildur Hagen	f. 1964
08. Tommy Andersen	f. 1974
09. Sølvi Bæivi	f. 1990
10. Mona Gaaseng	f. 1954
11. Kurt-Arild Henriksen	f. 1968
12. Alf Larsen	f. 1948
13. Marilou Pontanares Larsen	f. 1966
14. Edith Nilsen	f. 1978
15. Freddy Salomonsen	f. 1977
16. Asle Juliussen	f. 1975
17. Jørn Rune Dagsvold	f. 1973
18. Marianne Dagsvold	f. 1973
19. Ole Pedersen	f. 1960
20. Eirik Bæivi	f. 1973
21. Astrid Salomonsen	f. 1982
22. Steinar Hansen	f. 1964
23. Liv Fjellstad	f. 1947

☑ **01. Anne-Mette Bæivi**	**f. 1971**
☐ **02. Oddvar Linnes**	**f. 1956**
☐ **03. Andre Larsen**	**f. 1966**
☐ **04. Thomas Elverum**	**f. 1986**
☐ 05. Anne Grete Pedersen	f. 1964
☐ 06. Fritjof Nilsen	f. 1969
☐ 07. Hildur Hagen	f. 1964
☐ 08. Tommy Andersen	f. 1974
☐ 09. Sølvi Bæivi	f. 1990
☐ 10. Mona Gaaseng	f. 1954
☐ 11. Kurt-Arild Henriksen	f. 1968
☐ 12. Alf Larsen	f. 1948
☐ 13. Marilou Pontanares Larsen	f. 1966
☐ 14. Edith Nilsen	f. 1978
☐ 15. Freddy Salomonsen	f. 1977
☐ 16. Asle Juliussen	f. 1975
☐ 17. Jørn Rune Dagsvold	f. 1973
☐ 18. Marianne Dagsvold	f. 1973


09. Sølvi Bæivi f. 1990
10. Mona Gaaseng f. 1954
11. Kurt-Arild Henriksen f. 1968
12. Alf Larsen f. 1948
13. Marilou Pontanares Larsen f. 1966
14. Edith Nilsen f. 1978
15. Freddy Salomonsen f. 1977
16. Asle Juliussen f. 1975
17. Jørn Rune Dagsvold f. 1973
18. Marianne Dagsvold
19. Ole Pedersen
20. Eirik Bæivi
21. Astrid Salomonsen
22. Steinar Hansen
23. Liv Fjellstad
Velg kandidat
Dan Sølvfester Andersen, Det norske Arbeiderparti, f. 1972
Terje Willy Andersen, Fremskrittspartiet, f. 1967
Bjørn Andreassen, Fremskrittspartiet, f. 1949
Marianne Arild, Høyre, f. 1978
Per Gunnar Arnesen, Høyre, f. 1967
Inger Johanne Arnesen, Høyre, f. 1957
Svein Aspelund, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, f. 1958
Leif Arne Asphaug-Hansen, Det norske Arbeiderparti, f. 1958
Liv Mari Bakkeby, Det norske Arbeiderparti, f. 1957
Tarjei Jensen Bech, Det norske Arbeiderparti, f. 1992
Trond Atle Berg, Fremskrittspartiet, f. 1967
Anne Katrine Berg, Kristelig Folkeparti, f. 1974
Karin Berg, Senterpartiet, f. 1950
Tara Bloch, Høyre, f. 1990
Gunnar Bolle, Høyre, f. 1953
Svein Bratland, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, f. 1948
Ann-Helene Dagsvold, Fremskrittspartiet, f. 1981
Hans Arne Dahl, Kristelig Folkeparti, f. 1946
Marita Didriksen, Høyre, f. 1987
Du kan gi personstemme til inntil 7 kandidater fra
Dette gjør du ved å velge kandidater fra nedtrekk
Randi Ree, Senterpartiet, f. 1961
Alle partier
Velg kandidat
Gå tilbake
Avbryt
Gå videre med endringer på stemmeseddel
Trenger du hjelp?Ring brukerstøtte på tlf. 800 38 254 (800 EVALG)
Versjon: 2.2.1


Vennligst kontroller stemmeseddelen din:
Du stemmer på:
KYSTPARTIET
Du har gitt personstemme til:
Anne-Mette Bæivi f. 1971
Du har gitt personstemme til kandidat(er) fra andre partier og grupper:
Randi Ree, Senterpartiet, f. 1961
Dan Sølvfester Andersen, Det norske Arbeiderparti, f. 1972
Terje Willy Andersen, Fremskrittspartiet, f. 1967
Marianne Arild, Høyre, f. 1978
Svein Aspelund, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, f. 1958
Anne Katrine Berg, Kristelig Folkeparti, f. 1974
Trykk "Gå tilbake" dersom du vil korrigere stemmen din.
Trykk "Send inn stemmeseddelen" for å levere stemmen din.
Gå tilbake
Avbryt
Send inn stemmeseddelen
Trenger du hjelp?Ring brukerstøtte på tlf. 800 38 254 (800 EVALG)
Versjon: 2.2.1



22 Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet



23 Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet

VALG

Return codes via SMS

Hi, Kirsti Bostrøm.
Your vote at the municipal council election was received 09/08-11 09:18:00.

You voted for the party with code 0975. You have 1 personal vote and listed 6 candidates from other parties.

You should check your return code against your poll card. Call 800 38 254 if the codes do not correspond.

VALG

Poll card with return codes

VALG VALGKORT 2011
Kommunestyre- og fylkestingsvalget 2011

Boda kommune
Valgstyret
Postboks 319
8001 Boda

Krets	Rode	Side	Linje
0025			

Fødselsår	Kommunenr.	Nr. i manntallet
1991	1804	000044

Navn: Nore Per Wessel

Nore Per Wessel
LANGHØYANE 28
0553 Forsøkskommune

Valglokale på valgdagen er:
Landego skole
8098 Landegode

På valgdagen er lokalet åpent:
16.08.2011 Kl. 11.00 - 05.00

Dato Stemmemottakers signatur



Stem via Internett på evalg.stat.no

1. Gå inn på evalg.stat.no
2. Gi din stemme
3. Kontroller at returkoden du får via SMS er den samme som på valgkortet

Hva bruker jeg returkodene som står på valgkortet til?

Returkodene på valgkoret er unike for deg og kan brukes til å kontrollere at stemmen din er kommet fram og er riktig registrert. Stemmer du via Internett, vil du få tilsendt en returkode via SMS. Returkoden kan du sammenligne med koden på valgkortet ditt. Kodene skal være like. Det er frivillig å gjøre denne kontrollen.

Hvis returkoden ikke er i samsvar med det du har stemt, er det viktig at vi får vite om det. Ta straks kontakt med brukerstøtte på tlf. 800 38 254 og meld fra om problemet.

0975

Returkoder for kommunestyre- og fylkestingsvalget

Parti-/gruppenavn	Kode	Parti-/gruppenavn	Kode
Blank stemmeseddel	6129	Det norske Arbeiderparti	3643
Demokratene i Norge	8152	Fremskrittspartiet	5766
Høyre	3605	Kristelig Folkeparti	0681
Kystpartiet	0975	Miljøpartiet De Grønne	7663
Norges Kommunistiske parti	2700	Pensjonistpartiet	5241
Rødt	5252	Samfunnspartiet	0321
Senterpartiet	3348	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	7153
Venstre	0904		

Ved valg skal alle få stemme på det partiet eller den gruppen de selv ønsker. Pass derfor på at du er alene når du stemmer via Internett, og at ingen andre ser hva du stemmer på. Husk at du når som helst kan stemme på nytt, både i forhånds-stemmeperioden og på valgdagen. På valgdagen må du gå i et valglokale og stemme der.

VALG

VALG

Observing paper voting



VALG

E-voting=Black Box Voting?



Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development

Doesn't certification and/or open source fix this?

No.
The source code is far too complex to be meaningfully reviewed
Research shows that hidden «back doors» will almost never be found.
Certification is only valid within set parameters.
However – it's still an important step towards openness and accountability

VALG

The solution: Verifiability



30 Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development

Norwegian verifiability in brief:

- The return codes prove to the voter that her individual vote was *cast as intended*
- One can prove mathematically that
  - All cast votes were also stored
  - All (valid) stored votes were also counted
- The proofs are not public, but are made available to anyone who wishes to verify

VALG

Verifiability in Norwegian system



Possibilities for fraud in e-voting

Whenever the subject of electronic voting is discussed, fraud is a hot topic:

- Buying and selling of votes / Coercion
- Re-voting and paper votes taking precedence
- Vote-changing viruses
- Return codes
- Manipulation of votes or results
  - by EMB staff
  - by software vendors
  - by «hackers»
- Verifiability
- Note: Verifiability is not a panacea, but it's the most important measure to combat fraud.

"Fighting electoral fraud and securing the e-enabled voting – the role of the electoral administration and observation of voting"

by Ms Ardita DRIZA MAURER

Overview of Internet voting

Internet Voting has more than 10 years history in Switzerland. It is being gradually introduced since the beginning of 2000. After a pilot period, the federal Government and Parliament approved (respectively) in May 2006 and March 2007 the current approach to internet voting : s step by step introduction which takes into account the lessons learned as well as the rapidly changing risks.

Four steps/phases have been identified and are followed when introducing internet voting:

1. Voting via the Internet at referenda (e-voting)
2. Voting via the Internet at elections (e-elections)
3. *Online e- collecting of signatures for initiatives and referendums (not yet explored)*
4. *Electronical handing of candidate lists (not yet explored)*

The three internet voting systems which have been developed by the three pilot cantons of Geneva, Neuchâtel and Zürich, with the financial support of the Confederation, have been so far used by thirteen cantons (half of the 26 Swiss cantons).

Internet voting has been extensively used during federal referenda. At the last federal elections in October 2011 four cantons conducted first trials with e-voting. The shift to the second phase was a success. So far (30 June 2012) internet voting has been used 92 times at the federal level and other numerous times at the cantonal level.

The new voting channel is understood as a third, complementary channel besides the voting in person at the polling station and the completely liberalized postal voting. More than 90% of all votes are remote votes and are handed in via the postal channel. Remote voting being already a standard, it was also the starting point for the introduction of internet voting.

Introduction of internet voting has so far focused on Swiss abroad, since they have difficulties to vote due to postal delays. It is planned to introduce internet voting for all citizens in the long run. It's up to the Cantons to decide if and when they wish to introduce this new channel as they are responsible for the organization of votes and elections, including federal ones.

Security first – this is the idea behind the step by step approach which allows for a constant evaluation of the security matters. At the moment no more than 10% of the voters are allowed to participate electronically. A taskforce consisting of members of the Confederation, Cantons and the academic world is currently defining new security standards in order to raise this limit. The task force proposes the introduction of verifiability.

The federal Chancellery coordinates the different cantonal projects and is responsible for the authorization procedure through which the federal government decides to authorize or not cantons to use internet voting at a certain federal voting event.

Electoral fraud and risk management

Electoral fraud is defined as follows in article 282 of the Swiss Criminal Code (RS 311.0, http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c311_0.html)
Art. 282, **Electoral Fraud**

*1. **Any person** who forges, falsifies, removes or destroys an electoral register, any person who participates in an election or a vote, or signs a request for a referendum or an initiative without authority, and any person who falsifies the results of an election or vote or a petition requesting a referendum or initiative, in particular by adding, altering, omitting, deleting ballot papers or signatures, counting them incorrectly or incorrectly certifying the result, shall be liable to a custodial sentence*
not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.

*2. If the offender acts in **official capacity**, the penalty shall be a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 30 daily penalty units. The custodial sentence may be combined with a monetary penalty.*

Other articles dealing with electoral misdemeanors against the will of the People are:

Art. 279, Disruption and obstruction of elections and votes
Art. 280, Attacks on the right to vote
Art. 281, Corrupt electoral practices
Art. 282bis, Vote caching
Art. 283, Breach of voting secrecy

So far no fraud occurred in relation to internet voting. Nevertheless several fraud scenarios are envisaged and authorities prepare themselves in case anything happens. The following examples of fraud in the context of internet voting can be envisaged:

Client posts (private computers) infected by a virus aiming at altering voting results
Internet voting servers infected by a virus
dDoS attack (distributed denial of service)
Successful hacking of the internet voting system
Spoofing
Man-in-the-middle attack
Divulgation of sensitive information (codes) used to print voting cards

Several organizational measures to deal with possible frauds in the context of internet voting are foreseen. A crisis management body involving the system administrators, the federal Chancellery and any involved canton is created before each internet voting event to deal with potential problems, including fraud. The crisis management body elaborates and adopts contingency plans in the event of problems as well as communication scenarios and other transparency related measures. The OSCE/ODIHR election assessment mission in October 2011 found the crisis management body was a good practice[3]. Furthermore the legislation foresees prosecution ex officio in case of electoral fraud. Depending on the impact of fraud its consequences range from suspension to cancellation of internet voting and its results.

Both remote voting channels – the postal and the internet one – present higher risks of fraud than polling station voting. The main difference is of course scalability: fraud with the electronic ballot box will presumably have a higher impact on voting results than fraud with the postal channel.

The policy of limited, controlled and step by step introduction of internet voting adopted so far has been a way of mitigating risk. An exemple: at the federal vote on 17 June 2012 only 3% of voters were authorized to use internet voting. This small amount is of course no incentive to potential cheaters.
It is expected that the future introduction of verifiability as well as more formalized controls would allow extending or even generalizing internet voting without taking higher risks.

[3] See Swiss Confederation, Federal Assembly Elections 23 october 2011, OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report at http://www.osce.org/odihr/87417

Electoral administration

Electoral administration functions very well and enjoys a high level of trust (see the OSCE/ODIHR report of January 2012). Registers are permanent and are kept at cantonal/communal level.

In the context of internet voting, potential fraud both from outside and inside has been considered and the systems have been constructed and are operated accordingly to prevent and detect it.

Several technical and organizational rules have been introduced to mitigate and detect fraud. Examples include system architecture, separation of duty, authorization of interventions, transparency of interventions, monitoring of operations, rules for hiring of personnel, liability rules, dual control at any intervention, etc.

Role of observation

Another good practice is the independent electoral commission existing in two cantons which is a supervising body that controls part of the keys of the system, has access to all documents and information on internet voting and may order controls/audits, etc. The electoral commission allows for a more meaningful observation of internet voting.

Furthermore control ballot boxes have been introduced by all systems. External cheaters are unable to tell which is the control box. Its particularity is that the results it should contain have been put on record by the electoral commission. The final result will be checked against the recorded one. If fraud occurred it would theoretically also affect the control ballot box. Its integrity is a good hint that no fraud occurred.

Although observation is not regulated in law, observation both national and international is of course possible, as the previous election assessment missions of the OSCE also noted.

Open questions

When addressing the issue of fraud in the context of Internet voting one should note that several questions remain unanswered. They are currently being discussed at different forums (cantonal level, federal task force, federal working group…) and are taken into account when elaborating future solutions for internet voting. Here are some examples:

- *Fraud can be committed from outside the country. Prosecuting requires international cooperation: quid?*
- *Outsourcing* (cooperation with private sector) is currently regulated in contractual way. Is it necessary to modify the legislation in order to have a standard regulation?
- *Verifiability* helps to detect fraud as it gives the voter a « proof » in case fraud occurred. What to do with the proof from a legal point of view? Do we need to ensure such mathematical verifiability also for the other two voting channels (postal, polling station)? If yes, how?

“Technical support of elections and e-voting in the Russian Federation”

by Mr Mikhail POPOV

Ladies and Gentlemens,

Development of information society and fast introduction of information communication to all spheres of our life create new requirements with regards to electoral institution. Information becomes the leading resource of information society; its quantity rapidly grows and provides for the specific role. Internet has gained a stable position in modern life, increasing the speed of information transfer and changing the ways of its representation.

Information communication technologies improve constantly changing perception algorithms and global information background. Graphic and multimedia forms are used widely allowing provision of larger information volumes in compressed form and increasing perceptual speed.

In conditions of global informational support elections organizers shall carry out activities that ensure compliance of technological support of electoral procedures with information society expectations. Information shall be open to public at large and provided correctly and in full scale.

The Russian Federation has its own experience of usage of technical facilities for vote counting and electronic voting devices. The last cycle of federal elections was marked with large scale usage of technical facilities at election precincts in all 83 regions of the country.

Russian electoral legislation enshrined mandatory usage of the State automated system of the Russian Federation “Vybory” (GAS “Vybory”) for elections and referenda. Usage of this system is regulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, electoral legislation, legislation of the subjects of the Russian Federation and regulatory documents of the CEC of Russia.

Automation of electoral process in the Russian Federation started over 15 years ago with creation of GAS “Vybory”. Presently this is one of the largest permanently functioning information systems in the country. For years of its work the system has proved its reliability during tens of thousands of elections at federal, regional and local levels. GAS “Vybory” has earned complete trust of public at large. The system guarantees respect for electoral rights of citizens and makes a foundation for electronic democracy development.

GAS “Vybory” performs other functions besides automation of labor intensive information processes. The system is created with the use of algorithms in compliance with the federal legislation and legislation of all the subjects of the Russian Federation that regulate electoral issues at all levels and provide for strict observation of legislation.

GAS “Vybory” is used at all stages of electoral process from the moment of publication of the decision to conduct election campaign and up to summarizing of the results. The system automates all the processes included into operational activity of election commissions during election campaigns and in between elections.

Main objectives of GAS “Vybory” include: procession of information on election campaigns and candidates, control over electoral funds, compilation of voters’ lists, gathering and processing of information on voting returns, prompt informing of electoral process participants on the course and returns of voting.

GAS “Vybory” structure is multilevel and geographically distributed and is in compliance with the structure of election commissions of the Russian Federation: the CEC of Russia, 83 election

commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation and 2726 territorial election commissions are equipped with complexes of automated facilities (CAF). Total number of technical and software facilities in the system exceeds four hundred thousand.

GAS “Vybory” provides well protected information-technological infrastructure, unified software and information processing procedures at all levels.

Voting returns data is entered into the system in territorial election commissions and then is transferred to election commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation and the CEC of Russia via secured communication channels.

In order to provide openness and transparency of electoral process information on planned election campaigns, candidates, course and preliminary voting returns from the database of GAS “Vybory” is published on GAS “Vybory” Internet portal that includes the CEC of Russia site and sites of 83 election commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

Specific attention is paid to development of the CEC of Russia Internet resource for disabled citizens. One of the first Internet resources of federal state power bodies of that kind was developed for the CEC of Russia site aiming at visually impaired citizens. This resource constantly expands the list of topics and sections accessible by visually impaired people.

On the single voting day on March 4, 2012 the election of the President of the Russian Federation was conducted, as well as over 4 thousand regional and local campaigns. 95 424 election commissions carried out their activities in their territories. Over 130 000 protocols of voting returns were transferred and processed with the system application and published on GAS “Vybory” Internet portal which provided an additional possibility for the public at large to monitor the course of elections.

Two types of vote counting technical facilities are used at election precincts in the Russian Federation: ballot processing complexes (BPC) and electronic voting complexes (EVC). Both were developed and are produced in Russia.

BPC uses the technology of contact scan of marks put by voters in their ballots. Complexes were created in 2003 and improved in 2010. The first batch of electronic voting complexes (EVC) that uses paperless technology of voters’ will expression was produced in 2005.

Over the last years the number of vote counting facilities used at precincts has increased multiple times. For example, the usage of BPC at election precincts when comparing 2008 and 2012 has increased by 3.6 times, and the usage of EVC – by 55 times.

At the election of the President of the Russian Federation in 2012 the number of people that voted using BPC increased by 5 892 994 in comparison with 2008. The number of voters who used EVC during the same electoral cycle has increased by 312 347.

Electronic voting complex automates the voting process at election precincts and ensures conduct of electronic voting, automated votes count, establishment of voting returns and compilation of election precinct protocol of the election results.

EVC consists of microcontroller electronic chips and its own data format. This technical solution allows reliable protection of EVC from any attempts of unauthorized access and virus attacks. One complex consists of fixed touch screen voting devices (2 to 9 devices), 2 mobile touch screen devices, and 2 touch screen trainers that are placed at the election precinct entrance allowing voters to vote in a training mode.

Complexes are certified. I would like to note that technical facilities for vote counting – BPC and EVC – undergo mandatory certification to confirm there are no undeclared features. Certification is carried out by special organizations that are controlled by the state.

At an election precinct a voter presents his passport and receives a bar code card. By using it with reader of a touch screen device he is granted access to an electronic ballot. Bar code on cards is generated and printed out with the usage of a special program of random numbers generation. The card may be used only once and only at one specific election precinct. There is no possibility to use it twice.

Algorithms and interfaces of screen forms of touch screen voting device exclude occasional omission of any electronic ballot by voter in the process of voting.

EVC uses the system of backup printing on paper media: voter's choice is recorded on control tape of individual printing device that is accessible only to the voter at the moment of voting. By checking it the voter may be assured that his vote was recorded correctly. After the voter confirms his choice, the tape automatically moves and the next voter is not able to see the previous voting result.

I would like to emphasize that the control tape records only the voter's choice (who he or she voted for) without indicating any personal data of the voter. Regulatory documents of the CEC of Russia in case of any reasoned complaints provide for carrying out of control count of votes that shall be made by election commission at precincts equipped with EVC for the particular control tape.

Mobile touch screen voting devices within EVC provide for voting outside election precinct. They include additional features for visually and hearing impaired voters: devices are equipped with Braille alphabet and earphones for audio instructions.

Before the voting starts at each precinct equipped with vote counting technical facilities (EVC or BPC), these facilities shall undergo mandatory testing. Complete cycle of voting in training mode is carried out in presence of the chairman, members of election commission, observers. In the process of testing the complex software is checked with regards to its correct work. All facilities are checked with regards to possibility of choosing each of candidates, and the final protocol of test voting is compiled and signed by members of precinct election commission and observers. Further on the facilities are sealed.

Last federal campaigns were marked with large scale application of vote counting technical facilities at election precincts. They were used in all 83 subjects of the Russian Federation.

None of electoral process participants complained about BPC or EVC performance. There were no attempts recorded to interfere with work of technical facilities and GAS "Vybory".

During the election of the President of the Russian Federation 5 500 election precincts were equipped with over 12 000 technical facilities (BPC and EVC). Electronic voting complexes were used at 311 precincts in 8 subjects of the Russian Federation: the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Komi Republic, the Republic of Mari El, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Khakass Republic and the Chechen Republic, as well as in Murmansk and Toms Regions.
EVC were also used at 22 precincts outside the country: in Germany – at 11 precincts, in Poland – at 4 precincts, and in Baikonur (the Republic of Kazakhstan) – at 7 precincts.

Video films explaining the voting rules and special education films for election commission members were created for public awareness purposes. In all regions of the country complexes operators and members of election commissions attended training courses. Information materials on the voting rules were placed at all election precincts of the country equipped with technical facilities. Election commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation carried out public

awareness events, presentations of technical facilities and special explanatory meetings and public discussions.

Mandatory testing procedures of vote counting technical facilities before voting at election precincts with participation of observers that confirm correct performance of such facilities considerably decrease the amount of unjustified critics against the facilities and election organizers and is one of the basic measures for the purpose of increasing of electoral procedure transparency and trust in electronic voting systems.

Issues of practical application and further improvement of vote counting technical facilities are publicly and comprehensively discussed with participation of public at large, political parties' representatives, experts, journalists, public organizations of disabled people.

Electronic voting complexes shall undergo mandatory expertise in national organizations for disabled citizens to check how they account the needs of disabled voters.

As the result of active public participation in monitoring elections trust of voters in EVC becomes stable and considerably high which allows their future increased application at election precincts.

Electronic voting with EVC usage is defined by Russian organizers of elections as the priority direction of vote counting technical facilities development.

In order to increase EVC application several amendments to electoral legislation shall be made. Presently there is a restriction on complexes application: total number of precincts equipped for electronic voting shall not exceed one percent of precincts established in the territory of elections (referendum). The proposal to remove this restriction is currently under consideration.

In future we plan to expand EVC functions to provide for electronic voting in national languages of people of Russia.

Establishment of integrated voting system at all levels of election commissions ensuring automated vote counting and automated transfer of voting returns in electronic form from election precincts to GAS "Vybory" is the main purpose of implementation of information communication technologies into electoral practice of Russia.

Activity directions aimed at this objective achievement as well as the range of works are determined in the Program of technical re-equipment of the Russian Federation electoral system adopted in 2011.

We plan to automate activities of precinct election commissions with regards to compilation of electronic protocol of voting returns signed with the usage of electronic-digital signature by commission members and its automated transfer to GAS "Vybory". Special software-technical facilities – automated work places at the polling station (AWP PS) equipped with data transfer devices will be established.

The program provides for automation of 60 000 election precincts (62.16% of total number) where 90 percent of voters vote within the nearest three years. This will allow speed increase of vote counting process and compilation of vote returns protocol, decrease of possibility of occasional and willful mistakes during vote counting and vote returns protocol.

The unique system of video monitoring of election precincts was successfully implemented at the election of the President of the Russian Federation on March 4, 2012.

Over 200 000 webcams were installed, 2 at every precinct election out of more than 90 000 precincts all over the country. Video broadcasting system was established for the purpose of connecting up to 25 million users with the possibility of 60 000 simultaneous viewing with each camera.

During the broadcast around 99.3% of precincts equipped with broadcasting cameras were in working mode. Failures at maximum load amounted only to few dozens that was equal to fractions of total percentage. In case of failures recording was exercised locally and loaded into archive later.

Simultaneous recording time amounted to 500 years of video. 3.5 million people observed the voting process online on March 4 through the portal www.webvybory2012.ru, and altogether they watched over 7.9 million broadcasts. In total during the election on March 4 over 2.5 petabytes of video information was recorded with the usage of videomonitoring system.

Within one day 500 million of views were recorded for webvybory2012.ru site that was established for broadcasts monitoring. Over 100 ddos-attacks with wide geography were attempted.

Video broadcasting system established for the purpose of increasing of openness and transparency of electoral procedure and prevention of incidents of counterfeiting of elections results was fully justified. It allowed representatives of candidates and political parties, observers, experts, journalists and public at large monitoring the course of voting and vote counting in real time mode.

Presently in the Russian Federation modern information communication technologies are implemented at all levels of electoral system. New integrated automated system of vote counting and data transfer from election precincts is being established. This work is carried out in close cooperation with voters, representatives of political parties, expert community and national organizations.

The procedure of national certification of technical facilities guaranteed by the state is also implemented.

System of video broadcasting established at election precincts is required at all electoral levels, including municipal elections. In the nearest future it is planned to be used during elections of mayors of Krasnoyarsk and Omsk, as well as during elections on the single voting day in October 2012.

Implementation of electronic voting systems in the Russian Federation is carried out with the account of feedback provided by representatives of expert community, political parties, and public organizations in order to maintain the balance between increasing technologies range and trust of citizens in electronic voting systems.

Implementation of these works allows:

Expansion of possibility of realisation of the suffrage of the citizens of the Russian Federation;

Increase of transparency of the election process;

Expansion of possibility of control of the public over the election process;

Exception of influence of the human factor on a course and results of voting.

“Election Observation of New Voting Technologies”

by Mr Robert KRIMMER

1836: One of the First Voting Machines …



Grote (1836): Bill to Enable Votes to be Taken by Ballot at the Election of Members to Serve in Parliament.

OSCE ODIHR

1925: An Early Assessment …

„Presumably the voting machine **does require an act of faith on the part of the voter** in a mechanical contrivance whose **workings he cannot see**.

No more so, however, than is required in the case of the automobile in which he drives up to the polls.“

T. David Zuckerman (1925)

OSCE ODIHR

Some arguments

NVT can help offer additional functionalities to elections, i.e. counting complicated and large volume elections, supporting hadicapped or enfranchise very remote voters to participate in elections.

On the other had NVT can endanger the secrecy of the vote, the integrity of elections as a whole, as well as raise doubts about the transparency and accountability of the conduct of the elctions.
With NVT it is challenging ot reach the same level of universal acceptance, trust and confidence to understand as with paper voting. It can not help to bild trust, but requires trust for proper implementation.

Why observe elections?

To assess compliance with the international standarts, OSCE commitments 5not to certify or validate results)
Create confidence for contestants and voters to participate in election process
To enhance the intagrity of the process
To deter possible fraud and intimidation
Process oriented – only interested in results to the degree that they are reported honestly and accurately
To recommend ways in which the electoral process can be improved

Mandate of OSCE/ODIHR

Copenhague document 1990 – establishes basic criteria for genuin democratic elections

Paragraphe 8 states:

"The OSCe participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreig and domestic, can enhance the electoral process of States in which elections are taking place."



Seven Key Principles for observations and assessment of NVT

Secrecy of the vote
Integrity of results
Equality of the vote
Enfranchisement
Transparency
Accountability
Public confidence

Election Activities with NVT 2011/12

Estonia EAM **Norway EET** **Russia EOM's** **Switzerland EAM**

Overall experience

Time schedule quite challenging – NVT starts earlier and finishes later than normal time frames
Deployed one or more NVT analysts to join the Core Team
NVT analysts come from academia, EMBs
Integrated approach to analyse NVT and to compare it to the existing (paper observation) experience
More recommendations: some 53

Legislation

Further detail the procedure in the law – set-up, start, stop, counting, data destruction – needs to cover all the steps of the whole electoral process
Important
- show to the voter how his/her data is processed and destroyed after not needed anymore
- needs to give guidence to voters, candidates and administration how the system is operated and how it processes data

Formalize clear regulations for invalid ballots

Oversigt and Management

Formalize a body to oversee internet voting
Technical capacity for election management body
Formalized separation of duties
Develop a disaster recovery plan

Secrecy and integrity

Use of paper based voter credentials or smart cards
Quality of printing process, including the potential misuse of data, is of concern
(Formalized) Separation of Duty
Management of Secret Keys
Review and improvement of Encryption Model
For NVT Systems Involving paper to record the votes
Random Hand-recount of meaningful number of Polling Stations Ballot Boxes

Voting Process

Develop time-plan/ election calendar
Determine deadlines
Co-operate and co-laborate with important stakeholders to protect the process against dDoS attacks
Consider to offer end-to-end verifiability to voters and public
Offer voter interface in multiple languages

Testing, Evaluation, Certification and Auditing

Conduct end-to-end tests in real world environments to identify problems especially with interfaces
Use final software
Compile command level document including publish it, as basis for audits
Elaborate detailed specifications for evaluation and with it certification of NVT
Delegate audit, evaluationa nd certification to independent competent national bodies
Publish audit, evaluation and certification reports

Training

IT literacy needed by
- Election Management Bodies to operate – internal training
- Voters to use the system to cast votes – Voter education porgrams
- Observers, political parties, interested public

Summary

While they are new they still have to fulfill the existing commitments and standards
NVT Observation takes considerable longer
NVT Observation Methodology has emerged and will soon be formalized – Handbook of NVT Election Observation

*“*Новые технологии по обучению избирателей и членов избирательных комиссий*”*

М.А.Сарсембаев

Под новыми технологиями в обучении избирателей и членов избирательных комиссий мы понимаем использование компьютерных возможностей. Мы имеем в виду информационно-коммуникационный метод обучения, который реализуется в следующих формах: создание веб-портала молодого избирателя; разработка интерактивных компьютерных игр и вовлечение молодежи, уязвимых слоев населения (инвалидов), женщин и всех желающих участвовать в эти деловых играх; организация и проведение интернет-голосования.

Центральная избирательная комиссия Республики Казахстан и Программа развития ООН в Казахстане совместными усилиями составили документы для участия в конкурсе по линии ООН по вопросам повышения электоральной грамотности и культуры населения и среди многих конкурентов в масштабе всего мира выиграли грант на заявленную тему. Затем объявив конкурс в масштабе страны, остановили свой выбор на Павлодарской школе управления. Именно эта школа со своим руководителем Г.К.Исеновой и тренерами в течение 2-х лет сумела обучить 561 представителя различных социальных групп населения (сельскую молодежь, женщин, инвалидов), 242 молодых члена участковых и территориальных избирательных комиссиий 10 регионов Казахстана с помощью как раз того информационно-коммуникационного метода, который был упомянут в первых строках данного текста. Итого – более 800 человек. Давайте присмотримся к этому опыту обучения, вникнем в его суть.

Тренеры при проведении семинара поставили перед собой цель: информировать уязвимые группы населения (инвалидов, женщин и молодёжи) о выборных процессах в Казахстане, рассказать о формах и способах решения проблем своей социальной группы через представителей в выборных органах государства или непосредственно, став депутатом Мажилиса (нижней палаты) Парламента или маслихата того или иного местного уровня, а также повысить активность упомянутых социальных групп в осуществлении права избирать и быть избранным.

Тренеры заранее сформулировали и поставили перед собой следующие задачи: обучить слушателей основам конституционного, в том числе избирательного, права Республики Казахстан; информировать их об опыте соблюдения электорального законодательства в других странах; выявить проблемы низкой активности тех или иных групп населения в избирательных кампаниях и предложить пути их решения; обучить навыкам участия в избирательных кампаниях; привить коммуникативные и лидерские качества.

Количество часов в каждом регионе решено определить в 11 академических часов.

В процессе проведения семинара в соответствии со сформулированными задачами тренеры сумели привлечь пристальное внимание слушателей к занимательному изучению политических и электоральных аспектов Конституции Республики Казахстан и основам избирательного законодательства, в том числе Конституционному закону о выборах, проблемам тех и других групп, которые возникают при реализации ими своих конституционных прав, и к тем методам и средствам, с помощью которых они могли бы эти проблемы решить, сумели выбрать наиболее эффективные формы информирования и обучения этих целевых групп. Формами обучения стали ролевая игра, мозговая атака, презентации, блиц-опрос. Это надо было видеть и прочувствовать: автору этих строк довелось побывать на этих творческих семинарах в одном из регионов (в Восточном Казахстане).

Продуманное содержание этих учебных занятий и четкое распределение подаваемой по стадиям семинара информации, нетривиальные методы обучения, умелый и интригующий разбор практических электоральных ситуаций, погружение слушателей в ролевую игру, в процессе которой они испытывали реальные эмоции участников избирательного процесса, позволили слушателям получить новые знания, приобрести практические навыки в осуществлении электоральных действий и достаточно резко повысить свой коммуникативный уровень общения с людьми, задействованными в этот учебно-практический процесс.

Если рассматривать семинары-тренинги с точки зрения использованной методологии, то можно акцентировать внимание на следующем. Тренеры старались проводить семинары - тренинги в режиме интерактивной технологии, суть которой состояла в зажигательно-творческой реализации заранее специально разработанной ролевой игры под названием «Организация штаба избирательной кампании» с телевизионным ток-шоу. Эта интерактивная игра, плавно переходившая в телевизионное ток-шоу, позволяла тренерам даже за один день передавать слушателям солидный массив знаний по казахстанскому выборному законодательству, а также привить им навыки практического участника электоральной кампании. На следующий день тренеры ставили более масштабную цель – вызвать у слушателей еще больший интерес к предложенной теме с тем, чтобы побудить их осуществлять поиск знаний самим. Участие в ролевой игре представителей неправительственных организаций, которые критиковали действия членов избирательной комиссии, подогревали интерес к учебной игре, благодаря которой слушатели получали без особого напряжения дополнительные знания, передавали полученные знания и навыки свой целевой группе, поскольку это диктовалось необходимостью участия в игре этой целевой группы и защиты ее специфичных интересов.

Затем участников семинара-тренинга преподаватели делили на две команды, предлагали самим слушателям распределить роли внутри каждой команды. Это можно было делать по желанию самих участников, а также с помощью жребия. Ролевые функции участников электорального процесса распределялись так*:* кандидат на выборную должность, его советники, доверенные лица, а также эксперты, наблюдатели (как отечественные, так и международные) и избиратели. Здесь не мешает подчеркнуть, что в числе избирателей находились не только участники семинара, но и преподаватели-тренеры.

Была представлена легенда, по которой объявлялись выборы в Мажилис Парламента, поскольку учебные занятия происходили незадолго до реальных выборов в Мажилис Парламента Республики Казахстан. В соответствии с легендой командам предложили подготовить своего кандидата-политическую партию.

Для придания более острой конкуренции в выборах кандидатам было предложено представлять разные политические партии. Перед началом деловой игры были представлены информационный и подготовительный этапы проведения избирательной кампании, соответствующие стратегии организации избирательного процесса по линии штаба, описаны некоторые агитационные формы с предложением привести и применить новые агитационные формы работы, правила разработки предвыборной программы кандидатов, представлявших все официально зарегистрированные в стране политические партии. При этом следует особо подчеркнуть, что тренеры заранее, за 1-2 дня раздавали участникам семинара учебное пособие под названием «Я выбираю!», где четко и последовательно расписано казахстанское выборное законодательство и дана установка слушателям на обеспечение неукоснительного соблюдения законодательства Республики Казахстан.

Ролевая игра сплотила участников – представителей всех трех социальных групп в одну команду, что позволило им выработать нужные решения важнейших проблем инвалидов, женщин и молодежи. Обсуждая игру по ее окончании, участники отмечали, что все происходило, как в реальной жизни. Примерно об этом и других аспектах обучения часть слушателей говорила на семинаре в конце 2011 года и на конференции в мае 2012 года, которые были организованы Центральной избирательной комиссией Республики Казахстан и Программой развития ООН в Казахстане.

К каким результатам по итогам семинара-тренинга приходят наши слушатели? Мы хотели бы надеяться, что они донесут в интересных формах полученную и аналитическим образом собранную информацию представителям своих целевых групп о том, в каких необычных, интересных и полезных формах и способах могут быть решены их социальные проблемы посредством участия в избирательных кампаниях как избиратели и как кандидаты на ту или иную выборную должность. Мы знаем, что они получили определенные практические навыки, которые они захотят использовать в последующих избирательных кампаниях. По результатам семинаров и опросов были выработаны предложения, которые были направлены в государственные органы, которые, в свою очередь, могли принять организационно-практические меры по активизации целевых групп населения в общественной и политической жизни регионов и всей страны в целом.

А теперь предлагаю перейти к анализу семинаров-тренингов по развитию профессиональных навыков для молодых членов избирательных комиссий.

Преподаватели-тренеры ставили перед собой цель: повысить электорально-образовательный уровень молодых членов территориальных комиссий. В этой связи они формулировали перед собой следующие задачи. Первой задачей стало разъяснение слушателям основных норм конституционного, в том числе избирательного, законодательства Республики Казахстан. Вторая задача заключалась в необходимости изучения системы территориальных избирательных комиссий и направлений их деятельности. Интерес представила третья задача, замкнувшая общие знания о территориальных избирательных комиссиях с практическим опытом работы территориальных комиссий той области, где проходило обучение. В качестве четвертой задачи тренеры выставили необходимость обучения практическим навыкам работы в участковых избирательных комиссиях. Пятая задача предполагала привитие молодым членам избирательных комиссий коммуникативных и лидерских навыков.

В качестве слушателей была избрана целевая аудитория в виде молодых членов территориальных избирательных комиссий Республики Казахстан, которых обучали в течение не 11, а уже 18 академических часов. Количество участников – 242 члена участковых и территориальных избирательных комиссий. Отбор участников осуществляли Центральная избирательная комиссия Республики Казахстан и областные избирательные комиссии. Одно из направлений в содержании семинара-тренинга было сходным с направлением работы семинара по обучению избирателей: в обоих случаях большое внимание уделялось изучению конституционных норм и норм и избирательного законодательства Республики Казахстан. Но отличие все же было: на этих семинарах законодательство изучали глубже и целенаправленно, имея в виду нормы электорального законодательства о статусе и компетенции территориальных избирательных комиссий республики всех уровней. Другие объемы в содержании и структуре семинара в виде планирования деятельности территориальных и участковых комиссий, подготовки ко дню выборов, проведению дня голосования со всеми организационными мероприятиями составляли специфику только этих семинаров-тренингов, нацеленных на обучение молодых членов избирательных комиссий страны.

На этих семинарах-тренингах использовались и свои, особенные формы обучения. Это - работа в малых группах, разбор практических электоральных ситуаций, обеспечение ролевой игры под названием «День голосования», а также мозговая атака и блиц-опрос.
Согласно избранной методологии, ход семинара был запланирован на два дня. В течение первого дня шли подготовительные мероприятия к ролевой игре, участникам оказывали содействие в восполнении недостатка знаний по конкретным аспектам избирательного законодательства Республики Казахстан, а также способствовали сплочению участников в команды в целях организации дня голосования. В соответствии с замыслом тренеров семинара в первый день участникам предоставили возможность задавать вопросы и уточнять процедуры выборных мероприятий. После завершающих упражнений на знание избирательного законодательства в виде тестирования первый день завершался распределением необходимых ролей.

Роли в игре были разными. Среди них роли 7 членов участковой избирательной комиссии, казахстанских и международных наблюдателей, представителей политических, в том числе и оппозиционно настроенных, партий, а также представителей общественных объединений, представителей средств массовой информации, полицейского, ответственного за порядок на избирательном участке, избирателей на дому, избирателей – инвалидов, и впервые голосующих молодых избирателей. Наше участие и наблюдение за ходом практического семинара-тренинга показало, что участники семинара стремились творчески исполнять свою роль в игре и каждый старался исполнить свою роль в день голосования по возможности точно.

По окончании игры подводились итоги: каждый участник мог высказать свои наблюдения и дать оценку работе участковой избирательной комиссии. Оценки были достаточно жесткими.

Многие слушатели признавались в том, что ранее им не приходилось самостоятельно планировать работу избирательной комиссии, не всегда хватало опыта и знаний, чтобы их работу в качестве членов избирательной комиссии могли оценить высоко.

Результаты совпали с ожиданиями: содержание занятий и их объем, предложенные методы обучения, критический и детализированный разбор практических электоральных ситуаций, заинтересованное участие слушателей в ролевых играх позволили им получить дополнительные, новые знания, а также повысить свой коммуникационный уровень общения с разными людьми. Мы можем утверждать, что в результате проведенных семинаров-тренингов слушатели получили практические умения и навыки умелого планирования деятельности как территориальной, так и участковой избирательной комиссий, а также овладели навыками профессионального общения и работы с самыми различными группами электората в день голосования, причем такого уровня работы, который обеспечил бы избежание конфликтов и жалоб со стороны избирателей и других участников выборного процесса.

Мы считаем, одних семинаров-тренингов для избирателей и членов избирательных комиссий даже с интерактивными методами обучения все же недостаточно для повсеместного повышения электоральной грамотности и активности граждан в нашей стране. Поэтому Центральная избирательная комиссия Республики Казахстан совместно с Программой развития ООН предлагает и показывает свой опыт обучения молодежи и других слоев населения республики с помощью новейших информационных технологий в виде пилотного Интернет-голосования, использования компьютерных игр, веб-портала.

Интернет-голосование – это существенный компонент обучения молодежи казахстанскому избирательному законодательству и избирательным технологиям. Надо отметить, что площадкой для подготовки и проведения интернет-голосования стал веб-портал www.umitker.kz, в котором были размещены практически вся законодательная база, ролики,

материалы о работе городских молодежных маслихатах, материалы о семинарах-тренингах, компьютерная игра) Кстати, слово umitker – ұміткер – соискатель, кандидат - было предложено и принято на заседании представителей Центризбиркома и ПРООН в результате отбора среди многочисленных названий,

По легенде молодежные общественные объединения определенной области в целях решения проблем молодежи решили создать областной молодежный интернет-маслихат, в котором есть 22 депутатских места.

Было объявлено, что интернет-голосование назначено на 22 сентября 2011 года. Деловая учебная игра в Интернет-голосование предусматривает сбор подписей, желающих принять участие в голосовании, тестирование кандидатов на знание законодательства, создание предвыборного штаба и другие организационные мероприятия. Обязательным условием является регистрация на портале. Чтобы можно было легче понять смысл Интернет-голосования, попробуем показать поэтапно всю технологию интернет – голосования.

Первый этап: проводилась активная информационная кампания среди молодежи о предстоящем интернет-голосовании – было дано объявление о дате, интернет-голосования, разъяснялся механизм участия в таком голосовании, детально прописывался промоушн (содействие) интерактивной игры). Были обозначены сроки: с 25 августа по 5 сентября 2011 года.

Второй этап: началось выдвижение кандидатов: от каждого района, городов соответствующей области. Сроки были определены с 1 по 5 сентября.

Третий этап: шел процесс интенсивной регистрации в сети, после чего как условие дальнейшего участия участнику необходимо было пройти игру «Избиратель», что означало, что он должен был набрать не менее 20 баллов на знание избирательного процесса для получения ключа-приза, а также специального удостоверения о его регистрации как кандидата в депутаты областного молодежного интернет-маслихата. Здесь сроки были обозначены с 1 по 5 сентября.

Четвертый этап: характеризовался проведением агитационной кампании в виде обнародования программы (программ), показа, просмотра видеороликов, ведения блога. По всем параметрам действовала рейтинговая система. Этот этап был осуществлен с 5 по 18 сентября.

Пятый этап: распределили пин-коды среди участников голосования в период с 15 по 18 сентября. 9 000 участников интернет-голосования получили пин-коды.

19 сентября был объявлен днем тишины.

Шестой этап: проходил сам процесс Интернет-голосования с 20-21 сентября. В голосовании приняли участие 4 265 человек. Прошли 22 кандидата, которые набрали наибольшее количество голосов интернет-избирателей.

Седьмой этап: происходил процесс регистрации депутатов. 22 сентября был объявлен итог голосования. Фамилии и имена 22-х депутатов были обнародованы.

Есть еще один интересный способ вовлечения молодежи и других категорий населения в обучение наиболее сложным электоральным вопросам. Этому посвящена компьютерная игра «Кандидат», которая создана совместными усилиями Центризбиркома и ПРООН в формате 3D. Она существенно помогает участникам овладевать навыками построения избирательной стратегии в жесткой конкурентной борьбе с виртуальными соперниками.

Флэш-игра «Избиратель» и 3D игра «Кандидат» были записаны на дисках на государственном и русском языках в количестве 1000 экземпляров. В распространении дисков среди студентов казахстанских вузов и молодежи оказывала содействие Центральная избирательная комиссия республики.

В порядке заключения скажем, что Центризбирком будет продолжать использовать приведенные выше новые интерактивные технологии обучения избирателей и членов избирательных комиссий. Для этого было бы желательно оказывать содействие всем активным, зарекомендовавшим себя неправительственным организациям, специализирующимся в деле повышения электоральной грамотности населения страны. Есть смысл в стране усовершенствовать систему обучения избирателей и членов избирательных комиссий, что позволило бы молодым людям более активно участвовать в работе участковых и территориальных избирательной комиссий республики.

Специально для молодежи были разработаны флэш игра «Избиратель», в которой участникам предлагается пройти тестирование на знание законодательства Республики Казахстан в сфере конституционного и избирательного права. Победителю, правильно ответившему на все вопросы, вручается приз-ключ и удостоверение о регистрации его в качестве кандидата в депутаты;

Открыт веб-портал молодого избирателя umitker.kz., на котором молодежь сможет найти интересную информацию о выборах в РК, учебные пособия «Я выбираю!» и «Закон и выборы», фотоотчеты о проведенных семинарах, а также игры «Избиратель» и «Кандидат»; разработана и опробована технология интернет-голосования в молодежный маслихат.
По предложению ПРООН в РК пилотное интернет-голосование проведено в Павлодарской области в сентябре прошлого года, результаты которого были обсуждены на заседании круглого стола в ЦИК РК 27 сентября 2011 г. Количество участников интернет-голосования, получивших пин-коды – 9000, приняло участие в голосовании - 4265 человек.

В сентябре 2011 года совместно с ЦИК РК, ПРООН проведен круглый стол на тему «Пути повышения электоральной активности молодежи в РК», на котором были обсуждены промежуточные результаты проекта и технология интернет-голосования, как инструмент выборов в молодежные маслихаты городов и районов, молодежных лидеров образовательных учреждений.

Итоги прошедших выборов в местные выборные органы показали рост количества молодых кандидатов в депутаты более чем на 60%. Если в 2007 году лишь 7,5 % кандидатов в депутаты местных маслихатов составляли молодые люди до 30 лет, то в 2012 году уже 12%, а в областные и городские маслихаты – 13%.

Помолодел и сам корпус депутатов маслихатов всех уровней. 3,15% от общего количества депутатов составляют молодые люди до 30 лет (в районных маслихатах 3,45%) против 1,5 % в 2007 году. Рост составил более чем в два раза. Учитывая увеличивающуюся с каждым годом активность молодежи можно прогнозировать, что в следующем электоральном периоде доля молодежи в выборных органах значительно возрастет.

Аналогично складывается ситуация и с повышением представительства женщин в маслихатах всех уровней.

Наблюдается опережающий рост представительства женщин в областных маслихатах: 16, 7% против 10, 9% в 2007 году. В районных маслихатах женщины составляют 19% против 17, 3% в 2012 году.

Необходимо отметить, что в некоторых регионах Казахстана представительство женщин в маслихатах достигло 20% и более.

Несмотря на то, что показатели по стране еще отстают от Европейских стран (Дания – 27%, Финляндия – 34%, Норвегия - 42%, Швеция – 46,3%, Франция – 48%) можно сделать вывод, что тенденция расширения представительства женщин в местных выборных органах для Казахстана позитивная.

К сожалению, отсутствуют данные участия в выборах инвалидов, представляющих 3% населения страны. Однако есть данные о заинтересованности граждан с ограниченными возможностями в выдвижении своих кандидатур в электоральный период 2012 года.

Низкая активность уязвимых групп населения (инвалидов, женщин и неработающей молодёжи) в осуществлении гарантированного Конституцией страны права избирать и быть избранным вследствие недостаточной осведомленности о выборных процессах и возможности решения проблем своей социальной группы через представителей в законодательных органах или непосредственно, став депутатом;

Недостаточный уровень практических знаний и навыков молодых членов избирательных комиссий