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**THE DEADLOCK OF FEDERALISM IN GERMANY
AND RECENT REFORMS**

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The Deadlock of Federalism in Germany and Recent Reforms

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I. Introduction

Federalism increases individual well being (Frey and Stutzer, 2000). Many scholars and recently also politicians began to appreciate the efficiency borne by decentralised local government tasks (Blankart, 2007). Especially in Europe, but also in many other industrialized and developing countries, devolution tendencies increased during the last decades. Competencies and tax raising powers have been transferred from the central to the subnational governments. The reallocation is undertaken inter alia in order to promote efficiency and transparency in the public sector. Remarkably, not merely multi-tier systems are subject to devolution, but also more centralized states, e.g. UK, increased their local fiscal autonomy. On average, the OECD countries increased their own local revenues by 8.1 percent from 21.9 to 30.0 percent of consolidated general government revenues between 1970 and 2001 (excluding social security). 17 out of 22 countries have higher degrees of decentralisation (Stegarescu, 2005). In the same time period, local expenditures increased from 24.9 to 31.2 percent. However, not all countries feature federal structures and some federal states tend to have moved competences towards the central government level in recent decades. Hence, the question arises, on how to design the institutional setting to deliver the optimal policy outcome? And why do some federal states do not fully utilize the advantages of a federal system?

We focus on the case of Germany and explain first the historical developments that led to the status quo of intertwined federal structures within Germany and show major problems resulting thereof. Second, we exhibit recent political attempts to reform the federal system, which were intended to clarify responsibilities between government levels and the reestablishment of sound public finances. However, the clear aim of the reforms was diluted within the political process and only minor reforms were enacted. Besides the reduction of laws which require approval by both chambers of parliament within Germany, the Bundestag (lower house) and the Bundesrat (upper house), a debt brake on the federal as well as on the level of the constituent units, the Länder, was enacted. Third, we sketch upcoming economic challenges and possible reform options to establish a sustainable and

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
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flexible federal system, that are implementable under the current institutional setting. Finally, we draw a conclusion.

II. Historical evolution of federal structures in Germany

Federal structures have a long lasting tradition in Germany. During the Kaiserreich of 1871, the state was organized following the autonomy principle: some few tasks, as Military, Railway, Customs, Post, social security had been assigned to the Reich and all the rest remained with the states. On the revenue side, the Reich had legislative competence for excise taxes and revenues thereof were shared between the Reich and the states. Legislative and revenue competence for the personal and corporate income taxes remained with the states and the communities. Responsibilities had been clear and public goods were provided depending on the needs of the people in the specific states. Sudden changes in local needs could be served instantly, which eased the monitoring of politicians to sensibly spend tax payer's money – institutional symmetry prevailed (Figure 1 left hand side).

Figure 1: Institutional asymmetry in Germany



Source: Blankart, 2008

In the aftermath of the First World War and the foundation of the Weimar Republic, the federal system changed significantly. Fiscal autonomy of states was no longer secured and a structure based on the system of vertical administration prevailed. Decisions on tax rates and tax bases were now taken on the federal level and revenues were shared between all three government tiers. States could not react flexibly in lowering or increasing tax revenues to account for state specific effects, but had to rely on federal decisions. The motives of tax payers, decision makers and beneficiaries did no longer coincide (Figure 1 right hand side).

This fiscal regime was terminated with the end of World War II. Now, three years of an occupation regime followed in Germany. First steps towards a new constitution started 1 July 1948 when the western allies asked the *prime ministers of the Länder* to set up a draft of a new constitution. Prime ministers' aim was to establish a decentralized government with fiscal autonomy of the Länder supplemented by a fiscal equalization scheme.

A formal federal constitutional assembly, the *Parliamentary council*, was convoked on 1 September 1948. Its task was to create a federal German state (in the West) in which the power should be divided between the federation, the "Bund", and the states, the "Länder". Within this council the draft elaborated by the prime ministers was soon put aside, as the more centralistically minded politicians gained influence. Some of them were eager to obtain mandates in the new federal government and hence tried to shift the maximum amount of political power towards the federal government.

This process was supervised by the *Governors of western allies*. They held veto power on the final draft of the constitution. Governors' main objective was the dispersion of political power in order to mitigate the reappearance of a German central power. Therefore they favored the decentralized federal governmental system over a unitary state.

Given these diverging views, it was easy to predict that the council and the allies soon ran into conflicts. The majority of the council wanted a powerful central government that should allocate assignments to subnational entities, while it itself maintains full competences. The allies favoured a decentralized organizing system where tasks are assigned according to the subsidiarity principle mainly from the Länder to the Federation. In the final negotiations the members of the parliamentary council and the allies had to find a compromise and agreed on a concurrent legislation between the federation and the Länder. A system of mixed obligations and responsibilities was born (Blankart, 2007). The legislative competence for personal and corporate income taxation were negotiated within the concurrent legislation. In principle, the Länder were in charge, but the federation could easily attract the competences, when the "similarity of living standards" was in danger or the unity of the economic system had to be fostered. The collection of those taxes remained with the Länder, even though the tax revenues generated in their territory did not fully remain in the respective Land. If a Land could not extract enough resources in its own territories, the Länder should set up a horizontal financial equalization scheme. The notion of a cooperative federalism was stressed. In the financial reform of 1969, the mixed responsibilities between government levels were fostered. As a result, also nowadays the legislative competence for the tax system lies mostly on the federal level, but the Länder have to agree in the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament). Fiscal autonomy for the Länder to raise additional revenues or cut taxes is still lacking. On the expenditure side, various federal laws assign tasks to the Länder governments, which need to be executed independently of the available fiscal space in the respective Land. In principle, Länder are merely able to increase their room to maneuver by running budget deficits and in turn piling up public debt.

In general, the broad theory of political failures to promote fiscal discipline may lead to the impression that federal systems have higher debt levels than unitary states, since all influences on an increasing budget, such as fiscal illusion by politicians (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977), political business cycles (Nordhaus, 1975) and fragmented governments (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) may occur on each federal level separately and hence multiplier effects evolve. Decentralized countries are therefore particularly susceptible to overspending as subnational governments are likely to put their own interests and those of their constituents before those of the larger entity, hence a common pool problem arises (Rodden, 2006). Additionally, a cooperation problem might evolve, which refers to the game played by the multiple subnational and national political actors (Braun and Tommasi,


2004). If spillovers between jurisdictions are not internalized, local governments might seek to free ride on the expense of other jurisdictions (Musgrave, 1959). Moreover, redistribution of income and macroeconomic stabilization policies might be hindered, as coordination is required. The accumulation of debt increases *ceteris paribus* in federal rather than in unitary states if subnational governments are not self responsible for their debt and therefore do not face hard budget constraints.³ Thus formal policies, coordination and the institutional design describing the interactions between state levels in a multi-tier federal state are main parameters affecting the accumulation of debt by politicians and the expectation on the hardness of budget constraints (Rodden, 2004).

It is true that the German constitution contained a budget constraint, but it is also perceived as being too soft. The “golden rule”, allows federal and state deficit spending up to the amount of public investment spending⁴. In addition the constitutional budget principles, enacted in 1969, require German federal and state budgets to be in line with the requirements of macroeconomic conditions, such as stable prices, high levels of employment, steady state external balances and sound economic growth. As one consequence, federal and state public debt levels increased steadily since the 1970ies (Figure 2). That the debt of communities in contrast remained rather low should not be taken too literally as local communities heavily rely on off budget and short term cash credits which are not counted in the official figures. An additional structural push on federal and state public debt was exerted by the German reunification in 1990, when “blooming and prospering landscapes” were promised and should be created by public expenditures in eastern Germany.

³ In contrast, deficits in unitary states might also mount due to log-rolling of representatives of subnational governments on the federal level. They seek to maximize distribution of funds in favor of their local clientele and also face a common pool problem.

⁴ One of the major shortcomings of the golden rule is the imprecise definition of investment spending, which allowed finance ministers to constantly broaden their budgets. The differentiation of “consumptive spending” and “investment spending” as well as the determination of the depreciation rates is difficult in practice.

Figure 2: Debt levels of Government Levels in Germany 1970 -2008 (in billion €)



Source: Destatis (2009)

Predictably the situation of the German Länder became increasingly unsustainable as they lacked the revenue sources to feed their spending goals. The first two candidates were the Länder Bremen and Saarland. They became practically insolvent in 1992. In order to overcome their fiscal distress and to survive, they sued the federal government in a constitutional trial to obtain additional funds. The court decided that the federation had to bailout the Länder and consequently both Länder received substantial federal assistance funds. But since no structural reforms were enacted, the fiscal positions of both Länder quite predictably did not substantially improve. What was thought to be a short term assistance measure became a long-term structural subsidy for the regions, and the politicians in the respective Länder did not make any attempts to reduce the expenditure ratios to enhance their fiscal positions.

III. Recent Federal Reform attempts

The need for the amendment of the relationships within the German federal system became obvious over the last decades, especially after the Land Berlin followed the examples of Bremen and Saarland and sued the federation to provide bailout measures. This time, the court decided differently. First, it ruled that the fiscal means of Berlin were still sufficient to provide required public services and that additional federal funds would merely be available as ultima ratio. Second, the court demanded that revisions of the federal system were required to avoid financial distress of the Länder and therewith shifted the problem back to the political level. In addition to national discussions on debt

sustainability, the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, adopted in 1997 on the European level, dominated the German public spending discussions in the subsequent years, as it was stricter than the national constitutional golden rule, although the pact itself could not avoid substantial deficits in some EU countries and had been relaxed in 2005 under the pressure of France and Germany, which were running “excessive deficits” during that time. In addition, the council of ministers always failed to apply sanctions and therefore, the pact cannot be perceived as a hard budget constraint.

As a result, the reform deadlock between both chambers of parliament and the increasing debt levels led to the consensus among politicians from different parties that constitutional amendments were required. A two stage procedure was followed. Under the grand coalition, the first stage (Föderalismusreform I) was enacted, which mainly focused on an efficient allocation of powers to both chambers and the second stage (Föderalismusreform II) was intended to concentrate on the sustainability of public deficits and the potential autonomy of the different levels of the state.

i. Federalism reform I

In October 2003 an initiative to reform the federal legislative procedure was launched. The deadlock between both chambers of the parliament should be broken up in order to increase the ability to act of the German federal system. In December 2004, the negotiations failed, since no consensus between political parties as well as between representatives of both chambers of parliament could be reached. One year later, in March 2005, the negotiations were revived and in June 2006 the Bundestag agreed on a reform proposal and in July 2006 the Bundesrat also agreed. Focal points of the reform were the realignment of powers between the federation and the Länder. The amount of legislation which required the approval by both chambers was significantly reduced from about 60 percent of all laws before the reform to about 35 to 40 percent after the reform.

The deadlock could not be fully broken, as no individual taxation powers on substantial taxes, neither on the tax base nor on the tax rate, was transferred to the Länder. The Länder however gained exclusive legislative rights on specific policy areas such as: the penal system, press, assembly rights and shop closing times. Furthermore, they can determine the rights and the remuneration of their civil servants and are free to set property acquisition taxes. In return, the federation received exclusive powers in the fight against terrorism and the amount of laws which need to be approved by the Bundesrat is reduced. Moreover, the distribution of costs stemming from sanctions following the noncompliance with the European Stability and Growth Pact is determined. The federation has to pay 65 percent, while the Länder share the remaining 35 percent. The distribution of costs is thereby independent of the causality of the sanctions.

In summary, the direction of the reform was correct. The imbalances of the German federal system were reduced, but the extent of the reform was clearly insufficient. Länder still do not have adequate taxing powers to adjust their budgets according to the needs of their citizens. Shared responsibilities prevail in various legislative procedures, which hinder an efficient legislation and reduce the likelihood of political reforms.

ii. Federalism reform II

As a consequence of the high debt levels on all government levels, a consensus evolved among all political parties, that the fiscal constitution required additional improvements. The “soft budget constraint” in the German constitution insufficiently installed sound public finances and therefore the discussions led to the implementation of a fiscal rule that is intended to be a “hard budget constraint”. Initially, the agenda for the federalism commission contained the goal of further increasing the autonomy of the Länder governments in allowing to levy additional taxes on substantial tax bases, such as personal income and corporate income tax, but it became obvious relatively soon, that no majorities could be found for a federal system based on competitive elements. The system of a cooperative federalism should prevail.

In May 2009, the Bundestag agreed to a constitutional amendment which installs a debt brake for the federal and the Länder level, as the main innovation of the reform process (Foeko II, 2009). In line with the European Stability and Growth Pact, the German debt brake demands the budget to be “close to balance” in normal times. The framework differentiates between a structural and cyclical component. The structural deficit of the federal government is limited to 0.35 percent of GDP, while the Länder are not allowed to accumulate any deficits over the business cycle. Hence, the debt stock would diminish to sustainable levels if economic growth is sufficiently high and the structural rule is followed by politicians. In addition to the structural component, both the federation and the Länder are allowed to accumulate deficits depending on the respective economic conditions. Automatic stabilizers should fully function and thereby reduce adverse fiscal effects over the business cycle. In a downswing, the budget balance might be negative and in an upswing it is required to be positive to symmetrically account for the accumulated deficits. The deviations from “normal” conditions are determined with a production function approach. Furthermore, a “control account” is created for the federal government, which should function as a collective memory and hence should increase intertemporal transparency of the budget process. If the actual deficit exceeds the permitted values in a budget cycle, the difference is credited to the control account, which should not exceed 1.5 percent of GDP and should be reduced if the value exceeds 1 percent of GDP in accordance with the economic conditions. In the case of natural disasters or extraordinary circumstances exceptions from the rule might be enacted with the approval of the majority of the Bundestag. A clear definition of both terms is lacking and therefore, there might be room for creativity to circumvent the rule. In addition to the rule, a stability board is constituted, which is intended to supervise the budget process of the federal as well as the Länder governments. The stability board consists of the finance ministers of the Länder and the federation and is intended to audit the budget process. The decisions of the board should be made public to increase transparency. Furthermore, advice for distressed entities shall be provided and concreate restructuring measures suggested. However, there are no sanctions or other possibilities for the board to intervene in the budget process.


But how did the rule path both chambers of parliament, even though deficit spending has been highly popular in recent years? The commission applied two innovative mechanisms. First, the reform implementation is shifted into the future. The federal government has to issue a budget in compliance with the new debt brake firstly in 2016 and the Länder might use an additional four years (up to 2020) to consolidate their budgets. Thereafter, they are required to adhere to the debt brake. Second, the poorest Länder received additional financial funds to implement a successful

consolidation strategy. Between 2011 and 2019, financial assistance means of 800 million Euros per year is provided for Bremen (€ 300 million), Saarland (€ 260 million), Berlin (€ 80 million), Lower Saxony (€ 80 million) and Schleswig-Holstein (€ 80 million), which add up to 7.2 billion Euros over the entire period. The extra funds are conditional on the implementation of successful consolidation measures to reach the goal of implementing the debt brake in 2020. The agreement is therefore on the one hand bought by the federal government and the rich Länder and on the other hand, the implementation was eased, since the politicians that agreed are likely not be the ones who are bounded by the rule. The coalition of reform opponents, on the one hand beneficiaries of the financial equalization scheme and on the other hand competition opponents, agreed to the solution, as the additional funds were sufficiently high. But the question remains open, whether the installed reform steps are sufficient to tackle the upcoming policy challenges.

IV. Upcoming challenges and reform avenues

Population ageing and the low birth rate in Germany during the last years will lead to substantial public financing problems in the medium term. Recent projections of the federal statistical office in Germany estimate that the population will decrease from currently 82.4 million to 69 to 74 million in 2050 (Destatis, 2006). In addition, the proportion of elderly escalates (Figure 3). Recent reforms of the social welfare system could not impede the substantial financing challenges in the health-, pension- and further social security systems. Latest reforms of the pension scheme, that introduced a gradual increase of the age of entry to 67 years, will not be sufficient to tackle the financing gap. Furthermore, the health care system has been under reform annually to introduce a sustainable system for the future, since the current financing gap is estimated to be as high as 2.5 times of the current GDP. The recent attempts to reduce health care costs and increase competition in the market failed to achieve their aim. Already one year after the adoption of a new funding system, public health insurance companies are again running deficits and it is likely, that the taxpayer has to subsidize the system. As a result, public finances in Germany face significant contingent liabilities.

Figure 3: Population ageing in Germany



Source: Destatis (2006)

Note: The projections assume a constant birth rate and a migration balance of 100,000 people per year.

In addition, fiscal costs of the recent economic and financial crisis will still be very high in the upcoming years. The European commission estimates fiscal deficits to be 3.4 %, 5.0 % and 4.6 % of GDP in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively (European Commission, 2009). Furthermore, it is arguable, if the German economy will return to the former growth path or if the potential output is reduced in the long-run. If this is the case, the urgency of policy reforms soars even further.

The tremendous challenges in the upcoming years demand a flexible institutional environment, which can react timely to variations in economic conditions. Therefore, it is required to further increase the room for maneuver for elected representatives and shape institutions to allow for a smooth policy implementation. The deadlock within the federal system has to be broken and clear responsibilities have to be installed. A system based on the subsidiary principle thereby allows to account for the decentral distribution of information (Hayek, 1945) and the heterogeneity of preferences within Germany (Tibout, 1956). Efficiency of policy making would be installed and sound public finances would result.

Tsebelis (2002) argues that the institutional setting and especially the number of veto players is of importance for the likelihood of amendments of the political status quo. If the number of veto players increases or the cohesiveness decreases, political stability will increase and reform projects will unlikely be enacted. The recent federalism reform I was intended to reduce the negotiation costs

of political actors, but still about 35 to 40 percent of the laws have to pass both, the Bundestag as well as the Bundesrat. The interactions between the national and the subnational government level as well as between parties within the German federal system are illustrated in Table 1. On the one hand, the equality of majorities in both chambers is of importance, as it allows passing new legislation under the agreement of the ruling coalition. If majorities in both chambers diverge, a “conciliation committee” has to be installed, where a consensus between the chambers might be reached. If no agreement is found, the reform project is declined. On the other hand, diverging interests between the federation and the Länder can evolve, which might be independent of the political affiliation of the actors. The potential to blockade reform projects increases in Table 1 towards the lower right corner.

Table 1: Institutional interrelation and the ability to reform

		Ruling coalition interests equal interests of Länder representatives	
		Yes	No
Party or party coalition builds majority in both chambers of parliament	Yes	Capability to reform is high	Potential deadlock within party/coalition
	No	Potential deadlock between coalition and opposition	Potential deadlock within party/coalition and between coalition and opposition

Source: own illustration

An example from the recent policy debate stresses the shortcomings of the implemented federalism reform solutions, as they failed to further reduce the institutional asymmetries: After the federal elections in autumn 2009, the coalition of Christian democrats and the liberal party announced to put their election pledges into practice and announced tax cuts. The value added tax was intended to be reduced for specific business, especially for the hotel industry.⁵ But suddenly, the Länder noticed, that also their budgets would be affected through the reform proposal. They feared lower revenues, but the same amount of mandatory expenditures, since they were still tied to the decisions of the federal government and do not have own taxing rights. As a consequence, the prime ministers of several Länder, independent of the political affiliation decided to oppose the plan and announced to block the reform in the Bundesrat. In the final negotiations the prime ministers gave up their resistance and agreed to the proposal, but it is clear that in the upcoming years the capability to reform is restricted and the federal deadlock was not broken through the recent federalism reforms.

Therefore, the question arises what has to be undertaken to reform the German federal system? How is it possible to break the current rigidities? In principle, the approach that was pursuit in the recent federalism reform might be reapplied. At first, the implementation of the reform can be

⁵ Furthermore, the tax exemptions for dependent children were increased and crisis related losses for corporations can be deducted from the tax bill more easily.

shifted into the future. Therewith, politicians will not bind their own hands, but the ones of the following generation. Furthermore, an option based model is suggested: each Land can choose between either staying in the current system or opting out. Opting out leads to additional autonomy and Länder could e.g. receive the right to levy additional taxes on personal or corporate income taxes, but also obligations, as they cannot further rely on subsidies by the federal government in case of distress. The reform would allow an unfolding of the entire potential of federal structures. Länder could become laboratories for new institutions and innovative policy decisions. They would learn from each other and could provide services which are in line with the local requirements. The financial equalization scheme in Germany requires amendments latest in 2019, when the current additional subsidies for the eastern Länder will expire. Therefore, it is now the right time to reform the entire financial equalization scheme and allow for more flexibility and institutional symmetry.

V. Conclusion

Germany faces tremendous economic challenges in the upcoming years. High public debt levels on all levels of government, population ageing, financing gaps in the social security system – just to name a few – require further policy reforms. But the current federal system lacks clear responsibilities of decision makers and is characterized by a reform deadlock. The latest reforms of the federal system were steps in the right direction, but did not significantly reduce the potential to block reform attempts. The number of laws under concurrent legislation between the federal government and the Länder has been decreased, but is still relatively high. In addition, the enacted debt brake might assist in reducing debt levels on the federal and the Länder level, but it is unclear if the governments will follow the rule. We propose to further reform the federal system in allowing each Land to opt out of the current system of intertwined responsibilities in order to decide autonomously on e.g. provisions of public services in the respective Land. Therewith, the advantages of a federal system could be fully employed and the overall prosperity increased. The option based model should be installed rather soon, in order to separate the time of decision from the time of implementation, which eases the decision making process. In summary, further reform steps are urgently required to implement a federal system in Germany that is capable of reacting to upcoming challenges and promotes institutional as well as political innovations.

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